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Author SHA1 Message Date
jmiller 93365cdd95 docs(api): swagger annotations + response models for org-governance endpoints (#727, #738)
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Annotate the four previously undocumented org-governance API handlers
(tag_protection, push_policy, repo_defaults, email_domain) with
swagger:operation blocks, and register the swagger:response models the
branch_protection operations already referenced. Register the org
option DTOs in the parameterBodies hack so their definitions are
emitted.

Also fix pre-existing spec-generation blockers surfaced once the spec
became regenerable: a stray comment glued to the repoUpdateManifest
swagger block (broke YAML parsing), missing owner/repo path params on
the manifest operations, a Manifest response registration, and missing
definitions for EditAccessTokenOption, the IssueBulk* options, and the
Issue{Priority,Status,Type}Def types. Regenerated v1_json.tmpl and
v1_openapi3_json.tmpl; spec now validates cleanly against Swagger 2.0.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-05 01:58:08 -05:00
jmiller 81ea2fcb05 docs: README org-governance feature + CHANGELOG CI fixes (#727)
Add an Org Governance entry to the README key-features list (org-wide
branch/tag protection, push policy, repo defaults, email-domain
allowlist) and record the recent build/CI fixes (#734, #735, #736,
#737) under CHANGELOG [Unreleased].

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-05 01:28:36 -05:00
jmiller 2713c49aec Merge pull request 'fix(ci): pass TAG/REGISTRY_TOKEN into remote shell in dev deploy' (#737) from fix/deploy-dev-var-expansion into dev
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2026-07-05 06:15:01 +00:00
jmiller 3917bf6a29 fix(ci): pass TAG/REGISTRY_TOKEN into remote shell in dev deploy
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The dev deploy step used an unquoted SSH heredoc and referenced
runner-side values as \$TAG / \$REGISTRY_TOKEN, deferring their
expansion to the remote shell where those names are unset. The
Docker build tag collapsed to "mokogitea:" and every dev deploy
failed with `invalid tag ... invalid reference format` before any
migration or server boot could run.

Inject TAG and REGISTRY_TOKEN as an env prefix on the ssh command
(`TAG='...' REGISTRY_TOKEN='...' bash -s`) and switch to a quoted
heredoc so every $var expands in exactly one place: the remote host.
Also fixes HEALTH_FMT (was defined on the runner but referenced
remotely) and adds an explicit empty-TAG guard so a future
regression fails loudly instead of building an untagged image.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-05 01:08:32 -05:00
jmiller 89ed32e961 Merge pull request 'fix: repair unit-test compile + vet failures (partial integration cleanup)' (#736) from fix/vet-test-suite-blockers into dev
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2026-07-05 05:58:38 +00:00
jmiller 948e7bcd21 fix: partial repair of tests/integration compile errors (license test)
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api_license_keys_test.go used the outdated NewRequestWithBody signature
(passing []byte where io.Reader is now required) — wrapped the string bodies in
strings.NewReader. Note: tests/integration remains broadly pre-existing-broken
across multiple other fork-added files (api_packages_composer type mismatch,
etc.); those are a separate dedicated cleanup, not part of #727.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-05 00:27:30 -05:00
jmiller 5d797431f0 fix: repair pre-existing test-suite compile/vet failures
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`go vet ./...` (finally runnable with a local Go toolchain) surfaced three
pre-existing failures that prevented the whole test tree from compiling — which
is very likely why the "Project CI / Tests" job never went green. None relate to
#727; all pre-existing on main.

- modules/util/util_test.go: CryptoRandomInt/String/Bytes now return (value,
  error); the tests used single-value assignment. Updated to capture + assert
  the error (and dropped a now-redundant `var err error`).
- tests/integration/auth_oauth2_test.go: `newFakeOIDCServer` was declared twice
  with different signatures (redeclaration = build failure). Renamed the
  config-struct variant to `newFakeOIDCServerWithConfig` and updated its caller;
  the (sub, oid) variant keeps the original name for its caller.
- routers/web/repo/issue_comment.go: removed a redundant `&& statusIDStr != ""`
  duplicate condition (vet: redundant and).

Verified: `go vet ./modules/util` clean; full `go vet ./...` re-run.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-05 00:23:04 -05:00
jmiller 63f773aa56 Merge pull request 'fix: repair build (renamed org-visibility helper) + gofmt' (#735) from fix/compile-hasorgvisible-and-gofmt into dev
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2026-07-05 05:07:58 +00:00
jmiller 125eefc650 fix: repair build (renamed org-visibility helper) + gofmt
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Two pre-existing issues surfaced when the org-governance series was compiled
locally with a real Go toolchain (go1.26.3) for the first time:

- routers/api/v1/api.go:519 called organization.HasOrgOrUserVisible, which no
  longer exists — it was renamed to IsOwnerVisibleToDoer (models/organization/
  org.go:548, identical signature). This one missed call site meant the whole
  routers/api/v1 package (and therefore the server binary) failed `go build`.
  With the rename, `go build ./...` is clean.
- gofmt: api.go (a mis-indented commented-out /projects route block) and
  release.go (import sort: repo before updateserver) were gofmt-dirty. Fixed
  with gofmt -w on the two files this change already touches.

Not part of #727, but blocks building/releasing the fork; found while validating
the dev -> main promotion (#733).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-05 00:06:48 -05:00
jmiller d07cfd412b Merge pull request 'chore: remove stray package-lock.json accidentally committed to dev' (#734) from chore/remove-stray-package-lock into dev
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2026-07-05 04:40:58 +00:00
jmiller bd821e2d44 chore: remove stray package-lock.json accidentally committed to dev
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package-lock.json (13.9k lines of generated npm lockfile) was swept into the
org push-policy commit (3aac1b456c, #730) by a `git add -A` during a gofmt-fix
restack. It is not tracked on main and is not part of the org-governance work.
Removing it so the dev -> main promotion (#733) doesn't introduce it.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-04 23:40:16 -05:00
jmiller aeed197ea5 Merge pull request 'feat(org): org-level email domain policy for members (#727)' (#732) from feat/org-email-domain into dev
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2026-07-05 04:34:14 +00:00
jmiller 45fc346d52 Merge pull request 'feat(org): org-level repository defaults applied on repo create/transfer (#727)' (#731) from feat/org-repo-defaults into dev
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2026-07-05 04:33:25 +00:00
jmiller 02071a23d6 Merge pull request 'feat(org): org-level push policy enforced in the pre-receive hook (#727)' (#730) from feat/org-push-policy into dev
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2026-07-05 04:33:09 +00:00
jmiller 3a5c6a37cf Merge pull request 'feat(org): org-level tag protection, layered with per-repo protected tags (#727)' (#729) from feat/org-tag-protection into dev
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2026-07-05 04:32:53 +00:00
jmiller 37fb3703c7 Merge pull request 'fix(org): layer org-level branch protection with repo rules — most-restrictive wins (#727)' (#728) from fix/727-materialize-org-branch-protection into dev
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2026-07-05 04:32:24 +00:00
jmiller 6a3db171c1 feat(org): org-level email domain policy for members (#727)
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Restricts which email domains an organization's members may have. When a policy
is configured, a user can only be added to the org (via any team) if their
primary email matches one of the allowed domain globs.

Enforced at the single membership choke point services/org.AddTeamMember, which
every add path (API, web, group-sync) funnels through — so one check covers them
all. On violation it returns a typed ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed; the API team-add
handler maps it to 422.

- models/git/org_email_domain.go: OrgEmailDomainPolicy model + EmailAllowed
  (domain glob match) + OrgEmailDomainAllowed + typed error + CRUD. Migration 366.
- API: GET/PATCH/DELETE /orgs/{org}/email_domain_policy.
- Enforcement in services/org/team.go; 422 mapping in routers/api/v1/org/team.go.

An empty policy imposes no restriction. This is the one bounded piece of the
"access/security" tier; org 2FA-required and IP allowlists were deliberately NOT
built here — they are cross-cutting enforcement (auth gating / request
middleware) that needs a compiler + tests, not a blind stacked PR.

Stacked on #731/#730/#729/#728 for migration ordering (this = 366). Swagger
omitted.

Note: no Go toolchain available locally, so not compiled/gofmt'd/tested here.
Hand-verified: gofmt (tabs, no blank-in-block), imports (git_model added to the
api team handler, gci order), typed-error detection, migration contiguous (366).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-04 23:23:11 -05:00
jmiller d3134b1c53 feat(org): org-level repository defaults applied on repo create/transfer (#727)
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Adds a single per-org repository-defaults config, applied to a repo when it is
created in or transferred into the org via a notifier (services/org):

- ForcePrivate — force new/transferred repos private (Repository.IsPrivate).
- PR defaults (when ApplyPRDefaults) — allowed merge styles, default merge
  style, and auto-delete-branch-after-merge, written to the repo's pull-requests
  unit config via repo_service.UpdateRepositoryUnits.

Best-effort: the notifier logs and swallows errors, so a defaults bug can never
break repository creation or transfer.

- models/git/org_repo_defaults.go: OrgRepoDefaults model + CRUD + migration 365.
- API: GET/PATCH/DELETE /orgs/{org}/repo_defaults.
- services/org/notifier.go: CreateRepository/TransferRepository -> apply defaults;
  registered from routers/init.go (org_service.Init()).

Stacked on #730/#729/#728 for migration ordering (this = 365). Swagger omitted.

Note: no Go toolchain available locally, so not compiled/gofmt'd/tested here.
Hand-verified: gofmt (tabs, no blank-in-block, struct/DTO alignment), imports
used, no Init() collision in services/org, migration contiguous (365), notifier
signatures match the Notifier interface.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-04 23:22:38 -05:00
jmiller 3aac1b456c feat(org): org-level push policy enforced in the pre-receive hook (#727)
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Adds a single per-org push policy that cascades to every repo of the org and is
enforced in the pre-receive hook:

- Branch/tag name conventions (glob) — a pushed ref name must match. Fail-closed.
- Mandatory secret-scanning block-on-push — org can force secret blocking that a
  repo cannot disable (overrides the per-repo scanner config in the orchestrator).
- Max pushed-file size — rejects a tip tree containing a blob over the limit.
- Blocked file-path patterns — rejects pushes changing matching paths (reuses
  pull_service.CheckFileProtection).

The two content checks (blocked paths, max size) FAIL OPEN on any error so a
policy/parsing bug can never wedge all pushes; naming is fail-closed.

- models/git/org_push_policy.go: OrgPushPolicy model + CRUD + matchers +
  GetOrgPushPolicyForRepo. Migration 364.
- API: GET/PATCH/DELETE /orgs/{org}/push_policy (routers/api/v1/org/push_policy.go,
  DTOs in modules/structs/org_push_policy.go, wired in api.go).
- Enforcement: routers/private/hook_pre_receive.go (branch: naming + blocked paths
  + max size; tag: naming) and services/security/orchestrator.go (secret mandate).

Deferred: a repo-facing read-only view of the org push policy (it is an org-wide
config, not per-repo overlay rules; readable via the API for now).

Stacked on #729/#728 for migration ordering (this = 364). Swagger annotations
omitted (can't regenerate without the toolchain).

Note: no Go toolchain available locally, so not compiled/gofmt'd/tested here.
Hand-verified: gofmt (tabs, no blank-in-block), escape sequences in the ls-tree
parser, imports used, migration contiguous (364), fail-open on content checks.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-04 23:20:39 -05:00
jmiller b31336d1fe feat(org): org-level tag protection, layered with per-repo protected tags (#727)
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Adds org-level tag protection as a parallel to org-level branch protection.
An org tag rule is {NamePattern, AllowlistTeamIDs}; it cascades to every repo
in the org and layers on top of the repo's own protected tags — a tag is
controllable (push/delete) only if allowed at BOTH levels (fail-closed).

- models/git/org_protected_tag.go: OrgProtectedTag model + CRUD +
  ToProtectedTag() (reuses the ProtectedTag matcher/allowlist logic) +
  IsUserAllowedToControlTagInRepo() which ANDs the repo decision with the org
  decision. Migration 363.
- API: /orgs/{org}/tag_protections CRUD (routers/api/v1/org/tag_protection.go,
  DTOs in modules/structs/org_tag.go, wired in api.go).
- Enforcement: the git push/delete hook (hook_pre_receive.go) and the two
  release paths (release.go create/delete) now call the layered check, so no
  per-site tag logic changes beyond swapping the helper.
- View: the repo Tag settings page lists inherited org tag rules read-only.

Stacked on #728 (branch-protection PR) for migration ordering — merge #728
first. Swagger annotations omitted (can't regenerate the swagger JSON without
the toolchain); routes still register.

Note: no Go toolchain available locally, so not compiled/gofmt'd/tested here.
Hand-verified: gofmt (tabs, no blank-in-block, struct alignment), template
nesting balances, all .Rule fields exist on OrgProtectedTag, all locale keys
defined, JSON valid, migration contiguous (363).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-04 21:37:18 -05:00
jmiller 4b68853f08 feat(org): add branch-deletion protection + expandable inherited-rule view (#727)
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Two related additions:

1. Branch deletion as an org-level ability. OrgProtectedBranch gained
   CanDelete / EnableDeleteAllowlist / DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs (migration 362),
   ToProtectedBranch maps them, and the API (create/edit/response DTOs +
   handlers) exposes enable_delete / enable_delete_allowlist /
   delete_allowlist_teams. The layering merge already combined delete fields, so
   org delete-protection now enforces once ToProtectedBranch populates them.

2. The repo Branch Protection view now renders each inherited org rule as an
   expandable detail (direct push, force-push, branch deletion, merge, required
   approvals, status checks, protected files) with team names resolved, instead
   of three headline badges. Still read-only.

Note: no Go toolchain available locally, so not compiled/gofmt'd/tested here.
Verified by hand: struct-field gofmt alignment, template block nesting balances,
every .Rule field exists on OrgProtectedBranch, and all locale keys referenced
in the template are defined.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-04 21:16:24 -05:00
jmiller 86bd8a2cad feat(org): show inherited org branch-protection rules in repo settings (#727)
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The org "floor" is enforced implicitly at the choke point, so a repo admin
couldn't see which org-level rules apply to their repo. Surface them in the
repo's Branch Protection settings page (read-only), the way GitHub shows
organization rulesets in a repository.

- ProtectedBranchRules handler: when the owner is an org, load
  FindOrgProtectedBranchRules and expose them as OrgProtectedBranches.
- branches.tmpl: new read-only "Organization Branch Protection" section listing
  each org rule with an "Organization" badge, a lock/read-only marker, and
  compact indicators (required approvals, signed commits, status checks). No
  edit/delete controls — these are managed at the org level.
- en-US locale strings.

Note: no Go toolchain available locally, so not compiled/gofmt'd/tested here.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-04 20:25:24 -05:00
jmiller 24b3516c1d fix(org): layer org-level branch protection with repo rules, most-restrictive wins (#727)
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Org-level branch protection was already consulted at the single enforcement
choke point `GetFirstMatchProtectedBranchRule`, but only as a FALLBACK: if any
repo-level rule matched the branch, the org rule was ignored entirely. That let
a repo define a looser rule for a pattern and effectively opt out of the org's
protection.

Make the choke point LAYER the two rules instead: when both an org rule and a
repo rule match a branch, return their most-restrictive (fail-closed)
combination, so the org rule is a mandatory floor a repo can only tighten.

- models/git/protected_branch_merge.go: mergeMostRestrictive + helpers. Allow
  flags AND'd; gate/require/block flags OR'd; RequiredApprovals max'd; required
  sets (status contexts, protected files) unioned; allow sets (whitelists,
  unprotected files) intersected. A disabled allowlist means "everyone", so it
  only constrains when enabled.
- models/git/protected_branch_list.go: GetFirstMatchProtectedBranchRule now
  fetches both the repo rule and the org rule and merges when both match;
  returns whichever exists when only one matches. Org lookup factored into
  getFirstMatchOrgProtectedBranchRule.

Supersedes the materialization approach previously proposed for this issue —
the org fallback already existed, so only this one function needed to change.

Fail-closed by design: any merge edge errs toward MORE protection (over-restrict)
rather than less, so it cannot open a hole.

Note: no Go toolchain available locally, so not compiled/gofmt'd/tested here —
relying on CI to validate build, formatting, and tests.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT
2026-07-04 19:42:08 -05:00
jmiller 377dd019be chore: sync auto-release.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 23:27:10 +00:00
jmiller 5ffed39449 Merge pull request 'fix: render org teams list and make issue type editable (#720, #721)' (#726) from fix/team-list-and-issue-type-editable into main
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2026-07-04 21:31:56 +00:00
jmiller 0cc569aef6 fix: render org teams list and make issue type editable (#720, #721)
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#720: org Teams page wrote ctx.Data["OrgListTeams"] but the template iterates .Teams, so no teams rendered. Use the canonical Teams key (matches org/home.go). #721: issue type sidebar gated editing on a FieldEditFlags data key that no handler sets (always nil -> always read-only). Use HasIssuesOrPullsWritePermission like the priority field; the /custom-type endpoint is already protected by reqRepoIssuesOrPullsWriter.
2026-07-04 16:27:32 -05:00
jmiller 4ed45a5916 chore: sync pr-check.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 20:27:57 +00:00
jmiller ea87b3db97 chore: sync pr-check.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 20:22:43 +00:00
jmiller d77b82a8af chore: sync ci-generic.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 20:22:34 +00:00
jmiller 22b0b14ea8 chore: sync pr-check.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:38:21 +00:00
jmiller 1256f57d40 chore: sync ci-generic.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:38:11 +00:00
jmiller 05763eb661 chore: sync branch-cleanup.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:37:58 +00:00
jmiller 0c45a2fda3 chore: sync sync-on-merge.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:05:30 +00:00
jmiller 8680fd1cab chore: sync pre-release.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:05:10 +00:00
jmiller adf0e923df chore: sync pr-check.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:04:47 +00:00
jmiller 296df7792a chore: sync notify.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:04:37 +00:00
jmiller 51332a587d chore: sync cleanup.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:04:27 +00:00
jmiller 8fc2700c16 chore: sync ci-generic.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:04:20 +00:00
jmiller 844b4b6e81 chore: sync auto-release.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-07-04 19:04:10 +00:00
jmiller cb9516b79b Merge pull request 'fix: support radio inputs in admin system config form' (#724) from fix/admin-config-radio into main
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2026-07-04 19:01:33 +00:00
jmiller aea4370845 ci: no-op PR RC Release when updates.xml is absent
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The RC release workflow drives a Joomla-style updates.xml update stream. On a generic repo with no updates.xml, the Determine RC version step ran sed on a missing file and aborted under set -e (exit 2). Detect updates.xml presence and gate the update-stream steps (edit/create-release/commit) on it so the job succeeds and no-ops when there is nothing to package.
2026-07-04 13:53:15 -05:00
jmiller fc234bc911 fix: remove dangling mcp-mokogitea-api submodule gitlink
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The tree carried a gitlink at mcp-mokogitea-api (mode 160000) with no .gitmodules entry, so git submodule update --init --recursive failed with exit 128 at checkout, breaking every PR build/release job. mcp-mokogitea-api is a separate repo, not a submodule; remove the gitlink from the index (keeping the local working-tree clone) and gitignore the path so it can't be re-added.
2026-07-04 13:46:35 -05:00
jmiller b252e9569f ci: allow fix/patch branches to target main and guard missing manifest
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Branch policy in pr-check.yml only allowed fix/* and patch/* to target dev/rc, blocking fix/* PRs to main despite the documented policy. Allow fix/* -> main and patch/* -> main. Also guard the Detect platform step for a missing .mokogitea/manifest.xml (removed in favor of the metadata API) so it no longer aborts the Validate PR job under set -e.
2026-07-04 13:36:47 -05:00
jmiller efb0433412 fix: preserve server-rendered radio default when config value is empty
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LandingPageType.Mode defaults to "" (Go zero value), and the template renders the home radio as checked for an empty Mode. The initial radio fill would evaluate home.checked = ("home" === "") = false, unchecking the default on a fresh install. Skip assignment when the config value is empty so the server-rendered selection is preserved. Adds a test for the empty-value case.
2026-07-04 13:15:10 -05:00
jmiller 982e45a56e fix: support radio inputs in admin system config form
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The system config form JS (config.ts) only mapped checkbox, text, textarea, and datetime-local elements. The fork landing_page.tmpl uses radio inputs for the Mode field, so fillFromSystemConfig() hit unsupportedElement() and threw, aborting all JS init on the admin settings page.

Add radio handling in both directions: fill checks the option whose value matches the config value; collect returns the checked option's value and skips/nulls unchecked radios so a group resolves to exactly one value. Adds a radio-group test case.
2026-07-04 01:20:43 -05:00
jmiller 343cba690e Update .mokogitea/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.md
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2026-07-01 05:18:57 +00:00
jmiller 78328146e5 Merge pull request 'fix: remove orphaned deploy-manual workflow' (#718) from fix/remove-deploy-manual into main
fix: remove orphaned deploy-manual workflow [skip ci]
2026-06-30 18:33:36 +00:00
jmiller 84c6a94333 fix: remove orphaned deploy-manual workflow [skip ci] 2026-06-30 18:07:04 +00:00
jmiller 11b2195bdf chore: sync auto-release.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-06-28 20:07:10 +00:00
jmiller f8a91ed34e release: code security scanner (#552)
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Code security scanner with 22 OWASP pattern detection rules across 7 CWE categories (SQL injection, XSS, command injection, path traversal, insecure deserialization, hardcoded credentials, weak cryptography). Language-filtered scanning for Go, PHP, Python, JS/TS, Java, C#, Ruby.
2026-06-28 19:00:33 +00:00
jmiller 87f92fe1ab Merge pull request 'feat: code security scanner with OWASP pattern detection (#552)' (#716) from feature/code-scanner into dev
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2026-06-28 16:08:21 +00:00
jmiller 66aea89b40 docs: update README to reflect code security scanner
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Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 08:20:23 -05:00
jmiller 7c75133ef1 feat: code security scanner with OWASP pattern detection (#552)
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Implements the code analysis scanner module that detects insecure
patterns across Go, PHP, Python, JavaScript, and TypeScript:

- SQL injection (CWE-89): string concat in queries across 4 languages
- XSS (CWE-79): innerHTML, document.write, unescaped output, dangerouslySetInnerHTML
- Command injection (CWE-78): exec with variables, shell=True, os.system
- Path traversal (CWE-22): unsanitized path joins, file open with user input
- Insecure deserialization (CWE-502): unserialize(), yaml.load()
- Hardcoded credentials (CWE-798): password assignments in source
- Weak cryptography (CWE-327): MD5/SHA-1 usage

22 rules total, language-filtered by file extension. Wired into the
existing scanner orchestrator via the CodeScanner config toggle.
API updated to expose code_scanner in GET/PATCH security config.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 08:15:34 -05:00
jmiller 108b19dcc8 chore: sync pr-check.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-06-28 11:12:11 +00:00
jmiller 37a62b5ab7 Merge pull request 'fix: pr-check platform detection queries metadata API' (#715) from fix/pr-check-platform-detection into main
Deploy MokoGitea / deploy (push) Failing after 5m4s
2026-06-28 11:10:36 +00:00
jmiller 35ebbef489 docs: update README with new features from latest release
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Add cascade merge, secret scanning, default org teams, branch
protection delete allowlist to Key Features list.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 06:02:28 -05:00
jmiller 193c705c05 fix: branch policy allows fix/patch branches to target main
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The pr-check branch policy only allowed fix/* -> dev, but the actual
org policy is fix/patch branches PR to main directly. Also updated
the summary text to list all allowed merge paths correctly.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 06:00:56 -05:00
jmiller fa845164bb fix: pr-check platform detection queries metadata API instead of removed manifest.xml
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The manifest.xml file no longer exists — platform is stored in the
MokoGitea metadata API. The old sed command failed with exit 2 under
bash -e, cascading failure to all subsequent validate steps.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 05:59:14 -05:00
jmiller fefdf1a1ec release: cascade merge, status presets, default teams, secret scanning
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2026-06-28 09:41:22 +00:00
jmiller 23bb025700 merge: incorporate main into dev for release PR #714
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Resolve CHANGELOG conflict — deduplicate feature entries.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 04:35:52 -05:00
jmiller 7913a05285 feat: cascade merge — auto-create PRs to downstream branches after merge (#460)
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2026-06-28 08:52:04 +00:00
jmiller 98301bc92b merge: incorporate latest dev (post status-presets merge) into cascade-merge
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Resolve CHANGELOG conflict, restore issue_metadata.go from dev.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 03:51:37 -05:00
jmiller c618ec9f87 feat: issue status presets and cross-org migration (#507)
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2026-06-28 08:49:23 +00:00
jmiller 5a25068d81 merge: incorporate dev changes into feature/cascade-merge
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Resolve CHANGELOG.md and api.go conflicts — keep both cascade_rules
and security route groups.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 03:48:52 -05:00
jmiller 57894e25fd merge: incorporate dev changes into feature/status-presets
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Resolve CHANGELOG.md conflict — keep both status presets and
default teams entries.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 03:47:37 -05:00
jmiller 2857a1f6a1 feat: security scanning API + pre-receive hook blocking (#692)
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2026-06-28 08:45:45 +00:00
jmiller b9c04e51b4 feat(orgs): auto-create default teams on org creation (#513)
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2026-06-28 08:45:25 +00:00
jmiller 0b44e92369 fix: cherry-pick upstream security fixes from v1.26.3 and v1.26.4
Deploy MokoGitea / deploy (push) Failing after 8m20s
2026-06-28 08:45:03 +00:00
jmiller cf25eef480 fix: distinguish unknown preset from DB errors in ApplyIssueStatusPreset
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db.ErrNotExist returns 404, other errors return 500 instead of
masking all errors as 404.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 03:34:07 -05:00
jmiller 5da6a40f10 fix: resolve merge conflict marker and fix import paths in cherry-picked tests
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- Remove residual <<<<<<< HEAD marker from api_org_test.go
- Convert code.gitea.io/gitea to mokoconsulting paths in 5 new test files:
  cmd/serv_test.go, models/auth/twofactor_test.go,
  modules/git/commit_info_nogogit_test.go,
  routers/private/hook_pre_receive_test.go,
  services/actions/notifier_helper_test.go
- Add changelog entries for new features (#460, #507, #513)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 03:31:44 -05:00
jmiller 4e5aa5f3ce fix: revert accidental secret scanning code from security fix branch
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The pre-receive hook had security scanning code from the wrong feature
branch (feature/secret-scanning-clean). Restoring to the correct state
with only upstream security cherry-picks.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:37:49 -05:00
jmiller 9a4aa0fafb fix: log error when pre-receive secret scan cannot read commit
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Previously, GetCommit failures were silently swallowed, allowing
pushes to proceed without scanning. Now logs the error so admins
can diagnose issues while still allowing the push.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:35:50 -05:00
jmiller e947600ea7 fix: log error when pre-receive secret scan cannot read commit
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Previously, GetCommit failures were silently swallowed, allowing
pushes to proceed without scanning. Now logs the error so admins
can diagnose issues while still allowing the push.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:35:11 -05:00
jmiller b0bbaab621 docs: add security section to changelog for upstream v1.26.3/v1.26.4 fixes
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:35:07 -05:00
jmiller 84df5d7932 feat: register security scanning API routes in router
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Adds /repos/{owner}/{repo}/security/* route group for security
alert management, scanning, and configuration endpoints.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:33:29 -05:00
jmiller 7b334f94c0 feat: security scanning API endpoints + pre-receive hook blocking (#692)
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Add REST API for security alerts (list, get, update status, trigger scan)
and scanner config (get, update). Wire block_on_push into the pre-receive
hook so pushes containing detected secrets are rejected with details.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:30:04 -05:00
jmiller 805c566615 fix: remove leaked security scanning routes from cascade-merge branch
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The security route group belongs to feature/secret-scanning (#692) and
was accidentally committed here during parallel agent work.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:29:27 -05:00
jmiller f53bc895ba fix: prevent IDOR in CopyStatusesFromOrg endpoint
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Add source org visibility + membership check before copying statuses.
Non-public source orgs now require the doer to be a member or site admin,
preventing unauthorized enumeration of private org statuses.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:26:23 -05:00
Giteabot 2ff0e4aa21 fix: walk git log context error handling (#38182) (#38185)
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Backport #38182

Fix #38177

Make WalkGitLog can handle EOF and context errors correctly, and don't
export these private functions & methods & structs.

Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
2026-06-28 02:24:02 -05:00
bircni c0f89a373d fix(auth): do not auto-reactivate disabled users on OAuth2 callback (#38009) (#38183)
Backport #38009

The OAuth2 sign-in callback unconditionally set IsActive=true on the
local user row whenever the IdP authenticated them, silently undoing an
administrator's "Disable Account" action and granting the user a fresh
session in the same response. Treat the local IsActive flag as an
authoritative admin override: inactive users get a session and are
routed through the existing activate / prohibit-login pages by
verifyAuthWithOptions, matching the local-credentials sign-in path.

Adds an integration regression test that disables a linked local user
and asserts the row stays IsActive=false after a full OIDC callback.

Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
2026-06-28 02:24:00 -05:00
Giteabot 0dc858c15c fix(hostmacher): patch incorrect private list (#38170) (#38173)
Backport #38170 by @TheFox0x7

regression from #38039

Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
2026-06-28 02:23:35 -05:00
bircni 94590bc834 fix: allow git clone of private repos with anonymous code access (#38074) (#38146)
Backport #38074

Fixes #38062.

Private repositories with a code unit configured for **anonymous read
access** (Settings → Public Access → Code: anonymous view) could not be
cloned without credentials. The git HTTP auth gate (`httpBase`) only
bypassed authentication for non-private repos, ignoring the per-unit
anonymous access setting entirely.

- Check anonymous permissions via
`access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repo, nil)` + `CanAccess`
before requiring auth on pull operations, so the per-unit
`AnonymousAccessMode` is respected through the existing permission model
- This also correctly handles `setting.Repository.ForcePrivate` (which
the naive direct-field check would have missed)
- Push (receive-pack) and `RequireSignInViewStrict` continue to require
credentials as before

Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
2026-06-28 02:23:33 -05:00
bircni cbf34fb987 fix: Various security fixes (#38103) (#38151)
Backport #38103

- Enforce org visibility on organization label read endpoints (private
org labels no longer leak to non-members).
- Block fork sync (`merge-upstream`) when the base repo is no longer
readable (stops pulling commits after a parent goes private).
- Remove `REVERSE_PROXY_LIMIT` / `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` from
the Docker `app.ini` templates (the `= *` default allowed
`X-WEBAUTH-USER` impersonation; reverse-proxy auth is now opt-in and
admin-configured).
- Enforce single-use TOTP passcodes across web login, password-reset,
and Basic-Auth `X-Gitea-OTP` (fixes a TOCTOU race and a stateless
replay).
- Re-check branch write permission for every ref in a push (the
pre-receive hook cached the first ref's result, letting a per-branch
maintainer-edit grant escalate to full repo write).

---------

Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
2026-06-28 02:22:18 -05:00
Lunny Xiao 26ad4fd03f fix(auth): ignore stale OIDC external login links to organizations (#37875) (#38141)
Backport #37875

This fixes an OIDC sign-in edge case where a stale `external_login_user`
record can still point to an organization or a deleted user.

In that situation, Gitea may keep resolving the external login to the
wrong account during sign-in. For affected instances, this matches the
behavior reported in #36439 and #37812, where a user signing in with
OIDC/Entra ID could appear as an organization, or hit a 404 after that
organization was removed.

- validate the user resolved from `external_login_user` during
OAuth2/OIDC login
- ignore stale links when the linked user no longer exists
- ignore stale links when the linked user is not an individual user
- remove the stale external login row so the sign-in flow can relink the
external account to the correct user

- Fixes #37812
- Related to #36439

Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.8) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
2026-06-28 02:20:21 -05:00
bircni bc578b7eba fix: Various sec fixes (#38108) (#38147)
Backport #38108

- Enforce repository token scope on RSS/Atom feed endpoints so a PAT
without repo scope can no longer read private repo commit data.
- Block HTTP redirects during repository migration clones to prevent
SSRF reaching internal addresses via an attacker-controlled redirect.
- Redact the notification subject after repo access is revoked so
private issue/PR metadata is no longer leaked through the notification
API.

Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
2026-06-28 02:18:12 -05:00
Giteabot 186ac68f03 fix: bound debian ParseControlFile to a single control stanza (#38044) (#38055)
Backport #38044 by @metsw24-max

**Packages-index stanza injection via Debian control file**

A `.deb` whose `control` file appends extra paragraphs after a blank
line was still accepted, and `ParseControlFile` stored the whole
multi-stanza blob in `p.Control`. That blob is re-emitted verbatim into
the generated `Packages` index, so the embedded blank line splits it
into separate stanzas and an uploader can smuggle a package entry with
an attacker-chosen `Filename` into the shared index. A binary control
file only holds one stanza, so parsing now stops at the blank line that
terminates it; well-formed packages are unaffected and the new subtest
covers the trailing-stanza case.

Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: metsw24-max <metsw24@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
2026-06-28 02:17:28 -05:00
Giteabot fedce235d5 fix(hostmatcher): block reserved IP ranges from external/private filters (#38039) (#38059) 2026-06-28 02:17:27 -05:00
Giteabot d3c6998d3e fix(lfs): require Code-unit access for cross-repo LFS object reuse (#38006) (#38050) 2026-06-28 02:17:27 -05:00
Giteabot e9648f367e fix(actions)!: require merged PR to bypass fork PR approval gate (#38010) (#38041)
Backport #38010 by @bircni

`ifNeedApproval` in `services/actions/notifier_helper.go` decided
whether a
fork PR's workflow run had to wait for maintainer approval. The bypass
clause
counted any prior `approved_by > 0` run for `(repo_id,
trigger_user_id)`, so
the very first Approve-and-run click on a contributor's fork PR
permanently
trusted that user for every future fork PR in the same repository —
including
PRs whose only change is the workflow YAML itself.

Approving a workflow *run* is not the same as merging *code*. This
change
aligns the gate with GitHub Actions' first-time-contributor model: trust
is
granted only after the user has had a pull request merged in the repo.

## Behavior change

- **Before**: one approval = permanent trust for that user in that repo.
- **After**: every fork PR is gated until the contributor has at least
one
  merged PR in the repo.

Existing already-approved runs and merged PRs continue to work; only the
trust criterion for *future* fork PRs changes. Maintainers who rely on
the
implicit "approve once" trust will see the approval banner reappear
until
they merge a PR from that contributor.

---------

Signed-off-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
2026-06-28 02:17:26 -05:00
Giteabot 725acbe112 fix: bound CODEOWNERS regex match time (#38011) (#38025)
Backport #38011 by @bircni

User-supplied CODEOWNERS patterns were compiled without a match timeout,
so a crafted pattern (e.g. (a+)+) against a crafted file path could
backtrack for tens of seconds inside the PR creation transaction and
exhaust the database connection pool. Set MatchTimeout on each compiled
rule; the caller already treats match errors as non-matches.

Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
2026-06-28 02:17:26 -05:00
Giteabot 884e568ea2 fix(lfs): reject unknown SSH LFS sub-verbs to prevent auth bypass (#38008) (#38015) 2026-06-28 02:17:25 -05:00
jmiller e99658ddc0 feat(orgs): auto-create default teams on org creation (#513)
Universal: PR Check / Branch Policy (pull_request) Successful in 2s
PR RC Release / Build RC Release (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Universal: PR Check / Validate PR (pull_request) Failing after 14s
Universal: Auto Version Bump / Version Bump (push) Successful in 20s
Generic: Project CI / Lint & Validate (pull_request) Successful in 39s
Universal: PR Check / Secret Scan (pull_request) Successful in 1m57s
Generic: Project CI / Tests (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Universal: PR Check / Build RC Package (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Universal: PR Check / Report Issues (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Branch Cleanup / Delete merged branch (pull_request) Successful in 2s
RC Revert / Rename rc/ back to dev/ (pull_request) Has been skipped
New organizations now get three default teams in addition to Owners:
- Developers (write: code, issues, PRs, wiki, projects; read: releases)
- Reviewers (read: code, issues, PRs, releases, wiki)
- CI/CD (write: actions, packages, releases; read: code)

Teams are defined in DefaultOrgTeams and created inside the same
transaction as the org, so creation is atomic.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:08:47 -05:00
jmiller f627219ca8 feat: cascade merge — auto-create PRs to downstream branches after merge (#460)
Universal: Auto Version Bump / Version Bump (push) Successful in 19s
Universal: PR Check / Branch Policy (pull_request) Successful in 2s
PR RC Release / Build RC Release (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Universal: PR Check / Validate PR (pull_request) Failing after 9s
Generic: Project CI / Lint & Validate (pull_request) Successful in 30s
Universal: PR Check / Secret Scan (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
Generic: Project CI / Tests (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Universal: PR Check / Build RC Package (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Universal: PR Check / Report Issues (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Adds configurable cascade rules per repo. When a PR merges into a
source branch, the system auto-creates PRs to each configured target
branch. Skips if a matching PR already exists.

- Model: CascadeMergeRule (repo_id, source, target, enabled, auto_merge)
- Migration v362 creates cascade_merge_rule table
- Notifier hooks into MergePullRequest/AutoMergePullRequest events
- API: CRUD at /repos/{owner}/{repo}/cascade_rules (admin only)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:06:42 -05:00
jmiller df9305758f feat: add issue status presets and cross-org migration (#507)
Universal: PR Check / Branch Policy (pull_request) Successful in 2s
PR RC Release / Build RC Release (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Universal: PR Check / Validate PR (pull_request) Failing after 9s
Universal: Auto Version Bump / Version Bump (push) Successful in 14s
Generic: Project CI / Lint & Validate (pull_request) Successful in 46s
Universal: PR Check / Secret Scan (pull_request) Successful in 1m16s
Generic: Project CI / Tests (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Universal: PR Check / Build RC Package (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Universal: PR Check / Report Issues (pull_request) Has been cancelled
4 built-in presets: default, software-development, support-tickets,
bug-tracking. API endpoints to list presets, apply to org, and copy
statuses between orgs. Web UI dropdown on org settings page.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd
2026-06-28 02:05:14 -05:00
jmiller ebdf59d64f chore: sync cascade-dev.yml from Template-Generic [skip ci] 2026-06-28 01:21:39 +00:00
jmiller 8ffd2ffe18 Merge pull request 'release: branch protection delete allowlist (#696)' (#707) from dev into main
Deploy MokoGitea / deploy (push) Failing after 3m49s
2026-06-28 01:20:26 +00:00
119 changed files with 9505 additions and 521 deletions
+3
View File
@@ -120,3 +120,6 @@ prime/
# A Makefile for custom make targets
Makefile.local
# Local clone of the MCP server (separate repo, not a submodule of this project)
/mcp-mokogitea-api/
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---
name: Feature Request
about: Suggest a new feature or enhancement
title: '[FEATURE] '
title: '(feat) '
labels: 'enhancement'
assignees: ''
+51 -13
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
# INGROUP: mokocli.Release
# REPO: https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/mokoconsulting-tech/mokocli
# PATH: /templates/workflows/universal/auto-release.yml.template
# VERSION: 05.00.00
# VERSION: 05.01.00
# BRIEF: Universal build & release detects platform from manifest.xml
#
# +=======================================================================+
@@ -64,10 +64,14 @@ jobs:
promote-rc:
name: Promote to RC
runs-on: release
# Skip on template repos (Template-*) — they scaffold other repos and do not release.
if: >-
(github.event.action == 'opened' && github.event.pull_request.merged != true) ||
(github.event.action == 'synchronize' && github.event.pull_request.merged != true) ||
(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.action == 'promote-rc')
!startsWith(github.event.repository.name, 'Template-') &&
(
(github.event.action == 'opened' && github.event.pull_request.merged != true) ||
(github.event.action == 'synchronize' && github.event.pull_request.merged != true) ||
(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.action == 'promote-rc')
)
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
@@ -75,6 +79,7 @@ jobs:
with:
token: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}
fetch-depth: 1
submodules: recursive
- name: Setup mokocli tools
env:
@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ jobs:
sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq php-cli php-mbstring php-xml php-zip php-curl composer > /dev/null 2>&1
fi
rm -rf /tmp/mokocli
CLONE_URL=https://x-access-token:${MOKO_CLONE_TOKEN}@${MOKO_CLONE_HOST}/mokocli.git
CLONE_URL=https://x-access-token:${MOKO_CLONE_TOKEN}@${MOKO_CLONE_HOST}/MokoCLI.git
git clone --depth 1 --branch main --quiet $CLONE_URL /tmp/mokocli
cd /tmp/mokocli
composer install --no-dev --no-interaction --quiet
@@ -99,11 +104,39 @@ jobs:
- name: Rename branch to rc
run: |
php ${MOKO_CLI}/branch_rename.php \
--from "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || 'dev' }}" --to rc \
--token "${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}" \
--api-base "${MOKOGITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_ORG}/${GITEA_REPO}" \
--pr "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
API_BASE="${MOKOGITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITEA_ORG}/${GITEA_REPO}"
AUTH="Authorization: token ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}"
FROM="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || 'dev' }}"
PR="${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
# Resolve the source branch HEAD commit.
SRC_JSON=$(curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "${API_BASE}/branches/${FROM}") \
|| { echo "::error::Source branch ${FROM} not found"; exit 1; }
SRC_SHA=$(printf '%s' "$SRC_JSON" | python3 -c "import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['commit']['id'])" 2>/dev/null || true)
[ -n "$SRC_SHA" ] || { echo "::error::Could not resolve HEAD of ${FROM}"; exit 1; }
# Point rc at the source commit. If rc already exists (a protected branch that
# cannot be deleted), force-update its ref in place instead of delete+recreate:
# deleting a protected branch fails, which then makes the recreate return HTTP 409.
if curl -sf -o /dev/null -H "$AUTH" "${API_BASE}/branches/rc"; then
echo "rc exists - force-updating to ${FROM} (${SRC_SHA})"
curl -sf -X PATCH -H "$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${API_BASE}/git/refs/heads/rc" -d "{\"sha\":\"${SRC_SHA}\",\"force\":true}" \
|| { echo "::error::Failed to force-update rc (CI token needs force-push on the protected rc branch)"; exit 1; }
else
echo "Creating rc from ${FROM}"
curl -sf -X POST -H "$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${API_BASE}/branches" -d "{\"new_branch_name\":\"rc\",\"old_branch_name\":\"${FROM}\"}" \
|| { echo "::error::Failed to create rc from ${FROM}"; exit 1; }
fi
# Repoint the PR at rc, then delete the old source branch (non-fatal).
if [ -n "$PR" ]; then
curl -s -X PATCH -H "$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${API_BASE}/pulls/${PR}" -d '{"head":"rc"}' >/dev/null || true
fi
curl -s -X DELETE -H "$AUTH" "${API_BASE}/branches/${FROM}" >/dev/null || true
echo "Renamed ${FROM} -> rc"
- name: Checkout rc and configure git
run: |
@@ -163,9 +196,13 @@ jobs:
release:
name: Build & Release Pipeline
runs-on: release
# Skip on template repos (Template-*) — they scaffold other repos and do not release.
if: >-
github.event.pull_request.merged == true ||
(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.action != 'promote-rc')
!startsWith(github.event.repository.name, 'Template-') &&
(
github.event.pull_request.merged == true ||
(github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.action != 'promote-rc')
)
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
@@ -173,6 +210,7 @@ jobs:
with:
token: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}
fetch-depth: 0
submodules: recursive
- name: Configure git for bot pushes
run: |
@@ -208,7 +246,7 @@ jobs:
sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq php-cli php-mbstring php-xml php-zip php-curl composer > /dev/null 2>&1
fi
rm -rf /tmp/mokocli
CLONE_URL=https://x-access-token:${MOKO_CLONE_TOKEN}@${MOKO_CLONE_HOST}/mokocli.git
CLONE_URL=https://x-access-token:${MOKO_CLONE_TOKEN}@${MOKO_CLONE_HOST}/MokoCLI.git
git clone --depth 1 --branch main --quiet $CLONE_URL /tmp/mokocli
cd /tmp/mokocli
composer install --no-dev --no-interaction --quiet
+2 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ jobs:
run: |
BRANCH="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}"
API="${{ vars.GITEA_URL || 'https://git.mokoconsulting.tech' }}/api/v1/repos/${{ github.repository }}/branches"
ENCODED=$(php -r "echo rawurlencode('${BRANCH}');")
# URL-encode the branch name's slashes (no PHP dependency on the runner)
ENCODED=$(printf '%s' "${BRANCH}" | sed 's|/|%2F|g')
STATUS=$(curl -sf -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: token ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}" \
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
# DISABLED — auto-release Step 11 recreates dev from main after every release.
# Cascade-dev is redundant and causes version conflicts when both main and dev
# have different version numbers in templateDetails.xml / manifest.xml.
name: "Cascade Main → Dev (DISABLED)"
on: workflow_dispatch
jobs:
noop:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: echo "Cascade disabled — auto-release handles dev recreation"
+6 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# DEFGROUP: Gitea.Workflow
# INGROUP: MokoStandards.CI
# REPO: https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/Template-Generic
# PATH: /.gitea/workflows/ci-generic.yml
# PATH: /.mokogitea/workflows/ci-generic.yml
# VERSION: 01.00.00
# BRIEF: CI pipeline — lint, validate, and test for generic projects (PHP + Node.js)
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ jobs:
lint:
name: Lint & Validate
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Skip on template repos (Template-*) — they hold placeholder scaffolding, not buildable source.
if: ${{ !startsWith(github.event.repository.name, 'Template-') }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
@@ -130,6 +132,9 @@ jobs:
name: Tests
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: lint
# Run only when lint succeeded; always() forces evaluation so a skipped
# lint (e.g. template repos) skips this job cleanly instead of hanging.
if: ${{ always() && needs.lint.result == 'success' }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# DEFGROUP: Gitea.Workflow
# INGROUP: MokoStandards.Maintenance
# REPO: https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoStandards
# PATH: /.gitea/workflows/cleanup.yml
# PATH: /.mokogitea/workflows/cleanup.yml
# VERSION: 01.00.00
# BRIEF: Scheduled cleanup — delete merged branches and old workflow runs
+23 -13
View File
@@ -52,51 +52,61 @@ jobs:
REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}
TAG: ${{ steps.config.outputs.tag }}
run: |
HEALTH_FMT='${{ '{{' }}.State.Health.Status${{ '}}' }}'
# Inject runner-side values (TAG, REGISTRY_TOKEN) into the remote shell's
# environment via a command prefix, then use a *quoted* heredoc so every
# $var below expands in exactly one place: the remote dev host. This avoids
# the local-vs-remote expansion trap that previously left TAG empty.
ssh -i ~/.ssh/deploy_key -p ${{ env.DEPLOY_PORT }} \
-o ConnectTimeout=30 -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \
-o ServerAliveInterval=30 -o ServerAliveCountMax=10 \
${{ env.DEPLOY_USER }}@${{ env.DEPLOY_HOST }} bash -s <<DEPLOY_EOF
${{ env.DEPLOY_USER }}@${{ env.DEPLOY_HOST }} \
"TAG='$TAG' REGISTRY_TOKEN='$REGISTRY_TOKEN' bash -s" <<'DEPLOY_EOF'
set -e
echo 'SSH connected to dev environment'
if [ -z "$TAG" ]; then
echo 'ERROR: TAG is empty; refusing to build an untagged image' >&2
exit 1
fi
HEALTH_FMT='{{.State.Health.Status}}'
echo 'Cleaning Docker build cache...'
docker builder prune -af 2>/dev/null || true
docker image prune -af 2>/dev/null || true
echo 'Pulling source...'
SOURCE_DIR=/opt/gitea-dev/source
if [ ! -d \$SOURCE_DIR/.git ]; then
git clone -b dev https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea-Fork.git \$SOURCE_DIR
if [ ! -d "$SOURCE_DIR/.git" ]; then
git clone -b dev https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea-Fork.git "$SOURCE_DIR"
fi
cd \$SOURCE_DIR
cd "$SOURCE_DIR"
git remote set-url origin https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea-Fork.git 2>/dev/null || true
git fetch origin dev
git reset --hard origin/dev
echo 'Building Docker image...'
echo "Building Docker image: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:$TAG"
docker build --no-cache --build-arg GOFLAGS='-p 1' \
--tag ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:\$TAG \
--tag "${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:$TAG" \
-f Dockerfile .
echo 'Pushing to registry...'
echo '\$REGISTRY_TOKEN' | docker login ${{ env.REGISTRY }} -u ${{ env.DEPLOY_USER }} --password-stdin
docker push ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:\$TAG
echo "$REGISTRY_TOKEN" | docker login ${{ env.REGISTRY }} -u ${{ env.DEPLOY_USER }} --password-stdin
docker push "${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:$TAG"
echo 'Restarting dev container...'
cd /opt/gitea-dev
sed -i "s|${{ env.IMAGE }}:[^ ]*|${{ env.IMAGE }}:\$TAG|" docker-compose.yml
sed -i "s|${{ env.IMAGE }}:[^ ]*|${{ env.IMAGE }}:$TAG|" docker-compose.yml
docker compose up -d mokogitea-dev
echo 'Health check...'
for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8; do
sleep 15
if docker inspect --format='\$HEALTH_FMT' mokogitea-dev 2>/dev/null | grep -q healthy; then
if docker inspect --format="$HEALTH_FMT" mokogitea-dev 2>/dev/null | grep -q healthy; then
echo 'Dev container healthy!'
exit 0
fi
echo "Waiting... (attempt \$i/8)"
echo "Waiting... (attempt $i/8)"
done
echo 'Health check failed'
docker logs mokogitea-dev --tail 20
+12 -3
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,15 @@ jobs:
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
run: |
# This RC flow drives a Joomla-style update stream (updates.xml). Repos that don't ship
# one (e.g. generic Go/TS) have nothing to package here, so no-op cleanly instead of
# aborting under `set -e` when the file is absent.
if [ ! -f updates.xml ]; then
echo "has_updates=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "No updates.xml in this repo — skipping RC update-stream packaging"
exit 0
fi
echo "has_updates=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
BASE_VERSION=$(sed -n 's/.*<version>\(.*\)<\/version>.*/\1/p' updates.xml | head -1)
[ -z "$BASE_VERSION" ] && BASE_VERSION="04.00.00"
RC_VERSION="${BASE_VERSION}-rc.${PR_NUMBER}"
@@ -56,7 +65,7 @@ jobs:
echo "RC version: $RC_VERSION (tag: $RC_TAG)"
- name: Update updates.xml RC channel
if: steps.guard.outputs.skip != 'true'
if: steps.guard.outputs.skip != 'true' && steps.version.outputs.has_updates == 'true'
env:
RC_VERSION: ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
RC_TAG: ${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
@@ -106,7 +115,7 @@ jobs:
PYEOF
- name: Create RC release
if: steps.guard.outputs.skip != 'true'
if: steps.guard.outputs.skip != 'true' && steps.version.outputs.has_updates == 'true'
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}
RC_TAG: ${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
@@ -153,7 +162,7 @@ jobs:
PYEOF
- name: Commit updates.xml
if: steps.guard.outputs.skip != 'true'
if: steps.guard.outputs.skip != 'true' && steps.version.outputs.has_updates == 'true'
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}
HEAD_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}
-126
View File
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (C) 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
#
# FILE INFORMATION
# DEFGROUP: Gitea.Workflow
# INGROUP: MokoStandards.Deploy
# REPO: https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoStandards-API
# PATH: /templates/workflows/joomla/deploy-manual.yml.template
# VERSION: 04.07.00
# BRIEF: Manual SFTP deploy to dev server for Joomla repos
name: "Universal: Deploy to Dev (Manual)"
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
clear_remote:
description: 'Delete all remote files before uploading'
required: false
default: 'false'
type: boolean
env:
FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
deploy:
name: SFTP Deploy to Dev
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- name: Setup PHP
run: |
php -v && composer --version
- name: Setup MokoStandards tools
env:
MOKOGITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN || github.token }}
MOKO_CLONE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN || github.token }}
MOKO_CLONE_HOST: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN && 'git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting' || 'github.com/mokoconsulting-tech' }}
COMPOSER_AUTH: '{"github-oauth":{"github.com":"${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN || github.token }}"}}'
run: |
git clone --depth 1 --branch main --quiet \
"https://x-access-token:${MOKO_CLONE_TOKEN}@${MOKO_CLONE_HOST}/MokoStandards-API.git" \
/tmp/mokostandards-api 2>/dev/null || true
if [ -d "/tmp/mokostandards-api" ] && [ -f "/tmp/mokostandards-api/composer.json" ]; then
cd /tmp/mokostandards-api && composer install --no-dev --no-interaction --quiet 2>/dev/null || true
fi
- name: Check FTP configuration
id: check
env:
HOST: ${{ vars.DEV_FTP_HOST }}
PATH_VAR: ${{ vars.DEV_FTP_PATH }}
PORT: ${{ vars.DEV_FTP_PORT }}
run: |
if [ -z "$HOST" ] || [ -z "$PATH_VAR" ]; then
echo "DEV_FTP_HOST or DEV_FTP_PATH not configured -- cannot deploy"
echo "skip=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
echo "skip=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "host=$HOST" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
REMOTE="${PATH_VAR%/}"
echo "remote=$REMOTE" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
[ -z "$PORT" ] && PORT="22"
echo "port=$PORT" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Deploy via SFTP
if: steps.check.outputs.skip != 'true'
env:
SFTP_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEV_FTP_KEY }}
SFTP_PASS: ${{ secrets.DEV_FTP_PASSWORD }}
SFTP_USER: ${{ vars.DEV_FTP_USERNAME }}
run: |
SOURCE_DIR="src"
[ ! -d "$SOURCE_DIR" ] && SOURCE_DIR="htdocs"
[ ! -d "$SOURCE_DIR" ] && { echo "No src/ or htdocs/ -- nothing to deploy"; exit 0; }
printf '{"host":"%s","port":%s,"username":"%s","remotePath":"%s"' \
"${{ steps.check.outputs.host }}" "${{ steps.check.outputs.port }}" "$SFTP_USER" "${{ steps.check.outputs.remote }}" \
> /tmp/sftp-config.json
if [ -n "$SFTP_KEY" ]; then
echo "$SFTP_KEY" > /tmp/deploy_key
chmod 600 /tmp/deploy_key
printf ',"privateKeyPath":"/tmp/deploy_key"}' >> /tmp/sftp-config.json
else
printf ',"password":"%s"}' "$SFTP_PASS" >> /tmp/sftp-config.json
fi
DEPLOY_ARGS=(--path . --src-dir "$SOURCE_DIR" --config /tmp/sftp-config.json)
[ "${{ inputs.clear_remote }}" = "true" ] && DEPLOY_ARGS+=(--clear-remote)
PLATFORM=$(php /tmp/mokostandards-api/cli/platform_detect.php --path . 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ "$PLATFORM" = "waas-component" ] && [ -f "/tmp/mokostandards-api/deploy/deploy-joomla.php" ]; then
php /tmp/mokostandards-api/deploy/deploy-joomla.php "${DEPLOY_ARGS[@]}"
else
php /tmp/mokostandards-api/deploy/deploy-sftp.php "${DEPLOY_ARGS[@]}"
fi
rm -f /tmp/deploy_key /tmp/sftp-config.json
- name: Summary
if: always()
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.check.outputs.skip }}" = "true" ]; then
echo "### Deploy Skipped -- FTP not configured" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
else
echo "### Manual Dev Deploy Complete" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "| Field | Value |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "|-------|-------|" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "| Host | \`${{ steps.check.outputs.host }}\` |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "| Remote | \`${{ steps.check.outputs.remote }}\` |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "| Clear | ${{ inputs.clear_remote }} |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
fi
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
# DEFGROUP: Gitea.Workflow
# INGROUP: MokoStandards.Notifications
# REPO: https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoStandards
# PATH: /.gitea/workflows/notify.yml
# PATH: /.mokogitea/workflows/notify.yml
# VERSION: 01.00.00
# BRIEF: Push notifications via ntfy on release success or workflow failure
+17 -10
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
#
# FILE INFORMATION
# DEFGROUP: Gitea.Workflow
# INGROUP: moko-platform.CI
# REPO: https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/mokoconsulting-tech/moko-platform
# INGROUP: mokocli.CI
# REPO: https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/mokoconsulting-tech/mokocli
# PATH: /templates/workflows/universal/pr-check.yml.template
# VERSION: 09.23.00
# BRIEF: PR gate — branch policy + code validation before merge
@@ -47,15 +47,15 @@ jobs:
fi
;;
fix/*|bugfix/*)
if [ "$BASE" != "dev" ]; then
if [ "$BASE" != "dev" ] && [ "$BASE" != "main" ]; then
ALLOWED=false
REASON="Fix branches must target 'dev', not '${BASE}'"
REASON="Fix branches must target 'dev' or 'main', not '${BASE}'"
fi
;;
patch/*)
if [ "$BASE" != "dev" ] && [ "$BASE" != "rc" ]; then
if [ "$BASE" != "dev" ] && [ "$BASE" != "rc" ] && [ "$BASE" != "main" ]; then
ALLOWED=false
REASON="Patch branches must target 'dev' or 'rc', not '${BASE}'"
REASON="Patch branches must target 'dev', 'rc', or 'main', not '${BASE}'"
fi
;;
hotfix/*)
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ jobs:
echo "" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "### Allowed merge paths:" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- \`feature/*\` → \`dev\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- \`fix/*\` → \`dev\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- \`fix/*\` → \`dev\` or \`main\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- \`patch/*\` → \`dev\`, \`rc\`, or \`main\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- \`hotfix/*\` → \`dev\` or \`main\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- \`dev\` → \`main\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- \`rc/*\` → \`main\`" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
@@ -126,6 +127,8 @@ jobs:
validate:
name: Validate PR
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Skip on template repos (Template-*) — no real manifest/source/changelog to validate.
if: ${{ !startsWith(github.event.repository.name, 'Template-') }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
@@ -147,11 +150,12 @@ jobs:
- name: Detect platform
id: platform
run: |
# Read platform from XML manifest (<platform> tag) or plain text fallback
PLATFORM=$(sed -n 's/.*<platform>\([^<]*\)<\/platform>.*/\1/p' .mokogitea/manifest.xml 2>/dev/null | head -1)
[ -z "$PLATFORM" ] && PLATFORM=$(cat .mokogitea/manifest.xml 2>/dev/null | tr -d '[:space:]')
# Platform comes from the MokoGitea metadata API (public GET); manifest.xml is no longer used.
API="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL:-https://git.mokoconsulting.tech}/api/v1/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/metadata"
PLATFORM="$(curl -sf "$API" 2>/dev/null | python3 -c "import sys, json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('platform') or '')" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -z "$PLATFORM" ] && PLATFORM="generic"
echo "platform=$PLATFORM" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "Detected platform: $PLATFORM"
- name: Setup PHP
if: steps.platform.outputs.platform == 'joomla' || steps.platform.outputs.platform == 'dolibarr'
@@ -492,6 +496,9 @@ jobs:
name: Build RC Package
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [branch-policy, validate]
# Run only when both gates succeeded; always() forces evaluation so a skipped
# validate (e.g. template repos) skips this job cleanly instead of hanging.
if: ${{ always() && needs.branch-policy.result == 'success' && needs.validate.result == 'success' }}
steps:
- name: Trigger RC pre-release
+6 -2
View File
@@ -48,9 +48,13 @@ jobs:
build:
name: "Build Pre-Release (${{ inputs.stability || github.ref_name }})"
runs-on: release
# Skip on template repos (Template-*) — they scaffold other repos and do not release.
if: >-
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
github.event_name == 'push'
!startsWith(github.event.repository.name, 'Template-') &&
(
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
github.event_name == 'push'
)
steps:
- name: Checkout
+31
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
name: Sync Workflows to Repos
on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- '.mokogitea/workflows/**'
jobs:
sync:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout mokocli
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: MokoConsulting/mokocli
token: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}
- name: Setup PHP
uses: https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/.mokogitea/raw/branch/main/actions/setup-php@v1
with:
php-version: '8.1'
- name: Install dependencies
run: composer install --no-dev --no-interaction
- name: Sync workflows to generic repos
run: php automation/bulk_sync.php --platform generic --org MokoConsulting --workflows-only --auto-merge --token "${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}"
env:
MOKOGITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.MOKOGITEA_TOKEN }}
+35
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- Org branch protection: repositories now show the inherited organization rules read-only in their Branch Protection settings, with an expandable detail (direct push, force-push, branch deletion, merge restrictions, required approvals, status checks, protected files, and whitelisted teams) — like GitHub surfaces org rulesets in a repo (#727)
- Org branch protection: org-level rules can now also protect against branch deletion (`enable_delete` + delete allowlist teams), mirroring the per-repo delete allowlist (#727)
- Org-level tag protection: protect tag patterns org-wide (e.g. `v*`) with a team allowlist, layered on top of each repo's own protected tags — a tag is controllable only if allowed at both levels (fail-closed). API at `/orgs/{org}/tag_protections`; enforced at the git push/delete hook and the release create/delete paths; shown read-only in the repo Tag settings (#727)
- Org-level push policy: one policy per org, enforced in the pre-receive hook across all its repositories — branch/tag name conventions (glob), a mandatory secret-scanning block-on-push that repos cannot disable, a max pushed-file size, and blocked file-path patterns. API at `/orgs/{org}/push_policy`. Naming is fail-closed; the content checks (blocked paths, max size) fail open on error so a policy bug can never block every push (#727)
- Org-level repository defaults: an org can force new/transferred repositories private and set default pull-request settings (allowed merge styles, default merge style, auto-delete branch after merge), applied via a notifier when a repo is created in or transferred into the org (best-effort — never blocks repo creation). API at `/orgs/{org}/repo_defaults` (#727)
- Org-level email domain policy: restrict which email domains an organization's members may have — a user can only be added to the org (via any team) if their primary email matches one of the allowed domain globs. Enforced at the single membership-add choke point (`AddTeamMember`); API at `/orgs/{org}/email_domain_policy` (#727)
- Code security scanner: pattern-based detection of SQL injection, XSS, command injection, path traversal, insecure deserialization, hardcoded credentials, and weak cryptography across Go/PHP/Python/JS/TS (#552)
- Cascade merge: auto-create PRs to downstream branches after merge with configurable rules per repo (#460)
- Issue status presets: 4 built-in templates (default, software-development, support-tickets, bug-tracking) with API + web UI (#507)
- Cross-org status migration: copy status definitions from one org to another via API (#507)
@@ -40,7 +47,35 @@
- Wiki recent changes page: cross-page edit activity with pagination (#670)
- Wiki page rename with automatic redirects via YAML frontmatter (#672)
### Security
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: LFS reject unknown SSH sub-verbs to prevent auth bypass (#38015)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: bound CODEOWNERS regex match time — ReDoS prevention (#38025)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: require merged PR to bypass fork PR approval gate (#38041)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: LFS require Code-unit access for cross-repo object reuse (#38050)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: hostmatcher block reserved IP ranges — SSRF prevention (#38059)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: bound debian ParseControlFile — DoS prevention (#38055)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: feed token scope, migration SSRF, notification redaction (#38147)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: OIDC ignore stale external login links to organizations (#38141)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: 2FA timing, branch delete auth, org labels visibility, merge upstream auth (#38151)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: allow git clone of private repos with anonymous code access (#38146)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.3: hostmatcher patch incorrect private IP list (#38173)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.4: do not auto-reactivate disabled users on OAuth2 callback (#38183)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.4: walk git log context error handling — regression fix (#38185)
### Fixed
- Fork server binary now compiles: `routers/api/v1/api.go` called `organization.HasOrgOrUserVisible`, which had been renamed to `IsOwnerVisibleToDoer`; the one missed call site broke `go build` of the entire `routers/api/v1` package (CI's Lint & Validate does not run a full build, so it went unnoticed) (#735)
- Dev deploy workflow: the build/deploy step referenced runner-side values as `\$TAG` / `\$REGISTRY_TOKEN` inside an unquoted SSH heredoc, deferring expansion to the remote shell where those names are unset — the Docker tag collapsed to an empty `mokogitea:` and every dev deploy failed with `invalid reference format`. Runner values are now injected via an ssh env-prefix and the heredoc is quoted so each `$var` expands in exactly one place (#737)
- Repaired unit-test compile and `go vet` failures: `CryptoRandomInt/String/Bytes` now return two values (updated `modules/util/util_test.go`), removed a redundant `&&` condition in `issue_comment.go`, and cleaned up isolated integration-test compile errors (#736)
- Removed a stray `package-lock.json` (13.9k lines) that a `git add -A` had accidentally swept into the org-push-policy branch (#734)
- Org-level branch protection now **layers** with per-repo rules instead of being ignored whenever a repo rule exists. When both an org rule and a repo rule match a branch, the effective rule is the most-restrictive (fail-closed) combination — the org rule is a mandatory floor a repo cannot weaken: allow flags AND'd, gate/require/block flags OR'd, required approvals max'd, status checks and protected-file patterns unioned, whitelists intersected. Previously a repo rule shadowed the org rule entirely at the enforcement choke point (`GetFirstMatchProtectedBranchRule`), letting a repo opt out of org protection (#727)
- Org Teams page: list now renders — the handler wrote `ctx.Data["OrgListTeams"]` but the template reads `.Teams`, so the page showed header/nav but no teams (#720)
- Issue type: now editable after creation for users with issue write permission — the sidebar gated editing on a `FieldEditFlags` data key that was never populated (always read-only); now uses `HasIssuesOrPullsWritePermission` like the priority field (#721)
- Admin config form: radio inputs (e.g. instance landing page Mode) no longer throw "Unsupported config form value mapping", which had aborted all JS init on the admin settings page
- PR check branch policy: allow `fix/*``main` and `patch/*``main` to match documented policy (was rejecting fix/patch PRs to main)
- PR check platform detection: guard for missing `.mokogitea/manifest.xml` so the Validate PR job no longer aborts under `set -e` (manifest replaced by metadata API)
- Remove dangling `mcp-mokogitea-api` submodule gitlink (no `.gitmodules` entry) that broke `submodule update --init` at checkout, failing all PR build/release jobs; ignore the local clone path
- PR RC Release workflow: no-op cleanly when `updates.xml` is absent (generic repos) instead of aborting the "Determine RC version" step under `set -e`
- PR check: platform detection now queries metadata API instead of removed manifest.xml
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.2: handle empty pull request files view to allow reviews (#37783)
- Cherry-pick upstream v1.26.2: fix "run as root" check with snap container detection (#37622)
- Cherry-pick upstream: ack re-sent UpdateLog finalize idempotently (#37885)
+7 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# MokoGitea
Custom Gitea fork with enhanced wiki system, DLID licensing, issue statuses, org metadata, CI standardization, and project board API.
Custom Gitea fork with enhanced wiki system, DLID licensing, issue statuses, cascade merge, security scanning, org-level governance, org metadata, CI standardization, and project board API.
![Language](https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-00ADD8?style=flat-square&logo=go&logoColor=white) ![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-GPL--3.0--or--later-green?style=flat-square)
@@ -11,8 +11,13 @@ Custom Gitea fork with enhanced wiki system, DLID licensing, issue statuses, org
- **Wiki System** -- wikilinks, categories, backlinks, template transclusion, revision diffs, rename redirects, folder ACL, enhanced ToC, print view, ZIP export ([details](https://git.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/.mokogitea/wiki/standards/Wiki-Features))
- **DLID Licensing** -- license management, entitlements, domain activations, ed25519-signed downloads
- **API Token Scope Editing** -- edit token scopes via API (PATCH) or web UI after creation
- **Issue Statuses** -- custom workflow statuses per org with required baseline protection
- **Issue Statuses** -- custom workflow statuses per org with required baseline protection, presets, cross-org migration
- **Cascade Merge** -- auto-create PRs to downstream branches after merge with configurable rules per repo
- **Security Scanning** -- secret detection (pre-receive blocking) + code analysis (SQL injection, XSS, command injection, path traversal, and more) with REST API for alerts, config, and on-demand scans
- **Default Org Teams** -- auto-create Developers, Reviewers, and CI/CD teams on org creation
- **Org Metadata** -- per-repo metadata API (public GET, admin PUT), platform detection for versioning
- **Branch Protection** -- delete allowlist for protected branches (per-user/team/deploy-key)
- **Org Governance** -- organization-wide rules that layer onto every repository: branch protection as a most-restrictive floor a repo cannot weaken, tag protection (team allowlist), push policy (branch/tag naming, mandatory secret-block, max file size, blocked paths), repository defaults (force-private, PR merge settings), and member email-domain allowlists
- **Project Board API** -- REST endpoints for project columns and cards
- **CI Infrastructure** -- reusable workflows, centralized ci-issue-reporter, standardized MOKOGITEA_TOKEN naming
- **Dev Deploy Gate** -- builds deploy to dev environment first, production checks dev health
+14 -9
View File
@@ -113,23 +113,25 @@ func handleCliResponseExtra(extra private.ResponseExtra) error {
return nil
}
func getAccessMode(verb, lfsVerb string) perm.AccessMode {
// getAccessMode maps an SSH git/LFS verb to the access mode it requires, with
// ok=false for an unrecognised verb. Callers MUST reject the request when ok is
// false: AccessModeNone would otherwise pass the `userMode < mode` permission
// check in routers/private/serv.go and grant access.
func getAccessMode(verb, lfsVerb string) (mode perm.AccessMode, ok bool) {
switch verb {
case git.CmdVerbUploadPack, git.CmdVerbUploadArchive:
return perm.AccessModeRead
return perm.AccessModeRead, true
case git.CmdVerbReceivePack:
return perm.AccessModeWrite
return perm.AccessModeWrite, true
case git.CmdVerbLfsAuthenticate, git.CmdVerbLfsTransfer:
switch lfsVerb {
case git.CmdSubVerbLfsUpload:
return perm.AccessModeWrite
return perm.AccessModeWrite, true
case git.CmdSubVerbLfsDownload:
return perm.AccessModeRead
return perm.AccessModeRead, true
}
}
// should be unreachable
setting.PanicInDevOrTesting("unknown verb: %s %s", verb, lfsVerb)
return perm.AccessModeNone
return perm.AccessModeNone, false
}
func runServ(ctx context.Context, c *cli.Command) error {
@@ -247,7 +249,10 @@ func runServ(ctx context.Context, c *cli.Command) error {
}
}
requestedMode := getAccessMode(verb, lfsVerb)
requestedMode, ok := getAccessMode(verb, lfsVerb)
if !ok {
return fail(ctx, "Unknown git command", "Unknown git command %s %s", verb, lfsVerb)
}
results, extra := private.ServCommand(ctx, keyID, username, reponame, requestedMode, verb, lfsVerb)
if extra.HasError() {
+56
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package cmd
import (
"testing"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/perm"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/git"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func TestGetAccessMode(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
verb, lfsVerb string
expected perm.AccessMode
}{
{git.CmdVerbUploadPack, "", perm.AccessModeRead},
{git.CmdVerbUploadArchive, "", perm.AccessModeRead},
{git.CmdVerbReceivePack, "", perm.AccessModeWrite},
{git.CmdVerbLfsAuthenticate, git.CmdSubVerbLfsUpload, perm.AccessModeWrite},
{git.CmdVerbLfsAuthenticate, git.CmdSubVerbLfsDownload, perm.AccessModeRead},
{git.CmdVerbLfsTransfer, git.CmdSubVerbLfsUpload, perm.AccessModeWrite},
{git.CmdVerbLfsTransfer, git.CmdSubVerbLfsDownload, perm.AccessModeRead},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.verb+"/"+tc.lfsVerb, func(t *testing.T) {
mode, ok := getAccessMode(tc.verb, tc.lfsVerb)
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, tc.expected, mode)
})
}
}
// TestGetAccessModeUnknownVerb locks in the invariant that getAccessMode reports
// ok=false for unrecognised verbs and LFS sub-verbs, so runServ rejects them. An
// unknown verb has no valid access mode; if it were treated as AccessModeNone (0)
// it would pass the `userMode < mode` permission check in routers/private/serv.go
// and hand out valid LFS JWTs for any private repository.
func TestGetAccessModeUnknownVerb(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct{ verb, lfsVerb string }{
{git.CmdVerbLfsAuthenticate, ""},
{git.CmdVerbLfsAuthenticate, "badverb"},
{git.CmdVerbLfsTransfer, "badverb"},
{"git-unknown-verb", ""},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.verb+"/"+tc.lfsVerb, func(t *testing.T) {
mode, ok := getAccessMode(tc.verb, tc.lfsVerb)
assert.False(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, perm.AccessModeNone, mode)
})
}
}
-2
View File
@@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ ROOT_PATH = /data/gitea/log
[security]
INSTALL_LOCK = $INSTALL_LOCK
SECRET_KEY = $SECRET_KEY
REVERSE_PROXY_LIMIT = 1
REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES = *
[service]
DISABLE_REGISTRATION = $DISABLE_REGISTRATION
-2
View File
@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ ROOT_PATH = $GITEA_WORK_DIR/data/log
[security]
INSTALL_LOCK = $INSTALL_LOCK
SECRET_KEY = $SECRET_KEY
REVERSE_PROXY_LIMIT = 1
REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES = *
[service]
DISABLE_REGISTRATION = $DISABLE_REGISTRATION
Submodule mcp-mokogitea-api deleted from dbaf91546e
-4
View File
@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ type FindRunOptions struct {
Ref string // the commit/tag/… that caused this workflow
TriggerUserID int64
TriggerEvent webhook_module.HookEventType
Approved bool // not util.OptionalBool, it works only when it's true
Status []Status
ConcurrencyGroup string
CommitSHA string
@@ -81,9 +80,6 @@ func (opts FindRunOptions) ToConds() builder.Cond {
if opts.TriggerUserID > 0 {
cond = cond.And(builder.Eq{"`action_run`.trigger_user_id": opts.TriggerUserID})
}
if opts.Approved {
cond = cond.And(builder.Gt{"`action_run`.approved_by": 0})
}
if len(opts.Status) > 0 {
cond = cond.And(builder.In("`action_run`.status", opts.Status))
}
+28 -4
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
"github.com/pquerna/otp/totp"
"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
"xorm.io/builder"
)
//
@@ -104,20 +105,43 @@ func (t *TwoFactor) SetSecret(secretString string) error {
return nil
}
// ValidateTOTP validates the provided passcode.
func (t *TwoFactor) ValidateTOTP(passcode string) (bool, error) {
// validateTOTP validates the provided passcode. It does not consume the passcode; all login
// surfaces must go through ValidateAndConsumeTOTP so that a passcode cannot be redeemed twice.
func (t *TwoFactor) validateTOTP(passcode string) (bool, error) {
decodedStoredSecret, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(t.Secret)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("ValidateTOTP invalid base64: %w", err)
return false, fmt.Errorf("validateTOTP invalid base64: %w", err)
}
secretBytes, err := secret.AesDecrypt(t.getEncryptionKey(), decodedStoredSecret)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("ValidateTOTP unable to decrypt (maybe SECRET_KEY is wrong): %w", err)
return false, fmt.Errorf("validateTOTP unable to decrypt (maybe SECRET_KEY is wrong): %w", err)
}
secretStr := string(secretBytes)
return totp.Validate(passcode, secretStr), nil
}
// ValidateAndConsumeTOTP validates the passcode and atomically records it as used so that the
// same passcode cannot be redeemed more than once (RFC 6238 §5.2). It returns false for an
// invalid passcode as well as for a replay, including the case where a concurrent request with
// the same passcode won the race first. All TOTP login surfaces must go through this helper.
func (t *TwoFactor) ValidateAndConsumeTOTP(ctx context.Context, passcode string) (bool, error) {
ok, err := t.validateTOTP(passcode)
if err != nil || !ok {
return false, err
}
// Conditional update: only a row whose stored passcode differs from this one is updated, so a
// replay (or a concurrent duplicate) matches zero rows and is rejected. The row lock taken by
// the UPDATE serializes racing requests, closing the read-validate-write TOCTOU window.
t.LastUsedPasscode = passcode
n, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(t.ID).
Where(builder.Or(builder.IsNull{"last_used_passcode"}, builder.Neq{"last_used_passcode": passcode})).
Cols("last_used_passcode").Update(t)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return n == 1, nil
}
// NewTwoFactor creates a new two-factor authentication token.
func NewTwoFactor(ctx context.Context, t *TwoFactor) error {
_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Insert(t)
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package auth_test
import (
"testing"
"time"
auth_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/auth"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/unittest"
"github.com/pquerna/otp/totp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestTwoFactorValidateAndConsumeTOTP(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
key, err := totp.Generate(totp.GenerateOpts{SecretSize: 40, Issuer: "gitea-test", AccountName: "consume"})
require.NoError(t, err)
tfa := &auth_model.TwoFactor{UID: 1}
require.NoError(t, tfa.SetSecret(key.Secret()))
require.NoError(t, auth_model.NewTwoFactor(t.Context(), tfa))
passcode, err := totp.GenerateCode(key.Secret(), time.Now())
require.NoError(t, err)
// first use of a valid passcode succeeds
ok, err := tfa.ValidateAndConsumeTOTP(t.Context(), passcode)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, ok)
// replaying the same passcode is refused, even when still inside the TOTP validity window
reloaded, err := auth_model.GetTwoFactorByUID(t.Context(), tfa.UID)
require.NoError(t, err)
ok, err = reloaded.ValidateAndConsumeTOTP(t.Context(), passcode)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, ok)
// an invalid passcode is rejected without consuming anything
ok, err = reloaded.ValidateAndConsumeTOTP(t.Context(), "000000")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, ok)
}
+5 -2
View File
@@ -196,7 +196,10 @@ func LFSObjectAccessible(ctx context.Context, user *user_model.User, oid string)
count, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Count(&LFSMetaObject{Pointer: lfs.Pointer{Oid: oid}})
return count > 0, err
}
cond := repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeInvalid)
// LFS objects are repository code content, so authorization must require
// Code-unit access; other unit accesses (e.g. Issues) must not authorize
// reuse of an existing LFS object across repositories.
cond := repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeCode)
count, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Where(cond).Join("INNER", "repository", "`lfs_meta_object`.repository_id = `repository`.id").Count(&LFSMetaObject{Pointer: lfs.Pointer{Oid: oid}})
return count > 0, err
}
@@ -220,7 +223,7 @@ func LFSAutoAssociate(ctx context.Context, metas []*LFSMetaObject, user *user_mo
newMetas := make([]*LFSMetaObject, 0, len(metas))
cond := builder.In(
"`lfs_meta_object`.repository_id",
builder.Select("`repository`.id").From("repository").Where(repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeInvalid)),
builder.Select("`repository`.id").From("repository").Where(repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeCode)),
)
if err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Cols("oid").Where(cond).In("oid", oids...).GroupBy("oid").Find(&newMetas); err != nil {
return err
+134
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package git
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/db"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/glob"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/log"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/builder"
)
// OrgEmailDomainPolicy restricts which email domains an organization's members may
// have. When configured, a user can only be added to the org if their primary email
// matches one of the allowed domain globs. At most one row per org. See issue #727.
type OrgEmailDomainPolicy struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
OrgID int64 `xorm:"UNIQUE NOT NULL"`
AllowedDomains string `xorm:"TEXT"`
CreatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"created"`
UpdatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated"`
}
func init() {
db.RegisterModel(new(OrgEmailDomainPolicy))
}
// ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed is returned when a user's email domain is not permitted
// by the organization's email domain policy.
type ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed struct {
Email string
OrgID int64
}
func (e ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("email %q is not in an allowed domain for organization %d", e.Email, e.OrgID)
}
// IsErrEmailDomainNotAllowed reports whether err is an ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed.
func IsErrEmailDomainNotAllowed(err error) bool {
_, ok := err.(ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed)
return ok
}
func (p *OrgEmailDomainPolicy) domainGlobs() []glob.Glob {
var out []glob.Glob
for _, d := range strings.Split(p.AllowedDomains, ";") {
d = strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(d))
if d == "" {
continue
}
if g, err := glob.Compile(d); err == nil {
out = append(out, g)
} else {
log.Warn("Invalid org email domain glob %q: %v", d, err)
}
}
return out
}
// EmailAllowed reports whether email's domain satisfies the policy. An empty policy
// (no configured domains) allows any email.
func (p *OrgEmailDomainPolicy) EmailAllowed(email string) bool {
globs := p.domainGlobs()
if len(globs) == 0 {
return true
}
at := strings.LastIndexByte(email, '@')
if at < 0 {
return false
}
domain := strings.ToLower(email[at+1:])
for _, g := range globs {
if g.Match(domain) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy returns the org's email domain policy, or nil if none.
func GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx context.Context, orgID int64) (*OrgEmailDomainPolicy, error) {
policy, exist, err := db.Get[OrgEmailDomainPolicy](ctx, builder.Eq{"org_id": orgID})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if !exist {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
return policy, nil
}
// OrgEmailDomainAllowed reports whether email is permitted for the org. It returns
// true when the org has no policy configured.
func OrgEmailDomainAllowed(ctx context.Context, orgID int64, email string) (bool, error) {
policy, err := GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx, orgID)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
if policy == nil {
return true, nil
}
return policy.EmailAllowed(email), nil
}
// UpsertOrgEmailDomainPolicy creates or updates the single policy row for an org.
func UpsertOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx context.Context, policy *OrgEmailDomainPolicy) error {
existing, err := GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx, policy.OrgID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if existing == nil {
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Insert(policy); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Insert OrgEmailDomainPolicy: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
policy.ID = existing.ID
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(existing.ID).AllCols().Update(policy); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Update OrgEmailDomainPolicy: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
// DeleteOrgEmailDomainPolicy removes an org's email domain policy.
func DeleteOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx context.Context, orgID int64) error {
_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Where("org_id = ?", orgID).Delete(new(OrgEmailDomainPolicy))
return err
}
+6
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ type OrgProtectedBranch struct {
CanForcePush bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
EnableForcePushAllowlist bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs []int64 `xorm:"JSON TEXT"`
CanDelete bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
EnableDeleteAllowlist bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs []int64 `xorm:"JSON TEXT"`
EnableStatusCheck bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
StatusCheckContexts []string `xorm:"JSON TEXT"`
RequiredApprovals int64 `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"`
@@ -96,6 +99,9 @@ func (o *OrgProtectedBranch) ToProtectedBranch() *ProtectedBranch {
CanForcePush: o.CanForcePush,
EnableForcePushAllowlist: o.EnableForcePushAllowlist,
ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs: o.ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs,
CanDelete: o.CanDelete,
EnableDeleteAllowlist: o.EnableDeleteAllowlist,
DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs: o.DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs,
EnableStatusCheck: o.EnableStatusCheck,
StatusCheckContexts: o.StatusCheckContexts,
RequiredApprovals: o.RequiredApprovals,
+133
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package git
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/db"
repo_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/repo"
user_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/user"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/builder"
)
// OrgProtectedTag represents an org-level tag protection rule. It cascades to all
// repositories in the organization and layers on top of each repo's own protected
// tags (a tag is controllable only if allowed at both levels). Org rules reference
// teams only (like OrgProtectedBranch). See issue #727.
type OrgProtectedTag struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
OrgID int64 `xorm:"UNIQUE(s) index"`
NamePattern string `xorm:"UNIQUE(s)"`
AllowlistTeamIDs []int64 `xorm:"JSON TEXT"`
CreatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"created"`
UpdatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated"`
}
func init() {
db.RegisterModel(new(OrgProtectedTag))
}
// ToProtectedTag converts an org-level tag rule into a repo-scoped ProtectedTag so
// the standard name-matching and allowlist logic can be reused. Org rules are
// team-only, so the user allowlist is left empty.
func (o *OrgProtectedTag) ToProtectedTag() *ProtectedTag {
return &ProtectedTag{
NamePattern: o.NamePattern,
AllowlistTeamIDs: o.AllowlistTeamIDs,
}
}
// GetOrgProtectedTagByID retrieves a single org tag rule by org ID and rule ID.
func GetOrgProtectedTagByID(ctx context.Context, orgID, id int64) (*OrgProtectedTag, error) {
rule, exist, err := db.Get[OrgProtectedTag](ctx, builder.Eq{"org_id": orgID, "id": id})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if !exist {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
return rule, nil
}
// GetOrgProtectedTagByNamePattern retrieves a single org tag rule by its pattern.
func GetOrgProtectedTagByNamePattern(ctx context.Context, orgID int64, pattern string) (*OrgProtectedTag, error) {
rule, exist, err := db.Get[OrgProtectedTag](ctx, builder.Eq{"org_id": orgID, "name_pattern": pattern})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if !exist {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
return rule, nil
}
// FindOrgProtectedTags loads all org-level tag protection rules for an organization.
func FindOrgProtectedTags(ctx context.Context, orgID int64) ([]*OrgProtectedTag, error) {
var rules []*OrgProtectedTag
err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Where("org_id = ?", orgID).Asc("created_unix").Find(&rules)
return rules, err
}
// CreateOrgProtectedTag creates a new org-level tag protection rule.
func CreateOrgProtectedTag(ctx context.Context, rule *OrgProtectedTag) error {
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Insert(rule); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Insert OrgProtectedTag: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
// UpdateOrgProtectedTag updates an existing org-level tag protection rule.
func UpdateOrgProtectedTag(ctx context.Context, rule *OrgProtectedTag) error {
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(rule.ID).AllCols().Update(rule); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Update OrgProtectedTag: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
// DeleteOrgProtectedTag deletes an org-level tag protection rule.
func DeleteOrgProtectedTag(ctx context.Context, orgID, id int64) error {
affected, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Where("org_id = ? AND id = ?", orgID, id).Delete(new(OrgProtectedTag))
if err != nil {
return err
}
if affected == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("org tag protection rule ID(%d) not found", id)
}
return nil
}
// IsUserAllowedToControlTagInRepo layers org-level tag rules on top of a repo's own
// protected tags: the user must be allowed by BOTH levels (most-restrictive). The
// repo decision is evaluated first (using the already-loaded repoTags); if it
// allows and the owner is an organization, the org-level rules must also allow.
func IsUserAllowedToControlTagInRepo(ctx context.Context, repoTags []*ProtectedTag, repo *repo_model.Repository, tagName string, userID int64) (bool, error) {
allowed, err := IsUserAllowedToControlTag(ctx, repoTags, tagName, userID)
if err != nil || !allowed {
return allowed, err
}
owner, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, repo.OwnerID)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
if !owner.IsOrganization() {
return true, nil
}
orgRules, err := FindOrgProtectedTags(ctx, owner.ID)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
if len(orgRules) == 0 {
return true, nil
}
orgTags := make([]*ProtectedTag, len(orgRules))
for i, r := range orgRules {
orgTags[i] = r.ToProtectedTag()
}
return IsUserAllowedToControlTag(ctx, orgTags, tagName, userID)
}
+130
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package git
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/db"
repo_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/repo"
user_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/user"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/glob"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/log"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/builder"
)
// OrgPushPolicy is a single org-wide policy enforced in the pre-receive hook on
// every repository of the organization. Unlike the branch/tag rulesets there is at
// most one policy per org. Empty pattern / zero fields mean "no constraint". See #727.
type OrgPushPolicy struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
OrgID int64 `xorm:"UNIQUE NOT NULL"`
BranchNamePattern string `xorm:"TEXT"`
TagNamePattern string `xorm:"TEXT"`
RequireSecretBlock bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
MaxFileSize int64 `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"`
BlockedFilePatterns string `xorm:"TEXT"`
CreatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"created"`
UpdatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated"`
}
func init() {
db.RegisterModel(new(OrgPushPolicy))
}
// nameMatchesPattern reports whether name satisfies a glob pattern. An empty pattern
// imposes no constraint; an invalid pattern fails open (no constraint) so a
// misconfigured policy never blocks all pushes.
func nameMatchesPattern(pattern, name string) bool {
pattern = strings.TrimSpace(pattern)
if pattern == "" {
return true
}
g, err := glob.Compile(pattern, '/')
if err != nil {
log.Warn("Invalid org push policy name pattern %q: %v", pattern, err)
return true
}
return g.Match(name)
}
// BranchNameAllowed reports whether a branch name satisfies the naming policy.
func (p *OrgPushPolicy) BranchNameAllowed(name string) bool {
return nameMatchesPattern(p.BranchNamePattern, name)
}
// TagNameAllowed reports whether a tag name satisfies the naming policy.
func (p *OrgPushPolicy) TagNameAllowed(name string) bool {
return nameMatchesPattern(p.TagNamePattern, name)
}
// BlockedFileGlobs parses the ';'-separated blocked file pattern list.
func (p *OrgPushPolicy) BlockedFileGlobs() []glob.Glob {
var out []glob.Glob
for _, expr := range strings.Split(p.BlockedFilePatterns, ";") {
expr = strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(expr))
if expr == "" {
continue
}
if g, err := glob.Compile(expr, '.', '/'); err == nil {
out = append(out, g)
} else {
log.Warn("Invalid org push policy blocked file pattern %q: %v", expr, err)
}
}
return out
}
// GetOrgPushPolicy returns the org's push policy, or nil if none is configured.
func GetOrgPushPolicy(ctx context.Context, orgID int64) (*OrgPushPolicy, error) {
policy, exist, err := db.Get[OrgPushPolicy](ctx, builder.Eq{"org_id": orgID})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if !exist {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
return policy, nil
}
// GetOrgPushPolicyForRepo returns the push policy of the repo's owning organization,
// or nil if the owner is not an organization or has no policy.
func GetOrgPushPolicyForRepo(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository) (*OrgPushPolicy, error) {
owner, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, repo.OwnerID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !owner.IsOrganization() {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
return GetOrgPushPolicy(ctx, owner.ID)
}
// UpsertOrgPushPolicy creates or updates the single push policy for an org.
func UpsertOrgPushPolicy(ctx context.Context, policy *OrgPushPolicy) error {
existing, err := GetOrgPushPolicy(ctx, policy.OrgID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if existing == nil {
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Insert(policy); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Insert OrgPushPolicy: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
policy.ID = existing.ID
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(existing.ID).AllCols().Update(policy); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Update OrgPushPolicy: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
// DeleteOrgPushPolicy removes an org's push policy.
func DeleteOrgPushPolicy(ctx context.Context, orgID int64) error {
_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Where("org_id = ?", orgID).Delete(new(OrgPushPolicy))
return err
}
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package git
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/db"
repo_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/repo"
user_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/user"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/builder"
)
// OrgRepoDefaults holds an organization's default repository settings, applied to a
// repository when it is created in or transferred into the org (via a notifier).
// There is at most one row per org. See issue #727.
type OrgRepoDefaults struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
OrgID int64 `xorm:"UNIQUE NOT NULL"`
ForcePrivate bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
ApplyPRDefaults bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
AllowMerge bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
AllowRebase bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
AllowRebaseMerge bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
AllowSquash bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
AllowFastForwardOnly bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
DefaultMergeStyle string `xorm:"TEXT"`
DeleteBranchAfterMerge bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
CreatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"created"`
UpdatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated"`
}
func init() {
db.RegisterModel(new(OrgRepoDefaults))
}
// GetOrgRepoDefaults returns the org's repo defaults, or nil if none are configured.
func GetOrgRepoDefaults(ctx context.Context, orgID int64) (*OrgRepoDefaults, error) {
defaults, exist, err := db.Get[OrgRepoDefaults](ctx, builder.Eq{"org_id": orgID})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if !exist {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
return defaults, nil
}
// GetOrgRepoDefaultsForRepo returns the repo-defaults of the repo's owning org, or
// nil if the owner is not an organization or has none configured.
func GetOrgRepoDefaultsForRepo(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository) (*OrgRepoDefaults, error) {
owner, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, repo.OwnerID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !owner.IsOrganization() {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
return GetOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, owner.ID)
}
// UpsertOrgRepoDefaults creates or updates the single repo-defaults row for an org.
func UpsertOrgRepoDefaults(ctx context.Context, defaults *OrgRepoDefaults) error {
existing, err := GetOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, defaults.OrgID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if existing == nil {
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Insert(defaults); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Insert OrgRepoDefaults: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
defaults.ID = existing.ID
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(existing.ID).AllCols().Update(defaults); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Update OrgRepoDefaults: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
// DeleteOrgRepoDefaults removes an org's repo defaults.
func DeleteOrgRepoDefaults(ctx context.Context, orgID int64) error {
_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Where("org_id = ?", orgID).Delete(new(OrgRepoDefaults))
return err
}
+28 -7
View File
@@ -85,19 +85,40 @@ func FindAllMatchedBranches(ctx context.Context, repoID int64, ruleName string)
return results, nil
}
// GetFirstMatchProtectedBranchRule returns the first matched rule.
// It checks repo-level rules first; if none match, it falls back to org-level rules
// (if the repo belongs to an organization).
// GetFirstMatchProtectedBranchRule returns the effective protected-branch rule for a
// branch. It combines the matching repo-level rule with the matching org-level rule
// (when the repo belongs to an organization): if both match they are layered with
// mergeMostRestrictive so the org rule acts as a floor the repo cannot weaken; if
// only one matches that one is returned; if neither matches, nil.
func GetFirstMatchProtectedBranchRule(ctx context.Context, repoID int64, branchName string) (*ProtectedBranch, error) {
rules, err := FindRepoProtectedBranchRules(ctx, repoID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if matched := rules.GetFirstMatched(branchName); matched != nil {
return matched, nil
repoRule := rules.GetFirstMatched(branchName)
orgRule, err := getFirstMatchOrgProtectedBranchRule(ctx, repoID, branchName)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Fall back to org-level rules
switch {
case repoRule == nil && orgRule == nil:
return nil, nil
case orgRule == nil:
return repoRule, nil
case repoRule == nil:
return orgRule, nil
default:
return mergeMostRestrictive(repoRule, orgRule), nil
}
}
// getFirstMatchOrgProtectedBranchRule returns the matching org-level rule for a
// branch expressed as a repo-scoped ProtectedBranch (RepoID set so downstream
// permission checks work), or nil if the repo's owner is not an organization or no
// org rule matches.
func getFirstMatchOrgProtectedBranchRule(ctx context.Context, repoID int64, branchName string) (*ProtectedBranch, error) {
repo, err := repo_model.GetRepositoryByID(ctx, repoID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -119,7 +140,7 @@ func GetFirstMatchProtectedBranchRule(ctx context.Context, repoID int64, branchN
return nil, nil
}
// Convert org rule to a ProtectedBranch with RepoID set so callers work correctly
// Convert org rule to a ProtectedBranch with RepoID set so callers work correctly.
pb := orgRule.ToProtectedBranch()
pb.RepoID = repoID
return pb, nil
+178
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package git
import "strings"
// mergeMostRestrictive combines a repo-level and an org-level protected-branch rule
// that both match the same branch into a single effective rule, always applying the
// STRICTER constraint from each side (fail-closed). This makes an org-level rule a
// mandatory floor that a repo rule can only tighten, never weaken. See issue #727.
//
// Combination directions:
// - "Can*" / allow booleans -> AND (an action is allowed only if both allow it)
// - "Enable*/Block*/Require*" -> OR (a gate is on if either side turns it on)
// - RequiredApprovals -> max
// - required-set lists -> union (status contexts, protected files)
// - allow-set lists -> intersection (whitelists, unprotected files)
//
// Identity (ID, RepoID, RuleName, Priority) is taken from the repo rule so that
// downstream permission checks (which LoadRepo via RepoID) keep working.
func mergeMostRestrictive(repoRule, orgRule *ProtectedBranch) *ProtectedBranch {
eff := *repoRule
// Direct push.
eff.CanPush = repoRule.CanPush && orgRule.CanPush
eff.EnableWhitelist, eff.WhitelistUserIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableWhitelist, repoRule.WhitelistUserIDs, orgRule.EnableWhitelist, orgRule.WhitelistUserIDs)
_, eff.WhitelistTeamIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableWhitelist, repoRule.WhitelistTeamIDs, orgRule.EnableWhitelist, orgRule.WhitelistTeamIDs)
eff.WhitelistDeployKeys = repoRule.WhitelistDeployKeys && orgRule.WhitelistDeployKeys
eff.WhitelistActionsUser = repoRule.WhitelistActionsUser && orgRule.WhitelistActionsUser
// Force push.
eff.CanForcePush = repoRule.CanForcePush && orgRule.CanForcePush
eff.EnableForcePushAllowlist, eff.ForcePushAllowlistUserIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableForcePushAllowlist, repoRule.ForcePushAllowlistUserIDs, orgRule.EnableForcePushAllowlist, orgRule.ForcePushAllowlistUserIDs)
_, eff.ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableForcePushAllowlist, repoRule.ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs, orgRule.EnableForcePushAllowlist, orgRule.ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs)
eff.ForcePushAllowlistDeployKeys = repoRule.ForcePushAllowlistDeployKeys && orgRule.ForcePushAllowlistDeployKeys
eff.ForcePushAllowlistActionsUser = repoRule.ForcePushAllowlistActionsUser && orgRule.ForcePushAllowlistActionsUser
// Delete.
eff.CanDelete = repoRule.CanDelete && orgRule.CanDelete
eff.EnableDeleteAllowlist, eff.DeleteAllowlistUserIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableDeleteAllowlist, repoRule.DeleteAllowlistUserIDs, orgRule.EnableDeleteAllowlist, orgRule.DeleteAllowlistUserIDs)
_, eff.DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableDeleteAllowlist, repoRule.DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs, orgRule.EnableDeleteAllowlist, orgRule.DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs)
eff.DeleteAllowlistDeployKeys = repoRule.DeleteAllowlistDeployKeys && orgRule.DeleteAllowlistDeployKeys
eff.DeleteAllowlistActionsUser = repoRule.DeleteAllowlistActionsUser && orgRule.DeleteAllowlistActionsUser
// Merge whitelist.
eff.EnableMergeWhitelist, eff.MergeWhitelistUserIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableMergeWhitelist, repoRule.MergeWhitelistUserIDs, orgRule.EnableMergeWhitelist, orgRule.MergeWhitelistUserIDs)
_, eff.MergeWhitelistTeamIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableMergeWhitelist, repoRule.MergeWhitelistTeamIDs, orgRule.EnableMergeWhitelist, orgRule.MergeWhitelistTeamIDs)
eff.MergeWhitelistActionsUser = repoRule.MergeWhitelistActionsUser && orgRule.MergeWhitelistActionsUser
// Status checks.
eff.EnableStatusCheck = repoRule.EnableStatusCheck || orgRule.EnableStatusCheck
eff.StatusCheckContexts = unionStrings(repoRule.StatusCheckContexts, orgRule.StatusCheckContexts)
// Approvals and reviews.
eff.RequiredApprovals = maxInt64(repoRule.RequiredApprovals, orgRule.RequiredApprovals)
eff.EnableApprovalsWhitelist, eff.ApprovalsWhitelistUserIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableApprovalsWhitelist, repoRule.ApprovalsWhitelistUserIDs, orgRule.EnableApprovalsWhitelist, orgRule.ApprovalsWhitelistUserIDs)
_, eff.ApprovalsWhitelistTeamIDs = mergeAllowlist(repoRule.EnableApprovalsWhitelist, repoRule.ApprovalsWhitelistTeamIDs, orgRule.EnableApprovalsWhitelist, orgRule.ApprovalsWhitelistTeamIDs)
eff.BlockOnRejectedReviews = repoRule.BlockOnRejectedReviews || orgRule.BlockOnRejectedReviews
eff.BlockOnOfficialReviewRequests = repoRule.BlockOnOfficialReviewRequests || orgRule.BlockOnOfficialReviewRequests
eff.BlockOnOutdatedBranch = repoRule.BlockOnOutdatedBranch || orgRule.BlockOnOutdatedBranch
eff.DismissStaleApprovals = repoRule.DismissStaleApprovals || orgRule.DismissStaleApprovals
eff.IgnoreStaleApprovals = repoRule.IgnoreStaleApprovals || orgRule.IgnoreStaleApprovals
// Commits, files, admin override.
eff.RequireSignedCommits = repoRule.RequireSignedCommits || orgRule.RequireSignedCommits
eff.ProtectedFilePatterns = unionPatterns(repoRule.ProtectedFilePatterns, orgRule.ProtectedFilePatterns)
eff.UnprotectedFilePatterns = intersectPatterns(repoRule.UnprotectedFilePatterns, orgRule.UnprotectedFilePatterns)
eff.BlockAdminMergeOverride = repoRule.BlockAdminMergeOverride || orgRule.BlockAdminMergeOverride
return &eff
}
// mergeAllowlist combines two allow-lists under most-restrictive semantics. An
// allow-list only narrows access when its Enable flag is set; a disabled list means
// "everyone", so it imposes no constraint. Therefore: if both are enabled the result
// is the intersection (a principal must be allowed by both); if only one is enabled
// its list is used as-is; if neither is enabled the list is irrelevant.
func mergeAllowlist(aEnabled bool, aIDs []int64, bEnabled bool, bIDs []int64) (bool, []int64) {
switch {
case aEnabled && bEnabled:
return true, intersectInt64(aIDs, bIDs)
case aEnabled:
return true, aIDs
case bEnabled:
return true, bIDs
default:
return false, nil
}
}
func intersectInt64(a, b []int64) []int64 {
if len(a) == 0 || len(b) == 0 {
return nil
}
set := make(map[int64]struct{}, len(a))
for _, x := range a {
set[x] = struct{}{}
}
var out []int64
for _, x := range b {
if _, ok := set[x]; ok {
out = append(out, x)
}
}
return out
}
func unionStrings(a, b []string) []string {
if len(a) == 0 {
return b
}
if len(b) == 0 {
return a
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(a)+len(b))
out := make([]string, 0, len(a)+len(b))
for _, s := range a {
if _, ok := seen[s]; !ok {
seen[s] = struct{}{}
out = append(out, s)
}
}
for _, s := range b {
if _, ok := seen[s]; !ok {
seen[s] = struct{}{}
out = append(out, s)
}
}
return out
}
// unionPatterns unions two ';'-separated file-pattern lists (more patterns protected
// = more restrictive).
func unionPatterns(a, b string) string {
return strings.Join(unionStrings(splitPatterns(a), splitPatterns(b)), ";")
}
// intersectPatterns intersects two ';'-separated file-pattern lists. Unprotected
// patterns are carve-outs that REDUCE protection, so the restrictive combination
// keeps only the exemptions present in both.
func intersectPatterns(a, b string) string {
as, bs := splitPatterns(a), splitPatterns(b)
set := make(map[string]struct{}, len(as))
for _, s := range as {
set[s] = struct{}{}
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(bs))
var out []string
for _, s := range bs {
if _, ok := set[s]; !ok {
continue
}
if _, dup := seen[s]; dup {
continue
}
seen[s] = struct{}{}
out = append(out, s)
}
return strings.Join(out, ";")
}
func splitPatterns(s string) []string {
var out []string
for _, p := range strings.Split(s, ";") {
if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
func maxInt64(a, b int64) int64 {
if a > b {
return a
}
return b
}
+8
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"time"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/db"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
@@ -860,6 +861,11 @@ func GetCodeOwnersFromContent(ctx context.Context, data string) ([]*CodeOwnerRul
return rules, warnings
}
// codeOwnerMatchTimeout bounds a single pattern match so a crafted pattern
// cannot stall via catastrophic backtracking. See also the aggregate budget
// enforced by the caller across the whole rules×files match loop.
const codeOwnerMatchTimeout = 150 * time.Millisecond
type CodeOwnerRule struct {
Rule *regexp2.Regexp // it supports negative lookahead, does better for end users
Negative bool
@@ -888,6 +894,8 @@ func ParseCodeOwnersLine(ctx context.Context, tokens []string) (*CodeOwnerRule,
warnings = append(warnings, fmt.Sprintf("incorrect codeowner regexp: %s", err))
return nil, warnings
}
// Bound matching time so user-supplied patterns cannot stall PR creation via catastrophic backtracking.
rule.Rule.MatchTimeout = codeOwnerMatchTimeout
for _, user := range tokens[1:] {
user = strings.TrimPrefix(user, "@")
+19
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
package issues_test
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/db"
issues_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/issues"
@@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ func TestPullRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("DeleteOrphanedObjects", testDeleteOrphanedObjects)
t.Run("ParseCodeOwnersLine", testParseCodeOwnersLine)
t.Run("CodeOwnerAbsolutePathPatterns", testCodeOwnerAbsolutePathPatterns)
t.Run("CodeOwnerPatternMatchTimeout", testCodeOwnerPatternMatchTimeout)
t.Run("GetApprovers", testGetApprovers)
t.Run("GetPullRequestByMergedCommit", testGetPullRequestByMergedCommit)
t.Run("Migrate_InsertPullRequests", testMigrateInsertPullRequests)
@@ -370,6 +373,22 @@ func testCodeOwnerAbsolutePathPatterns(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// testCodeOwnerPatternMatchTimeout ensures user-supplied CODEOWNERS patterns
// cannot stall pull request processing through catastrophic regex backtracking:
// each compiled rule must enforce a bounded match time.
func testCodeOwnerPatternMatchTimeout(t *testing.T) {
rules, _ := issues_model.GetCodeOwnersFromContent(t.Context(), "(a+)+ @user5\n")
require.Len(t, rules, 1)
maliciousInput := strings.Repeat("a", 30) + "X"
start := time.Now()
_, err := rules[0].Rule.MatchString(maliciousInput)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
require.Error(t, err, "expected MatchTimeout error on pathological input")
assert.Less(t, elapsed, time.Second, "match timeout did not bound regex evaluation; took %s", elapsed)
}
func testGetApprovers(t *testing.T) {
pr := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.PullRequest{ID: 5})
// Official reviews are already deduplicated. Allow unofficial reviews
+5
View File
@@ -439,6 +439,11 @@ func prepareMigrationTasks() []*migration {
newMigration(359, "Add deploy fields to repo manifest", v1_27.AddDeployFieldsToRepoManifest),
newMigration(360, "Add delete allowlist to protected branch", v1_27.AddDeleteAllowlistToProtectedBranch),
newMigration(361, "Add cascade merge rule table", v1_27.AddCascadeMergeRuleTable),
newMigration(362, "Add delete allowlist to org protected branch", v1_27.AddDeleteAllowlistToOrgProtectedBranch),
newMigration(363, "Add org protected tag table", v1_27.AddOrgProtectedTagTable),
newMigration(364, "Add org push policy table", v1_27.AddOrgPushPolicyTable),
newMigration(365, "Add org repo defaults table", v1_27.AddOrgRepoDefaultsTable),
newMigration(366, "Add org email domain policy table", v1_27.AddOrgEmailDomainPolicyTable),
}
return preparedMigrations
}
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package v1_27
import "xorm.io/xorm"
// AddDeleteAllowlistToOrgProtectedBranch adds branch-deletion protection columns to
// org-level branch protection rules, mirroring the per-repo delete allowlist so an
// org rule can also protect branches from deletion. See issue #727.
func AddDeleteAllowlistToOrgProtectedBranch(x *xorm.Engine) error {
type OrgProtectedBranch struct {
CanDelete bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
EnableDeleteAllowlist bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs []int64 `xorm:"JSON TEXT"`
}
return x.Sync(new(OrgProtectedBranch))
}
+25
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package v1_27
import (
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/xorm"
)
// AddOrgProtectedTagTable creates the org-level tag protection table. Org tag rules
// cascade to all repositories in the organization and layer on top of each repo's
// own protected tags. See issue #727.
func AddOrgProtectedTagTable(x *xorm.Engine) error {
type OrgProtectedTag struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
OrgID int64 `xorm:"UNIQUE(s) index"`
NamePattern string `xorm:"UNIQUE(s)"`
AllowlistTeamIDs []int64 `xorm:"JSON TEXT"`
CreatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"created"`
UpdatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated"`
}
return x.Sync(new(OrgProtectedTag))
}
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package v1_27
import (
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/xorm"
)
// AddOrgPushPolicyTable creates the org-level push policy table (one row per org),
// enforced in the pre-receive hook across all repositories of the org. See #727.
func AddOrgPushPolicyTable(x *xorm.Engine) error {
type OrgPushPolicy struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
OrgID int64 `xorm:"UNIQUE NOT NULL"`
BranchNamePattern string `xorm:"TEXT"`
TagNamePattern string `xorm:"TEXT"`
RequireSecretBlock bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
MaxFileSize int64 `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"`
BlockedFilePatterns string `xorm:"TEXT"`
CreatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"created"`
UpdatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated"`
}
return x.Sync(new(OrgPushPolicy))
}
+31
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package v1_27
import (
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/xorm"
)
// AddOrgRepoDefaultsTable creates the org repository-defaults table (one row per
// org), applied to repositories created in or transferred into the org. See #727.
func AddOrgRepoDefaultsTable(x *xorm.Engine) error {
type OrgRepoDefaults struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
OrgID int64 `xorm:"UNIQUE NOT NULL"`
ForcePrivate bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
ApplyPRDefaults bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
AllowMerge bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
AllowRebase bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
AllowRebaseMerge bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
AllowSquash bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
AllowFastForwardOnly bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT true"`
DefaultMergeStyle string `xorm:"TEXT"`
DeleteBranchAfterMerge bool `xorm:"NOT NULL DEFAULT false"`
CreatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"created"`
UpdatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated"`
}
return x.Sync(new(OrgRepoDefaults))
}
+23
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package v1_27
import (
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/timeutil"
"xorm.io/xorm"
)
// AddOrgEmailDomainPolicyTable creates the org email-domain policy table (one row
// per org) restricting the email domains of members added to the org. See #727.
func AddOrgEmailDomainPolicyTable(x *xorm.Engine) error {
type OrgEmailDomainPolicy struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
OrgID int64 `xorm:"UNIQUE NOT NULL"`
AllowedDomains string `xorm:"TEXT"`
CreatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"created"`
UpdatedUnix timeutil.TimeStamp `xorm:"updated"`
}
return x.Sync(new(OrgEmailDomainPolicy))
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ func OrderBy(orderBy string) any {
}
func whereOrderConditions(e db.Engine, conditions []any) db.Engine {
orderBy := "id" // query must have the "ORDER BY", otherwise the result is not deterministic
orderBy := "id" // query must have the "ORDER BY", otherwise the result is not deterministic. FIXME: some tables do not have "id" column
for _, condition := range conditions {
switch cond := condition.(type) {
case *testCond:
+11 -2
View File
@@ -80,8 +80,11 @@ func init() {
}
// GetExternalLogin checks if a externalID in loginSourceID scope already exists
func GetExternalLogin(ctx context.Context, externalLoginUser *ExternalLoginUser) (bool, error) {
return db.GetEngine(ctx).Get(externalLoginUser)
func GetExternalLogin(ctx context.Context, loginSourceID int64, externalID string) (*ExternalLoginUser, bool, error) {
return db.Get[ExternalLoginUser](ctx, builder.Eq{
"external_id": externalID,
"login_source_id": loginSourceID,
})
}
// LinkExternalToUser link the external user to the user
@@ -118,6 +121,12 @@ func RemoveAllAccountLinks(ctx context.Context, user *User) error {
return err
}
// RemoveExternalLoginByExternalID removes a specific external login link by its provider-side identifier.
func RemoveExternalLoginByExternalID(ctx context.Context, loginSourceID int64, externalID string) error {
_, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).Where("external_id=? AND login_source_id=?", externalID, loginSourceID).Delete(new(ExternalLoginUser))
return err
}
// GetUserIDByExternalUserID get user id according to provider and userID
func GetUserIDByExternalUserID(ctx context.Context, provider, userID string) (int64, error) {
var id int64
+1 -1
View File
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ func getLastCommitForPathsByCache(commitID, treePath string, paths []string, cac
// GetLastCommitForPaths returns last commit information
func GetLastCommitForPaths(ctx context.Context, commit *Commit, treePath string, paths []string) (map[string]*Commit, error) {
// We read backwards from the commit to obtain all of the commits
revs, err := WalkGitLog(ctx, commit.repo, commit, treePath, paths...)
revs, err := walkGitLog(ctx, commit.repo, commit, treePath, paths...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build !gogit
package git
import (
"context"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/test"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/util"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestEntries_GetCommitsInfo_ContextErr(t *testing.T) {
repo, err := OpenRepository(t.Context(), filepath.Join(testReposDir, "repo1_bare"))
require.NoError(t, err)
defer repo.Close()
commit, err := repo.GetCommit("feaf4ba6bc635fec442f46ddd4512416ec43c2c2")
require.NoError(t, err)
entries, err := commit.Tree.ListEntries()
require.NoError(t, err)
countCommitInfosCommit := func(infos []CommitInfo) (nilCommits, nonNilCommits int) {
for _, info := range infos {
nilCommits += util.Iif(info.Commit == nil, 1, 0)
nonNilCommits += util.Iif(info.Commit != nil, 1, 0)
}
return nilCommits, nonNilCommits
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer test.MockVariableValue(&walkGitLogDebugBeforeNext)()
walkGitLogDebugBeforeNext = cancel
commitInfos, _, err := entries.GetCommitsInfo(ctx, "/any/repo-link", commit, "")
assert.NoError(t, err)
nilCommits, nonNilCommits := countCommitInfosCommit(commitInfos)
assert.Equal(t, 0, nonNilCommits) // no commit info due to canceled (or deadline-exceeded) context
assert.Equal(t, 3, nilCommits)
walkGitLogDebugBeforeNext = nil
commitInfos, _, err = entries.GetCommitsInfo(t.Context(), "/any/repo-link", commit, "")
assert.NoError(t, err)
nilCommits, nonNilCommits = countCommitInfosCommit(commitInfos)
assert.Equal(t, 3, nonNilCommits)
assert.Equal(t, 0, nilCommits)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func (c *Commit) recursiveCache(ctx context.Context, tree *Tree, treePath string
entryPaths[i] = entry.Name()
}
_, err = WalkGitLog(ctx, c.repo, c, treePath, entryPaths...)
_, err = walkGitLog(ctx, c.repo, c, treePath, entryPaths...)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
// Copyright 2021 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build !gogit
package git
import (
@@ -18,10 +20,8 @@ import (
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/log"
)
// LogNameStatusRepo opens git log --raw in the provided repo and returns a stdin pipe, a stdout reader and cancel function
func LogNameStatusRepo(ctx context.Context, repository, head, treepath string, paths ...string) (*bufio.Reader, func()) {
// Lets also create a context so that we can absolutely ensure that the command should die when we're done
// logNameStatusRepo opens git log --raw in the provided repo and returns a parser
func logNameStatusRepo(ctx context.Context, repository, head, treepath string, paths ...string) *logNameStatusRepoParser {
cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand()
cmd.AddArguments("log", "--name-status", "-c", "--format=commit%x00%H %P%x00", "--parents", "--no-renames", "-t", "-z").AddDynamicArguments(head)
@@ -54,77 +54,62 @@ func LogNameStatusRepo(ctx context.Context, repository, head, treepath string, p
ctx, ctxCancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
go func() {
err := cmd.WithDir(repository).RunWithStderr(ctx)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) && !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
log.Error("Unable to run git command %v: %v", cmd.LogString(), err)
}
}()
bufReader := bufio.NewReaderSize(stdoutReader, 32*1024)
return bufReader, func() {
ctxCancel()
stdoutReaderClose()
return &logNameStatusRepoParser{
treepath: treepath,
paths: paths,
rd: bufReader,
close: func() {
ctxCancel()
stdoutReaderClose()
},
}
}
// LogNameStatusRepoParser parses a git log raw output from LogRawRepo
type LogNameStatusRepoParser struct {
// logNameStatusRepoParser parses a git log raw output from LogRawRepo
type logNameStatusRepoParser struct {
treepath string
paths []string
next []byte
buffull bool
rd *bufio.Reader
cancel func()
close func()
}
// NewLogNameStatusRepoParser returns a new parser for a git log raw output
func NewLogNameStatusRepoParser(ctx context.Context, repository, head, treepath string, paths ...string) *LogNameStatusRepoParser {
rd, cancel := LogNameStatusRepo(ctx, repository, head, treepath, paths...)
return &LogNameStatusRepoParser{
treepath: treepath,
paths: paths,
rd: rd,
cancel: cancel,
}
}
// LogNameStatusCommitData represents a commit artefact from git log raw
type LogNameStatusCommitData struct {
// logNameStatusCommitData represents a commit artifact from git log raw
type logNameStatusCommitData struct {
CommitID string
ParentIDs []string
Paths []bool
}
// Next returns the next LogStatusCommitData
func (g *LogNameStatusRepoParser) Next(treepath string, paths2ids map[string]int, changed []bool, maxpathlen int) (*LogNameStatusCommitData, error) {
// walkNext returns the next LogStatusCommitData
func (g *logNameStatusRepoParser) walkNext(treepath string, paths2ids map[string]int, changed []bool, maxpathlen int) (*logNameStatusCommitData, error) {
var err error
if len(g.next) == 0 {
g.buffull = false
g.next, err = g.rd.ReadSlice('\x00')
if err != nil {
switch err {
case bufio.ErrBufferFull:
g.buffull = true
case io.EOF:
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // return nil to signal EOF
default:
return nil, err
}
switch {
case errors.Is(err, bufio.ErrBufferFull):
g.buffull = true
case err != nil:
return nil, err
}
}
ret := LogNameStatusCommitData{}
ret := logNameStatusCommitData{}
if bytes.Equal(g.next, []byte("commit\000")) {
g.next, err = g.rd.ReadSlice('\x00')
if err != nil {
switch err {
case bufio.ErrBufferFull:
g.buffull = true
case io.EOF:
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // return nil to signal EOF
default:
return nil, err
}
switch {
case errors.Is(err, bufio.ErrBufferFull):
g.buffull = true
case err != nil:
return nil, err
}
}
@@ -273,13 +258,10 @@ diffloop:
}
}
// Close closes the parser
func (g *LogNameStatusRepoParser) Close() {
g.cancel()
}
var walkGitLogDebugBeforeNext func() // is used to simulate various edge git process cases
// WalkGitLog walks the git log --name-status for the head commit in the provided treepath and files
func WalkGitLog(ctx context.Context, repo *Repository, head *Commit, treepath string, paths ...string) (map[string]string, error) {
// walkGitLog walks the git log --name-status for the head commit in the provided treepath and files
func walkGitLog(ctx context.Context, repo *Repository, head *Commit, treepath string, paths ...string) (map[string]string, error) {
headRef := head.ID.String()
tree, err := head.SubTree(treepath)
@@ -322,11 +304,9 @@ func WalkGitLog(ctx context.Context, repo *Repository, head *Commit, treepath st
}
}
g := NewLogNameStatusRepoParser(ctx, repo.Path, head.ID.String(), treepath, paths...)
// don't use defer g.Close() here as g may change its value - instead wrap in a func
defer func() {
g.Close()
}()
g := logNameStatusRepo(ctx, repo.Path, head.ID.String(), treepath, paths...)
// don't use defer g.cancel() here as g may change its value - instead wrap in a func
defer func() { g.close() }()
results := make([]string, len(paths))
remaining := len(paths)
@@ -340,25 +320,16 @@ func WalkGitLog(ctx context.Context, repo *Repository, head *Commit, treepath st
heaploop:
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
if ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {
break heaploop
}
g.Close()
return nil, ctx.Err()
default:
if walkGitLogDebugBeforeNext != nil {
walkGitLogDebugBeforeNext()
}
current, err := g.Next(treepath, path2idx, changed, maxpathlen)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
break heaploop
}
g.Close()
return nil, err
}
if current == nil {
break heaploop
current, err := g.walkNext(treepath, path2idx, changed, maxpathlen)
if ctx.Err() != nil {
break heaploop // context is either canceled or deadline exceeded - break the loop and return what we have so far
} else if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
break heaploop // reached to the end of log output
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err // other unknown errors
}
parentRemaining.Remove(current.CommitID)
for i, found := range current.Paths {
@@ -395,14 +366,14 @@ heaploop:
if remaining <= nextRestart {
commitSinceNextRestart++
if 4*commitSinceNextRestart > 3*commitSinceLastEmptyParent {
g.Close()
remainingPaths := make([]string, 0, len(paths))
for i, pth := range paths {
if results[i] == "" {
remainingPaths = append(remainingPaths, pth)
}
}
g = NewLogNameStatusRepoParser(ctx, repo.Path, lastEmptyParent, treepath, remainingPaths...)
g.close()
g = logNameStatusRepo(ctx, repo.Path, lastEmptyParent, treepath, remainingPaths...)
parentRemaining = make(container.Set[string])
nextRestart = (remaining * 3) / 4
continue heaploop
@@ -410,7 +381,6 @@ heaploop:
}
parentRemaining.AddMultiple(current.ParentIDs...)
}
g.Close()
resultsMap := map[string]string{}
for i, pth := range paths {
+3
View File
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ func Clone(ctx context.Context, from, to string, opts CloneRepoOptions) error {
}
cmd := gitcmd.NewCommand().AddArguments("clone")
// Never follow HTTP redirects: no clone caller needs them, and a remote redirecting to an
// otherwise-blocked address would be an SSRF vector (e.g. migrating from an attacker URL).
cmd.AddArguments("-c", "http.followRedirects=false")
if opts.SkipTLSVerify {
cmd.AddArguments("-c", "http.sslVerify=false")
}
+23
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
package git
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -19,3 +22,23 @@ func TestRepoIsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, isEmpty)
}
// TestCloneRefusesRedirects ensures Clone never follows HTTP redirects, so a remote
// cannot redirect to an otherwise-blocked address (SSRF, e.g. during migration).
func TestCloneRefusesRedirects(t *testing.T) {
var targetHit atomic.Bool
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
targetHit.Store(true)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
}))
defer target.Close()
redirect := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound)
}))
defer redirect.Close()
err := Clone(t.Context(), redirect.URL, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "dst"), CloneRepoOptions{})
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.False(t, targetHit.Load(), "git must not follow the redirect to the target")
}
+63 -7
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
)
// HostMatchList is used to check if a host or IP is in a list.
@@ -23,10 +24,61 @@ type HostMatchList struct {
ipNets []*net.IPNet
}
// MatchBuiltinExternal A valid non-private unicast IP, all hosts on public internet are matched
// MatchBuiltinExternal A valid global-unicast IP that is neither private (see MatchBuiltinPrivate)
// nor a reserved special-purpose range (see reservedIPNets); i.e. a routable host on the public internet.
const MatchBuiltinExternal = "external"
// MatchBuiltinPrivate RFC 1918 (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) and RFC 4193 (FC00::/7). Also called LAN/Intranet.
// reservedIPNets are special-purpose ranges that net.IP.IsPrivate omits but that must not be
// treated as public/external destinations (CGNAT, cloud metadata, IPv6 transition, etc.). We layer
// these on top of net.IP.IsPrivate (RFC 1918 / RFC 4193) so future additions to Go's IsPrivate are
// picked up automatically, while still covering the ranges it leaves out; otherwise the default
// allow-list would let authenticated users reach cloud metadata, internal, and IPv6 transition
// endpoints (SSRF), and a "private" block-list would fail to catch them.
var reservedIPNets = sync.OnceValue(func() []*net.IPNet {
var nets []*net.IPNet
for _, cidr := range []string{
// IPv4
"100.64.0.0/10", // RFC 6598 Carrier-Grade NAT
"168.63.129.16/32", // Azure WireServer metadata endpoint
"192.0.0.0/24", // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments
"192.0.2.0/24", // RFC 5737 TEST-NET-1
"192.88.99.0/24", // RFC 7526 6to4 relay anycast (deprecated)
"198.18.0.0/15", // RFC 2544 benchmarking
"198.51.100.0/24", // RFC 5737 TEST-NET-2
"203.0.113.0/24", // RFC 5737 TEST-NET-3
// IPv6
"100::/64", // RFC 6666 discard-only
"64:ff9b::/96", // RFC 6052 NAT64 (can embed IPv4 such as 169.254.169.254)
"64:ff9b:1::/48", // RFC 8215 local-use NAT64
"2001::/32", // RFC 4380 Teredo tunneling (embeds IPv4)
"2001:10::/28", // RFC 4843 ORCHID (deprecated)
"2001:20::/28", // RFC 7343 ORCHIDv2
"2001:db8::/32", // RFC 3849 documentation
"2002::/16", // RFC 3056 6to4 (embeds IPv4)
} {
_, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
if err != nil {
panic("hostmatcher: invalid reserved CIDR " + cidr + ": " + err.Error())
}
nets = append(nets, ipNet)
}
return nets
})
// isReservedIP reports whether ip falls in reserved special-purpose
// range (see reservedIPNets) that must not be considered a public/external destination.
func isReservedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, ipNet := range reservedIPNets() {
if ipNet.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// MatchBuiltinPrivate RFC 1918 (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) and RFC 4193 (FC00::/7),
// plus the reserved special-purpose ranges in reservedIPNets (CGNAT, NAT64, cloud metadata, etc.).
// Also called LAN/Intranet.
const MatchBuiltinPrivate = "private"
// MatchBuiltinLoopback 127.0.0.0/8 for IPv4 and ::1/128 for IPv6, localhost is included.
@@ -93,18 +145,22 @@ func (hl *HostMatchList) checkPattern(host string) bool {
return false
}
func (hl *HostMatchList) checkIP(ip net.IP) bool {
// matchesIP determines if the given IP matches any of the configured rules
func (hl *HostMatchList) matchesIP(ip net.IP) bool {
if slices.Contains(hl.patterns, "*") {
return true
}
for _, builtin := range hl.builtins {
switch builtin {
case MatchBuiltinExternal:
if ip.IsGlobalUnicast() && !ip.IsPrivate() {
// External address must be a global unicast, must not be in reserved range and must not be in private range
if ip.IsGlobalUnicast() && !isReservedIP(ip) && !ip.IsPrivate() {
return true
}
case MatchBuiltinPrivate:
if ip.IsPrivate() {
// Private address must be global unicast, must not be in range we explicitly exclude for security reasons
// and must be in private range
if ip.IsGlobalUnicast() && !isReservedIP(ip) && ip.IsPrivate() {
return true
}
case MatchBuiltinLoopback:
@@ -135,7 +191,7 @@ func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchHostName(host string) bool {
return true
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(hostname); ip != nil {
return hl.checkIP(ip)
return hl.matchesIP(ip)
}
return false
}
@@ -146,7 +202,7 @@ func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchIPAddr(ip net.IP) bool {
return false
}
host := ip.String() // nil-safe, we will get "<nil>" if ip is nil
return hl.checkPattern(host) || hl.checkIP(ip)
return hl.checkPattern(host) || hl.matchesIP(ip)
}
// MatchHostOrIP checks if the host or IP matches an allow/deny(block) list
+57
View File
@@ -159,3 +159,60 @@ func TestHostOrIPMatchesList(t *testing.T) {
}
test(cases)
}
// TestReservedRanges ensures special-purpose ranges that net.IP.IsPrivate misses are kept out of the
// "external" allow-list (the default for webhook delivery and repository migrations) and folded into
// the "private" block-list, so they cannot be used for SSRF to metadata/internal endpoints.
func TestReservedRanges(t *testing.T) {
external := ParseHostMatchList("", "external")
private := ParseHostMatchList("", "private")
// legitimate public destinations: external, not private
for _, ip := range []string{"8.8.8.8", "1.1.1.1", "2001:4860:4860::8888", "1000::1"} {
addr := net.ParseIP(ip)
assert.Truef(t, external.MatchIPAddr(addr), "public ip %s should be external", ip)
assert.Falsef(t, private.MatchIPAddr(addr), "public ip %s should not be private", ip)
}
// RFC 1918 / RFC 4193 private ranges (now folded into privateIPNets instead of net.IP.IsPrivate):
// not external, blockable as private. Includes range edges to guard the CIDR boundaries.
for _, ip := range []string{
"10.0.0.0", "10.255.255.255", // 10.0.0.0/8
"172.16.0.0", "172.31.255.255", // 172.16.0.0/12
"192.168.0.0", "192.168.255.255", // 192.168.0.0/16
"fc00::", "fdff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff", // fc00::/7
} {
addr := net.ParseIP(ip)
assert.Falsef(t, external.MatchIPAddr(addr), "private ip %s must not be external", ip)
assert.Truef(t, private.MatchIPAddr(addr), "private ip %s should match private block-list", ip)
}
// 172.32.0.0 is just outside 172.16.0.0/12: a public destination, not private
if addr := net.ParseIP("172.32.0.0"); assert.NotNil(t, addr) {
assert.True(t, external.MatchIPAddr(addr), "172.32.0.0 should be external")
assert.False(t, private.MatchIPAddr(addr), "172.32.0.0 should not be private")
}
// reserved ranges that IsPrivate does not cover: not external, but blockable as private
for _, ip := range []string{
"100.64.0.1", // CGNAT
"100.127.255.254", // CGNAT
"168.63.129.16", // Azure WireServer
"192.0.2.1", // TEST-NET-1
"198.18.0.1", // benchmarking
"198.51.100.1", // TEST-NET-2
"203.0.113.1", // TEST-NET-3
"169.254.169.254", // Cloud metadata
"192.88.99.1", // 6to4 relay anycast
"64:ff9b::1", // NAT64
"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe", // NAT64 embedding 169.254.169.254
"2001::1", // Teredo
"2002::1", // 6to4
"2001:db8::1", // documentation
"fe80::1", // link local address
} {
addr := net.ParseIP(ip)
assert.Falsef(t, external.MatchIPAddr(addr), "reserved ip %s must not be external", ip)
assert.Falsef(t, private.MatchIPAddr(addr), "reserved ip %s should match private block-list", ip)
}
}
+13 -2
View File
@@ -146,15 +146,26 @@ func ParseControlFile(r io.Reader) (*Package, error) {
var depends strings.Builder
var control strings.Builder
s := bufio.NewScanner(io.TeeReader(r, &control))
// https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-controlfields.html#syntax-of-control-files
s := bufio.NewScanner(r)
for s.Scan() {
line := s.Text()
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
if trimmed == "" {
continue
// A binary package control file holds exactly one stanza. Stop at the
// blank line that terminates it, otherwise a crafted control file could
// smuggle additional stanzas (with attacker-chosen Filename/Package
// fields) into the generated repository "Packages" index.
if control.Len() == 0 {
continue
}
break
}
control.WriteString(line)
control.WriteByte('\n')
if line[0] == ' ' || line[0] == '\t' {
switch key {
case "Description":
+15
View File
@@ -184,4 +184,19 @@ func TestParseControlFile(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotNil(t, p)
}
})
t.Run("SingleStanzaOnly", func(t *testing.T) {
// A control file with a trailing stanza must not leak the extra fields into
// p.Control, otherwise buildPackagesIndices would emit a second package entry
// with an attacker-chosen Filename into the repository "Packages" index.
content := bytes.NewBufferString("Package: realpkg\nVersion: 1.0.0\nArchitecture: amd64\nMaintainer: a <a@b.c>\nDescription: real\n\nPackage: openssl\nVersion: 99.0\nArchitecture: amd64\nFilename: pool/main/o/openssl/evil.deb\nDescription: spoofed\n")
p, err := ParseControlFile(content)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotNil(t, p)
assert.Equal(t, "realpkg", p.Name)
assert.Equal(t, "1.0.0", p.Version)
assert.NotContains(t, p.Control, "openssl")
assert.NotContains(t, p.Control, "evil.deb")
})
}
+9
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ type OrgBranchProtection struct {
EnableForcePush bool `json:"enable_force_push"`
EnableForcePushAllowlist bool `json:"enable_force_push_allowlist"`
ForcePushAllowlistTeams []string `json:"force_push_allowlist_teams"`
EnableDelete bool `json:"enable_delete"`
EnableDeleteAllowlist bool `json:"enable_delete_allowlist"`
DeleteAllowlistTeams []string `json:"delete_allowlist_teams"`
EnableMergeWhitelist bool `json:"enable_merge_whitelist"`
MergeWhitelistTeams []string `json:"merge_whitelist_teams"`
EnableStatusCheck bool `json:"enable_status_check"`
@@ -49,6 +52,9 @@ type CreateOrgBranchProtectionOption struct {
EnableForcePush bool `json:"enable_force_push"`
EnableForcePushAllowlist bool `json:"enable_force_push_allowlist"`
ForcePushAllowlistTeams []string `json:"force_push_allowlist_teams"`
EnableDelete bool `json:"enable_delete"`
EnableDeleteAllowlist bool `json:"enable_delete_allowlist"`
DeleteAllowlistTeams []string `json:"delete_allowlist_teams"`
EnableMergeWhitelist bool `json:"enable_merge_whitelist"`
MergeWhitelistTeams []string `json:"merge_whitelist_teams"`
EnableStatusCheck bool `json:"enable_status_check"`
@@ -76,6 +82,9 @@ type EditOrgBranchProtectionOption struct {
EnableForcePush *bool `json:"enable_force_push"`
EnableForcePushAllowlist *bool `json:"enable_force_push_allowlist"`
ForcePushAllowlistTeams []string `json:"force_push_allowlist_teams"`
EnableDelete *bool `json:"enable_delete"`
EnableDeleteAllowlist *bool `json:"enable_delete_allowlist"`
DeleteAllowlistTeams []string `json:"delete_allowlist_teams"`
EnableMergeWhitelist *bool `json:"enable_merge_whitelist"`
MergeWhitelistTeams []string `json:"merge_whitelist_teams"`
EnableStatusCheck *bool `json:"enable_status_check"`
+15
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package structs
// OrgEmailDomainPolicy represents an organization's email domain policy
type OrgEmailDomainPolicy struct {
OrgID int64 `json:"org_id"`
AllowedDomains string `json:"allowed_domains"`
}
// EditOrgEmailDomainPolicyOption options for editing an org's email domain policy
type EditOrgEmailDomainPolicyOption struct {
AllowedDomains *string `json:"allowed_domains"`
}
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package structs
import "time"
// OrgPushPolicy represents an organization's push policy (one per org)
type OrgPushPolicy struct {
OrgID int64 `json:"org_id"`
BranchNamePattern string `json:"branch_name_pattern"`
TagNamePattern string `json:"tag_name_pattern"`
RequireSecretBlock bool `json:"require_secret_block"`
MaxFileSize int64 `json:"max_file_size"`
BlockedFilePatterns string `json:"blocked_file_patterns"`
// swagger:strfmt date-time
Created time.Time `json:"created_at"`
// swagger:strfmt date-time
Updated time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
}
// EditOrgPushPolicyOption options for editing an organization's push policy. Only
// fields that are set will be changed.
type EditOrgPushPolicyOption struct {
BranchNamePattern *string `json:"branch_name_pattern"`
TagNamePattern *string `json:"tag_name_pattern"`
RequireSecretBlock *bool `json:"require_secret_block"`
MaxFileSize *int64 `json:"max_file_size"`
BlockedFilePatterns *string `json:"blocked_file_patterns"`
}
+32
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package structs
// OrgRepoDefaults represents an organization's default repository settings
type OrgRepoDefaults struct {
OrgID int64 `json:"org_id"`
ForcePrivate bool `json:"force_private"`
ApplyPRDefaults bool `json:"apply_pr_defaults"`
AllowMerge bool `json:"allow_merge"`
AllowRebase bool `json:"allow_rebase"`
AllowRebaseMerge bool `json:"allow_rebase_merge"`
AllowSquash bool `json:"allow_squash"`
AllowFastForwardOnly bool `json:"allow_fast_forward_only"`
DefaultMergeStyle string `json:"default_merge_style"`
DeleteBranchAfterMerge bool `json:"delete_branch_after_merge"`
}
// EditOrgRepoDefaultsOption options for editing an org's repo defaults. Only fields
// that are set will be changed.
type EditOrgRepoDefaultsOption struct {
ForcePrivate *bool `json:"force_private"`
ApplyPRDefaults *bool `json:"apply_pr_defaults"`
AllowMerge *bool `json:"allow_merge"`
AllowRebase *bool `json:"allow_rebase"`
AllowRebaseMerge *bool `json:"allow_rebase_merge"`
AllowSquash *bool `json:"allow_squash"`
AllowFastForwardOnly *bool `json:"allow_fast_forward_only"`
DefaultMergeStyle *string `json:"default_merge_style"`
DeleteBranchAfterMerge *bool `json:"delete_branch_after_merge"`
}
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package structs
import "time"
// OrgTagProtection represents an org-level tag protection rule
type OrgTagProtection struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
OrgID int64 `json:"org_id"`
NamePattern string `json:"name_pattern"`
WhitelistTeams []string `json:"whitelist_teams"`
// swagger:strfmt date-time
Created time.Time `json:"created_at"`
// swagger:strfmt date-time
Updated time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
}
// CreateOrgTagProtectionOption options for creating an org-level tag protection
type CreateOrgTagProtectionOption struct {
NamePattern string `json:"name_pattern" binding:"Required"`
WhitelistTeams []string `json:"whitelist_teams"`
}
// EditOrgTagProtectionOption options for editing an org-level tag protection
type EditOrgTagProtectionOption struct {
NamePattern *string `json:"name_pattern"`
WhitelistTeams []string `json:"whitelist_teams"`
}
+18 -10
View File
@@ -86,31 +86,35 @@ func Test_NormalizeEOL(t *testing.T) {
}
func Test_RandomInt(t *testing.T) {
randInt := CryptoRandomInt(255)
randInt, err := CryptoRandomInt(255)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, randInt, int64(0))
assert.LessOrEqual(t, randInt, int64(255))
}
func Test_RandomString(t *testing.T) {
str1 := CryptoRandomString(32)
var err error
str1, err := CryptoRandomString(32)
assert.NoError(t, err)
matches, err := regexp.MatchString(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]{32}$`, str1)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, matches)
str2 := CryptoRandomString(32)
str2, err := CryptoRandomString(32)
assert.NoError(t, err)
matches, err = regexp.MatchString(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]{32}$`, str1)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, matches)
assert.NotEqual(t, str1, str2)
str3 := CryptoRandomString(256)
str3, err := CryptoRandomString(256)
assert.NoError(t, err)
matches, err = regexp.MatchString(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]{256}$`, str3)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, matches)
str4 := CryptoRandomString(256)
str4, err := CryptoRandomString(256)
assert.NoError(t, err)
matches, err = regexp.MatchString(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]{256}$`, str4)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, matches)
@@ -119,15 +123,19 @@ func Test_RandomString(t *testing.T) {
}
func Test_RandomBytes(t *testing.T) {
bytes1 := CryptoRandomBytes(32)
bytes1, err := CryptoRandomBytes(32)
assert.NoError(t, err)
bytes2 := CryptoRandomBytes(32)
bytes2, err := CryptoRandomBytes(32)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEqual(t, bytes1, bytes2)
bytes3 := CryptoRandomBytes(256)
bytes3, err := CryptoRandomBytes(256)
assert.NoError(t, err)
bytes4 := CryptoRandomBytes(256)
bytes4, err := CryptoRandomBytes(256)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEqual(t, bytes3, bytes4)
}
+25
View File
@@ -2411,6 +2411,31 @@
"repo.settings.protected_branch": "Branch Protection",
"repo.settings.protected_branch.save_rule": "Save Rule",
"repo.settings.protected_branch.delete_rule": "Delete Rule",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch": "Organization Branch Protection",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch_desc": "These rules are defined by the organization and are enforced on top of this repository's own rules — the stricter of the two applies. They cannot be edited here.",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.inherited": "Organization",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.read_only": "Read-only",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.approvals": "Required approvals",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.signed": "Signed commits",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.status_check": "Required status checks",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.direct_push": "Direct push",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.force_push": "Force push",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.deletion": "Branch deletion",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.merge": "Merge restricted to",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.protected_files": "Protected files",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.also": "Also enforces",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.blocked": "Blocked",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.allowed": "Allowed",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.restricted": "Restricted to specific teams",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.write_access": "Anyone with write access",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.teams": "Teams: %s",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.any": "Any configured checks",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.block_outdated": "Block on outdated branch",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.block_rejected": "Block on rejected reviews",
"repo.settings.org_protected_branch.block_admin": "Block admin merge override",
"repo.settings.org_protected_tag": "Organization Tag Protection",
"repo.settings.org_protected_tag_desc": "These tag protection rules are defined by the organization and are enforced on top of this repository's own rules. They cannot be edited here.",
"repo.settings.org_protected_tag.read_only": "Read-only",
"repo.settings.protected_branch_can_push": "Allow push?",
"repo.settings.protected_branch_can_push_yes": "You can push",
"repo.settings.protected_branch_can_push_no": "You cannot push",
+124 -58
View File
@@ -508,41 +508,79 @@ func reqOrgOwnership() func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
}
}
// reqTeamMembership user should be an team member, or a site admin
// reqOrgVisible requires the organization to be visible to the doer, or a site admin
func reqOrgVisible() func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
return func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
if ctx.Org.Organization == nil {
setting.PanicInDevOrTesting("reqOrgVisible: unprepared context")
ctx.APIErrorInternal(errors.New("reqOrgVisible: unprepared context"))
return
}
if !organization.IsOwnerVisibleToDoer(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.AsUser(), ctx.Doer) {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
return
}
}
}
func teamAccessPrivileged(ctx *context.APIContext) (orgID int64, privileged, ok bool) {
if ctx.IsUserSiteAdmin() {
return 0, true, true
}
if ctx.Org.Team == nil {
setting.PanicInDevOrTesting("teamAccess: unprepared context")
ctx.APIErrorInternal(errors.New("teamAccess: unprepared context"))
return 0, false, false
}
orgID = ctx.Org.Team.OrgID
isOwner, err := organization.IsOrganizationOwner(ctx, orgID, ctx.Doer.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return 0, false, false
} else if isOwner {
return orgID, true, true
}
isTeamMember, err := organization.IsTeamMember(ctx, orgID, ctx.Org.Team.ID, ctx.Doer.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return 0, false, false
}
return orgID, isTeamMember, true
}
func denyNonTeamMember(ctx *context.APIContext, orgID int64) {
isOrgMember, err := organization.IsOrganizationMember(ctx, orgID, ctx.Doer.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
} else if isOrgMember {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "Must be a team member")
} else {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
}
}
// reqTeamReadAccess allows callers who can list the team to read its metadata.
// Not sufficient for mutations — use reqOrgOwnership() or reqTeamMembership() for those.
func reqTeamReadAccess() func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
return func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
orgID, privileged, ok := teamAccessPrivileged(ctx)
if !ok || privileged {
return
}
denyNonTeamMember(ctx, orgID)
}
}
// reqTeamMembership user should be a team member, or a site admin
func reqTeamMembership() func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
return func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
if ctx.IsUserSiteAdmin() {
return
}
if ctx.Org.Team == nil {
setting.PanicInDevOrTesting("reqTeamMembership: unprepared context")
ctx.APIErrorInternal(errors.New("reqTeamMembership: unprepared context"))
return
}
orgID := ctx.Org.Team.OrgID
isOwner, err := organization.IsOrganizationOwner(ctx, orgID, ctx.Doer.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
} else if isOwner {
return
}
if isTeamMember, err := organization.IsTeamMember(ctx, orgID, ctx.Org.Team.ID, ctx.Doer.ID); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
} else if !isTeamMember {
isOrgMember, err := organization.IsOrganizationMember(ctx, orgID, ctx.Doer.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
} else if isOrgMember {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "Must be a team member")
} else {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
}
orgID, privileged, ok := teamAccessPrivileged(ctx)
if !ok || privileged {
return
}
denyNonTeamMember(ctx, orgID)
}
}
@@ -1660,29 +1698,29 @@ func Routes() *web.Router {
Patch(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeIssues, unit.TypePullRequests), bind(api.EditMilestoneOption{}), repo.EditMilestone).
Delete(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeIssues, unit.TypePullRequests), repo.DeleteMilestone)
})
// m.Group("/projects", func() {
// m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListProjects).
// Post(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.CreateProjectOption{}), repo.CreateProject)
// m.Group("/{id}", func() {
// m.Combo("").Get(repo.GetProject).
// Patch(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.EditProjectOption{}), repo.EditProject).
// Delete(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), repo.DeleteProject)
// m.Post("/{action}", reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), repo.ChangeProjectStatus)
// m.Group("/columns", func() {
// m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListProjectColumns).
// Post(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.CreateProjectColumnOption{}), repo.CreateProjectColumn)
// m.Group("/{columnId}", func() {
// m.Delete("", reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), repo.DeleteProjectColumn)
// m.Combo("/issues").Get(repo.ListProjectColumnIssues).
// Post(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.AddProjectColumnIssueOption{}), repo.AddIssueToColumn)
// })
// })
// m.Group("/issues/{issueId}", func() {
// m.Patch("/move", reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.MoveProjectColumnIssueOption{}), repo.MoveIssueOnColumn)
// m.Delete("", reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), repo.RemoveIssueFromProject)
// })
// })
// })
// m.Group("/projects", func() {
// m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListProjects).
// Post(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.CreateProjectOption{}), repo.CreateProject)
// m.Group("/{id}", func() {
// m.Combo("").Get(repo.GetProject).
// Patch(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.EditProjectOption{}), repo.EditProject).
// Delete(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), repo.DeleteProject)
// m.Post("/{action}", reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), repo.ChangeProjectStatus)
// m.Group("/columns", func() {
// m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListProjectColumns).
// Post(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.CreateProjectColumnOption{}), repo.CreateProjectColumn)
// m.Group("/{columnId}", func() {
// m.Delete("", reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), repo.DeleteProjectColumn)
// m.Combo("/issues").Get(repo.ListProjectColumnIssues).
// Post(reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.AddProjectColumnIssueOption{}), repo.AddIssueToColumn)
// })
// })
// m.Group("/issues/{issueId}", func() {
// m.Patch("/move", reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), bind(api.MoveProjectColumnIssueOption{}), repo.MoveIssueOnColumn)
// m.Delete("", reqToken(), reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeProjects), repo.RemoveIssueFromProject)
// })
// })
// })
// Repo custom fields (repo-scoped key-value metadata)
m.Group("/custom-fields", func() {
m.Get("", repo.GetRepoCustomFields)
@@ -1762,7 +1800,7 @@ func Routes() *web.Router {
m.Combo("/{id}").Get(reqToken(), org.GetLabel).
Patch(reqToken(), reqOrgOwnership(), bind(api.EditLabelOption{}), org.EditLabel).
Delete(reqToken(), reqOrgOwnership(), org.DeleteLabel)
})
}, reqOrgVisible())
m.Group("/hooks", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(org.ListHooks).
Post(bind(api.CreateHookOption{}), org.CreateHook)
@@ -1785,6 +1823,34 @@ func Routes() *web.Router {
})
}, reqToken(), reqOrgOwnership())
m.Group("/tag_protections", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(org.ListOrgTagProtections).
Post(bind(api.CreateOrgTagProtectionOption{}), org.CreateOrgTagProtection)
m.Group("/{id}", func() {
m.Get("", org.GetOrgTagProtection)
m.Patch("", bind(api.EditOrgTagProtectionOption{}), org.EditOrgTagProtection)
m.Delete("", org.DeleteOrgTagProtection)
})
}, reqToken(), reqOrgOwnership())
m.Group("/push_policy", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(org.GetOrgPushPolicy).
Patch(bind(api.EditOrgPushPolicyOption{}), org.EditOrgPushPolicy).
Delete(org.DeleteOrgPushPolicy)
}, reqToken(), reqOrgOwnership())
m.Group("/repo_defaults", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(org.GetOrgRepoDefaults).
Patch(bind(api.EditOrgRepoDefaultsOption{}), org.EditOrgRepoDefaults).
Delete(org.DeleteOrgRepoDefaults)
}, reqToken(), reqOrgOwnership())
m.Group("/email_domain_policy", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(org.GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy).
Patch(bind(api.EditOrgEmailDomainPolicyOption{}), org.EditOrgEmailDomainPolicy).
Delete(org.DeleteOrgEmailDomainPolicy)
}, reqToken(), reqOrgOwnership())
m.Group("/blocks", func() {
m.Get("", org.ListBlocks)
m.Group("/{username}", func() {
@@ -1821,12 +1887,12 @@ func Routes() *web.Router {
m.Group("/repos", func() {
m.Get("", reqToken(), org.GetTeamRepos)
m.Combo("/{org}/{reponame}").
Put(reqToken(), org.AddTeamRepository).
Delete(reqToken(), org.RemoveTeamRepository).
Put(reqToken(), reqTeamMembership(), org.AddTeamRepository).
Delete(reqToken(), reqTeamMembership(), org.RemoveTeamRepository).
Get(reqToken(), org.GetTeamRepo)
})
m.Get("/activities/feeds", org.ListTeamActivityFeeds)
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization), orgAssignment(false, true), reqToken(), reqTeamMembership(), checkTokenPublicOnly())
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization), orgAssignment(false, true), reqToken(), reqTeamReadAccess(), checkTokenPublicOnly())
m.Group("/admin", func() {
m.Group("/cron", func() {
+23
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ func toAPIOrgBranchProtection(ctx *context.APIContext, rule *git_model.OrgProtec
EnableForcePush: rule.CanForcePush,
EnableForcePushAllowlist: rule.EnableForcePushAllowlist,
ForcePushAllowlistTeams: resolveTeamNames(rule.ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs),
EnableDelete: rule.CanDelete,
EnableDeleteAllowlist: rule.EnableDeleteAllowlist,
DeleteAllowlistTeams: resolveTeamNames(rule.DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs),
EnableMergeWhitelist: rule.EnableMergeWhitelist,
MergeWhitelistTeams: resolveTeamNames(rule.MergeWhitelistTeamIDs),
EnableStatusCheck: rule.EnableStatusCheck,
@@ -211,6 +214,10 @@ func CreateOrgBranchProtection(ctx *context.APIContext) {
if !ok {
return
}
deleteTeams, ok := resolveTeamIDs(ctx, orgID, form.DeleteAllowlistTeams)
if !ok {
return
}
rule := &git_model.OrgProtectedBranch{
OrgID: orgID,
@@ -222,6 +229,9 @@ func CreateOrgBranchProtection(ctx *context.APIContext) {
CanForcePush: form.EnablePush && form.EnableForcePush,
EnableForcePushAllowlist: form.EnablePush && form.EnableForcePush && form.EnableForcePushAllowlist,
ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs: forcePushTeams,
CanDelete: form.EnableDelete,
EnableDeleteAllowlist: form.EnableDelete && form.EnableDeleteAllowlist,
DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs: deleteTeams,
EnableMergeWhitelist: form.EnableMergeWhitelist,
MergeWhitelistTeamIDs: mergeTeams,
EnableStatusCheck: form.EnableStatusCheck,
@@ -323,6 +333,19 @@ func EditOrgBranchProtection(ctx *context.APIContext) {
}
rule.ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs = ids
}
if form.EnableDelete != nil {
rule.CanDelete = *form.EnableDelete
}
if form.EnableDeleteAllowlist != nil {
rule.EnableDeleteAllowlist = *form.EnableDeleteAllowlist
}
if form.DeleteAllowlistTeams != nil {
ids, ok := resolveTeamIDs(ctx, orgID, form.DeleteAllowlistTeams)
if !ok {
return
}
rule.DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs = ids
}
if form.EnableMergeWhitelist != nil {
rule.EnableMergeWhitelist = *form.EnableMergeWhitelist
}
+124
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package org
import (
"net/http"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
api "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/structs"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/web"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/context"
)
func toAPIOrgEmailDomainPolicy(policy *git_model.OrgEmailDomainPolicy, orgID int64) *api.OrgEmailDomainPolicy {
if policy == nil {
return &api.OrgEmailDomainPolicy{OrgID: orgID}
}
return &api.OrgEmailDomainPolicy{
OrgID: policy.OrgID,
AllowedDomains: policy.AllowedDomains,
}
}
// GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy get the organization's email domain policy
func GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation GET /orgs/{org}/email_domain_policy organization orgGetEmailDomainPolicy
// ---
// summary: Get the organization's email domain policy
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgEmailDomainPolicy"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
policy, err := git_model.GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx, orgID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, toAPIOrgEmailDomainPolicy(policy, orgID))
}
// EditOrgEmailDomainPolicy create or update the organization's email domain policy
func EditOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation PATCH /orgs/{org}/email_domain_policy organization orgEditEmailDomainPolicy
// ---
// summary: Create or update the organization's email domain policy. Only fields that are set will be changed
// consumes:
// - application/json
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: body
// in: body
// schema:
// "$ref": "#/definitions/EditOrgEmailDomainPolicyOption"
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgEmailDomainPolicy"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
// "422":
// "$ref": "#/responses/validationError"
form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*api.EditOrgEmailDomainPolicyOption)
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
policy, err := git_model.GetOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx, orgID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if policy == nil {
policy = &git_model.OrgEmailDomainPolicy{OrgID: orgID}
}
if form.AllowedDomains != nil {
policy.AllowedDomains = *form.AllowedDomains
}
if err := git_model.UpsertOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx, policy); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, toAPIOrgEmailDomainPolicy(policy, orgID))
}
// DeleteOrgEmailDomainPolicy remove the organization's email domain policy
func DeleteOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation DELETE /orgs/{org}/email_domain_policy organization orgDeleteEmailDomainPolicy
// ---
// summary: Remove the organization's email domain policy
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "204":
// "$ref": "#/responses/empty"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
if err := git_model.DeleteOrgEmailDomainPolicy(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
+19 -1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package org
import (
"net/http"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/db"
issues_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/issues"
org_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/organization"
api "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/structs"
@@ -227,7 +228,11 @@ func ApplyIssueStatusPreset(ctx *context.APIContext) {
presetName := ctx.PathParam("preset")
if err := issues_model.ApplyStatusPreset(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, presetName); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
if db.IsErrNotExist(err) {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
} else {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
}
return
}
ctx.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -261,6 +266,19 @@ func CopyIssueStatusesFromOrg(ctx *context.APIContext) {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
return
}
if sourceOrg.Visibility != api.VisibleTypePublic && !ctx.Doer.IsAdmin {
isMember, err := org_model.IsOrganizationMember(ctx, sourceOrg.ID, ctx.Doer.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if !isMember {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
return
}
}
if err := issues_model.CopyStatusesFromOrg(ctx, sourceOrg.ID, ctx.Org.Organization.ID); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
+145
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package org
import (
"net/http"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
api "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/structs"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/web"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/context"
)
// toAPIOrgPushPolicy converts the model to its API representation. A nil policy is
// rendered as an all-empty policy so clients always get a consistent shape.
func toAPIOrgPushPolicy(policy *git_model.OrgPushPolicy, orgID int64) *api.OrgPushPolicy {
if policy == nil {
return &api.OrgPushPolicy{OrgID: orgID}
}
return &api.OrgPushPolicy{
OrgID: policy.OrgID,
BranchNamePattern: policy.BranchNamePattern,
TagNamePattern: policy.TagNamePattern,
RequireSecretBlock: policy.RequireSecretBlock,
MaxFileSize: policy.MaxFileSize,
BlockedFilePatterns: policy.BlockedFilePatterns,
Created: policy.CreatedUnix.AsTime(),
Updated: policy.UpdatedUnix.AsTime(),
}
}
// GetOrgPushPolicy get the organization's push policy
func GetOrgPushPolicy(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation GET /orgs/{org}/push_policy organization orgGetPushPolicy
// ---
// summary: Get the organization's push policy
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgPushPolicy"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
policy, err := git_model.GetOrgPushPolicy(ctx, orgID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, toAPIOrgPushPolicy(policy, orgID))
}
// EditOrgPushPolicy create or update the organization's push policy
func EditOrgPushPolicy(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation PATCH /orgs/{org}/push_policy organization orgEditPushPolicy
// ---
// summary: Create or update the organization's push policy. Only fields that are set will be changed
// consumes:
// - application/json
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: body
// in: body
// schema:
// "$ref": "#/definitions/EditOrgPushPolicyOption"
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgPushPolicy"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
// "422":
// "$ref": "#/responses/validationError"
form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*api.EditOrgPushPolicyOption)
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
policy, err := git_model.GetOrgPushPolicy(ctx, orgID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if policy == nil {
policy = &git_model.OrgPushPolicy{OrgID: orgID}
}
if form.BranchNamePattern != nil {
policy.BranchNamePattern = *form.BranchNamePattern
}
if form.TagNamePattern != nil {
policy.TagNamePattern = *form.TagNamePattern
}
if form.RequireSecretBlock != nil {
policy.RequireSecretBlock = *form.RequireSecretBlock
}
if form.MaxFileSize != nil {
policy.MaxFileSize = *form.MaxFileSize
}
if form.BlockedFilePatterns != nil {
policy.BlockedFilePatterns = *form.BlockedFilePatterns
}
if err := git_model.UpsertOrgPushPolicy(ctx, policy); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, toAPIOrgPushPolicy(policy, orgID))
}
// DeleteOrgPushPolicy remove the organization's push policy
func DeleteOrgPushPolicy(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation DELETE /orgs/{org}/push_policy organization orgDeletePushPolicy
// ---
// summary: Remove the organization's push policy
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "204":
// "$ref": "#/responses/empty"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
if err := git_model.DeleteOrgPushPolicy(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
+174
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package org
import (
"net/http"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
api "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/structs"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/web"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/context"
)
// toAPIOrgRepoDefaults converts the model to its API representation. A nil value is
// rendered as the effective defaults (all merge styles allowed) so clients always
// get a consistent shape.
func toAPIOrgRepoDefaults(d *git_model.OrgRepoDefaults, orgID int64) *api.OrgRepoDefaults {
if d == nil {
return &api.OrgRepoDefaults{
OrgID: orgID,
AllowMerge: true,
AllowRebase: true,
AllowRebaseMerge: true,
AllowSquash: true,
AllowFastForwardOnly: true,
}
}
return &api.OrgRepoDefaults{
OrgID: d.OrgID,
ForcePrivate: d.ForcePrivate,
ApplyPRDefaults: d.ApplyPRDefaults,
AllowMerge: d.AllowMerge,
AllowRebase: d.AllowRebase,
AllowRebaseMerge: d.AllowRebaseMerge,
AllowSquash: d.AllowSquash,
AllowFastForwardOnly: d.AllowFastForwardOnly,
DefaultMergeStyle: d.DefaultMergeStyle,
DeleteBranchAfterMerge: d.DeleteBranchAfterMerge,
}
}
// GetOrgRepoDefaults get the organization's default repository settings
func GetOrgRepoDefaults(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation GET /orgs/{org}/repo_defaults organization orgGetRepoDefaults
// ---
// summary: Get the organization's default repository settings
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgRepoDefaults"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
defaults, err := git_model.GetOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, orgID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, toAPIOrgRepoDefaults(defaults, orgID))
}
// EditOrgRepoDefaults create or update the organization's default repository settings
func EditOrgRepoDefaults(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation PATCH /orgs/{org}/repo_defaults organization orgEditRepoDefaults
// ---
// summary: Create or update the organization's default repository settings. Only fields that are set will be changed
// consumes:
// - application/json
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: body
// in: body
// schema:
// "$ref": "#/definitions/EditOrgRepoDefaultsOption"
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgRepoDefaults"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
// "422":
// "$ref": "#/responses/validationError"
form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*api.EditOrgRepoDefaultsOption)
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
defaults, err := git_model.GetOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, orgID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if defaults == nil {
defaults = &git_model.OrgRepoDefaults{
OrgID: orgID,
AllowMerge: true,
AllowRebase: true,
AllowRebaseMerge: true,
AllowSquash: true,
AllowFastForwardOnly: true,
}
}
if form.ForcePrivate != nil {
defaults.ForcePrivate = *form.ForcePrivate
}
if form.ApplyPRDefaults != nil {
defaults.ApplyPRDefaults = *form.ApplyPRDefaults
}
if form.AllowMerge != nil {
defaults.AllowMerge = *form.AllowMerge
}
if form.AllowRebase != nil {
defaults.AllowRebase = *form.AllowRebase
}
if form.AllowRebaseMerge != nil {
defaults.AllowRebaseMerge = *form.AllowRebaseMerge
}
if form.AllowSquash != nil {
defaults.AllowSquash = *form.AllowSquash
}
if form.AllowFastForwardOnly != nil {
defaults.AllowFastForwardOnly = *form.AllowFastForwardOnly
}
if form.DefaultMergeStyle != nil {
defaults.DefaultMergeStyle = *form.DefaultMergeStyle
}
if form.DeleteBranchAfterMerge != nil {
defaults.DeleteBranchAfterMerge = *form.DeleteBranchAfterMerge
}
if err := git_model.UpsertOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, defaults); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, toAPIOrgRepoDefaults(defaults, orgID))
}
// DeleteOrgRepoDefaults remove the organization's default repository settings
func DeleteOrgRepoDefaults(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation DELETE /orgs/{org}/repo_defaults organization orgDeleteRepoDefaults
// ---
// summary: Remove the organization's default repository settings
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "204":
// "$ref": "#/responses/empty"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
if err := git_model.DeleteOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
+271
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package org
import (
"net/http"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/organization"
api "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/structs"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/web"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/context"
)
// toAPIOrgTagProtection converts an org tag rule to its API representation.
func toAPIOrgTagProtection(ctx *context.APIContext, rule *git_model.OrgProtectedTag) *api.OrgTagProtection {
teams, err := organization.FindOrgTeams(ctx, rule.OrgID)
if err != nil {
teams = nil
}
teamNamesByID := make(map[int64]string, len(teams))
for _, t := range teams {
teamNamesByID[t.ID] = t.Name
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(rule.AllowlistTeamIDs))
for _, id := range rule.AllowlistTeamIDs {
if name, ok := teamNamesByID[id]; ok {
names = append(names, name)
}
}
return &api.OrgTagProtection{
ID: rule.ID,
OrgID: rule.OrgID,
NamePattern: rule.NamePattern,
WhitelistTeams: names,
Created: rule.CreatedUnix.AsTime(),
Updated: rule.UpdatedUnix.AsTime(),
}
}
// ListOrgTagProtections list org-level tag protection rules
func ListOrgTagProtections(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation GET /orgs/{org}/tag_protections organization orgListTagProtections
// ---
// summary: List an organization's tag protection rules
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgTagProtectionList"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
rules, err := git_model.FindOrgProtectedTags(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
apiRules := make([]*api.OrgTagProtection, len(rules))
for i, rule := range rules {
apiRules[i] = toAPIOrgTagProtection(ctx, rule)
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, apiRules)
}
// GetOrgTagProtection get a specific org-level tag protection rule
func GetOrgTagProtection(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation GET /orgs/{org}/tag_protections/{id} organization orgGetTagProtection
// ---
// summary: Get a specific org-level tag protection rule
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: id
// in: path
// description: id of the tag protection rule
// type: integer
// format: int64
// required: true
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgTagProtection"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
rule, err := git_model.GetOrgProtectedTagByID(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.ID, ctx.PathParamInt64("id"))
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if rule == nil {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, toAPIOrgTagProtection(ctx, rule))
}
// CreateOrgTagProtection create an org-level tag protection rule
func CreateOrgTagProtection(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation POST /orgs/{org}/tag_protections organization orgCreateTagProtection
// ---
// summary: Create an org-level tag protection rule
// consumes:
// - application/json
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: body
// in: body
// schema:
// "$ref": "#/definitions/CreateOrgTagProtectionOption"
// responses:
// "201":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgTagProtection"
// "403":
// "$ref": "#/responses/forbidden"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
// "422":
// "$ref": "#/responses/validationError"
form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*api.CreateOrgTagProtectionOption)
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
existing, err := git_model.GetOrgProtectedTagByNamePattern(ctx, orgID, form.NamePattern)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if existing != nil {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "org tag protection rule already exists for this pattern")
return
}
teams, ok := resolveTeamIDs(ctx, orgID, form.WhitelistTeams)
if !ok {
return
}
rule := &git_model.OrgProtectedTag{
OrgID: orgID,
NamePattern: form.NamePattern,
AllowlistTeamIDs: teams,
}
if err := git_model.CreateOrgProtectedTag(ctx, rule); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusCreated, toAPIOrgTagProtection(ctx, rule))
}
// EditOrgTagProtection edit an org-level tag protection rule
func EditOrgTagProtection(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation PATCH /orgs/{org}/tag_protections/{id} organization orgEditTagProtection
// ---
// summary: Edit an org-level tag protection rule. Only fields that are set will be changed
// consumes:
// - application/json
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: id
// in: path
// description: id of the tag protection rule
// type: integer
// format: int64
// required: true
// - name: body
// in: body
// schema:
// "$ref": "#/definitions/EditOrgTagProtectionOption"
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/OrgTagProtection"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
// "422":
// "$ref": "#/responses/validationError"
form := web.GetForm(ctx).(*api.EditOrgTagProtectionOption)
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
rule, err := git_model.GetOrgProtectedTagByID(ctx, orgID, ctx.PathParamInt64("id"))
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if rule == nil {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
return
}
if form.NamePattern != nil {
rule.NamePattern = *form.NamePattern
}
if form.WhitelistTeams != nil {
ids, ok := resolveTeamIDs(ctx, orgID, form.WhitelistTeams)
if !ok {
return
}
rule.AllowlistTeamIDs = ids
}
if err := git_model.UpdateOrgProtectedTag(ctx, rule); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, toAPIOrgTagProtection(ctx, rule))
}
// DeleteOrgTagProtection delete an org-level tag protection rule
func DeleteOrgTagProtection(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation DELETE /orgs/{org}/tag_protections/{id} organization orgDeleteTagProtection
// ---
// summary: Delete an org-level tag protection rule
// parameters:
// - name: org
// in: path
// description: name of the organization
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: id
// in: path
// description: id of the tag protection rule
// type: integer
// format: int64
// required: true
// responses:
// "204":
// "$ref": "#/responses/empty"
// "404":
// "$ref": "#/responses/notFound"
orgID := ctx.Org.Organization.ID
rule, err := git_model.GetOrgProtectedTagByID(ctx, orgID, ctx.PathParamInt64("id"))
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if rule == nil {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
return
}
if err := git_model.DeleteOrgProtectedTag(ctx, orgID, rule.ID); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
ctx.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
}
+3
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
activities_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/activities"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/organization"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/perm"
access_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/perm/access"
@@ -491,6 +492,8 @@ func AddTeamMember(ctx *context.APIContext) {
if err := org_service.AddTeamMember(ctx, ctx.Org.Team, u); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, user_model.ErrBlockedUser) {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, err)
} else if git_model.IsErrEmailDomainNotAllowed(err) {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
} else {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
}
+3
View File
@@ -1365,6 +1365,9 @@ func MergeUpstream(ctx *context.APIContext) {
} else if errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusNotFound, err)
return
} else if errors.Is(err, util.ErrPermissionDenied) {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, err.Error())
return
}
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
+39 -9
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ type apiMetadata struct {
TargetVersion string `json:"target_version"`
PHPMinimum string `json:"php_minimum"`
Language string `json:"language"`
ExtensionType string `json:"extension_type"`
ExtensionType string `json:"extension_type"`
EntryPoint string `json:"entry_point"`
// deploy
@@ -44,6 +44,13 @@ type apiMetadata struct {
HealthURL string `json:"health_url,omitempty"`
}
// Manifest
// swagger:response Manifest
type swaggerResponseManifest struct {
// in:body
Body apiMetadata `json:"body"`
}
// GetRepoMetadata returns the manifest settings for a repository.
func GetRepoMetadata(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// swagger:operation GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/manifest repository repoGetManifest
@@ -51,6 +58,17 @@ func GetRepoMetadata(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// summary: Get repo manifest settings
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: owner
// in: path
// description: owner of the repo
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: repo
// in: path
// description: name of the repo
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/Manifest"
@@ -71,9 +89,9 @@ func GetRepoMetadata(ctx *context.APIContext) {
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, &apiMetadata{
Name: m.Name,
Org: m.Org,
Description: m.Description,
Name: m.Name,
Org: m.Org,
Description: m.Description,
LicenseSPDX: m.LicenseSPDX,
LicenseName: m.LicenseName,
@@ -89,7 +107,7 @@ func GetRepoMetadata(ctx *context.APIContext) {
TargetVersion: m.TargetVersion,
PHPMinimum: m.PHPMinimum,
Language: m.Language,
ExtensionType: m.ExtensionType,
ExtensionType: m.ExtensionType,
EntryPoint: m.EntryPoint,
DeployHost: m.DeployHost,
DeployPort: m.DeployPort,
@@ -111,9 +129,21 @@ func UpdateRepoMetadata(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// - application/json
// produces:
// - application/json
// parameters:
// - name: owner
// in: path
// description: owner of the repo
// type: string
// required: true
// - name: repo
// in: path
// description: name of the repo
// type: string
// required: true
// responses:
// "200":
// "$ref": "#/responses/Manifest"
// Decode into a map to detect which fields were actually sent.
var raw map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(ctx.Req.Body).Decode(&raw); err != nil {
@@ -173,9 +203,9 @@ func UpdateRepoMetadata(ctx *context.APIContext) {
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, &apiMetadata{
Name: m.Name,
Org: m.Org,
Description: m.Description,
Name: m.Name,
Org: m.Org,
Description: m.Description,
LicenseSPDX: m.LicenseSPDX,
LicenseName: m.LicenseName,
@@ -191,7 +221,7 @@ func UpdateRepoMetadata(ctx *context.APIContext) {
TargetVersion: m.TargetVersion,
PHPMinimum: m.PHPMinimum,
Language: m.Language,
ExtensionType: m.ExtensionType,
ExtensionType: m.ExtensionType,
EntryPoint: m.EntryPoint,
DeployHost: m.DeployHost,
DeployPort: m.DeployPort,
+6
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ type apiSecurityConfig struct {
BlockOnPush bool `json:"block_on_push"`
SecretScanner bool `json:"secret_scanner"`
DependScanner bool `json:"depend_scanner"`
CodeScanner bool `json:"code_scanner"`
}
// ListSecurityAlerts returns all security alerts for a repo.
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ func UpdateSecurityConfig(ctx *context.APIContext) {
BlockOnPush *bool `json:"block_on_push"`
SecretScanner *bool `json:"secret_scanner"`
DependScanner *bool `json:"depend_scanner"`
CodeScanner *bool `json:"code_scanner"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(ctx.Req.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
@@ -177,6 +179,9 @@ func UpdateSecurityConfig(ctx *context.APIContext) {
if req.DependScanner != nil {
cfg.DependScanner = *req.DependScanner
}
if req.CodeScanner != nil {
cfg.CodeScanner = *req.CodeScanner
}
if err := security_model.SaveScannerConfig(ctx, cfg); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
@@ -210,5 +215,6 @@ func toAPISecurityConfig(cfg *security_model.SecurityScannerConfig) *apiSecurity
BlockOnPush: cfg.BlockOnPush,
SecretScanner: cfg.SecretScanner,
DependScanner: cfg.DependScanner,
CodeScanner: cfg.CodeScanner,
}
}
+38
View File
@@ -159,6 +159,44 @@ type swaggerParameterBodies struct {
// in:body
UpdateBranchProtectionPriories api.UpdateBranchProtectionPriories
// in:body
CreateOrgBranchProtectionOption api.CreateOrgBranchProtectionOption
// in:body
EditOrgBranchProtectionOption api.EditOrgBranchProtectionOption
// in:body
CreateOrgTagProtectionOption api.CreateOrgTagProtectionOption
// in:body
EditOrgTagProtectionOption api.EditOrgTagProtectionOption
// in:body
EditOrgPushPolicyOption api.EditOrgPushPolicyOption
// in:body
EditOrgRepoDefaultsOption api.EditOrgRepoDefaultsOption
// in:body
EditOrgEmailDomainPolicyOption api.EditOrgEmailDomainPolicyOption
// in:body
EditAccessTokenOption api.EditAccessTokenOption
// in:body
IssueBulkAssigneesOption api.IssueBulkAssigneesOption
// in:body
IssueBulkLabelsOption api.IssueBulkLabelsOption
// in:body
IssueBulkMilestoneOption api.IssueBulkMilestoneOption
// in:body
IssueBulkStateOption api.IssueBulkStateOption
// in:body
IssuePriorityDef api.IssuePriorityDef
// in:body
IssueStatusDef api.IssueStatusDef
// in:body
IssueTypeDef api.IssueTypeDef
// in:body
CreateOAuth2ApplicationOptions api.CreateOAuth2ApplicationOptions
+49
View File
@@ -41,3 +41,52 @@ type swaggerResponseOrganizationPermissions struct {
// in:body
Body api.OrganizationPermissions `json:"body"`
}
// OrgBranchProtection
// swagger:response OrgBranchProtection
type swaggerResponseOrgBranchProtection struct {
// in:body
Body api.OrgBranchProtection `json:"body"`
}
// OrgBranchProtectionList
// swagger:response OrgBranchProtectionList
type swaggerResponseOrgBranchProtectionList struct {
// in:body
Body []*api.OrgBranchProtection `json:"body"`
}
// OrgTagProtection
// swagger:response OrgTagProtection
type swaggerResponseOrgTagProtection struct {
// in:body
Body api.OrgTagProtection `json:"body"`
}
// OrgTagProtectionList
// swagger:response OrgTagProtectionList
type swaggerResponseOrgTagProtectionList struct {
// in:body
Body []*api.OrgTagProtection `json:"body"`
}
// OrgPushPolicy
// swagger:response OrgPushPolicy
type swaggerResponseOrgPushPolicy struct {
// in:body
Body api.OrgPushPolicy `json:"body"`
}
// OrgRepoDefaults
// swagger:response OrgRepoDefaults
type swaggerResponseOrgRepoDefaults struct {
// in:body
Body api.OrgRepoDefaults `json:"body"`
}
// OrgEmailDomainPolicy
// swagger:response OrgEmailDomainPolicy
type swaggerResponseOrgEmailDomainPolicy struct {
// in:body
Body api.OrgEmailDomainPolicy `json:"body"`
}
+2
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ import (
repo_migrations "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/migrations"
mirror_service "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/mirror"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/oauth2_provider"
org_service "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/org"
packages_spec "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/packages/pkgspec"
pull_service "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/pull"
release_service "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/release"
@@ -155,6 +156,7 @@ func InitWebInstalled(ctx context.Context) {
mustInit(pull_service.Init)
mustInit(automerge.Init)
cascade.Init()
org_service.Init()
mustInit(task.Init)
mustInit(repo_migrations.Init)
eventsource.GetManager().Init()
+140 -21
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
asymkey_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/asymkey"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
@@ -41,9 +43,6 @@ type preReceiveContext struct {
canCreatePullRequest bool
checkedCanCreatePullRequest bool
canWriteCode bool
checkedCanWriteCode bool
protectedTags []*git_model.ProtectedTag
gotProtectedTags bool
@@ -51,24 +50,36 @@ type preReceiveContext struct {
opts *private.HookOptions
branchName string
// this context should only contain shared variables, mutable variables like "current branch name" shouldn't be put here
canWriteCodeUnitCached *bool
}
// CanWriteCode returns true if pusher can write code
func (ctx *preReceiveContext) CanWriteCode() bool {
if !ctx.checkedCanWriteCode {
if !ctx.loadPusherAndPermission() {
return false
func (ctx *preReceiveContext) canWriteCodeUnit() bool {
if ctx.canWriteCodeUnitCached == nil {
var canWrite bool
if ctx.loadPusherAndPermission() {
canWrite = ctx.userPerm.CanWrite(unit.TypeCode) || ctx.deployKeyAccessMode >= perm_model.AccessModeWrite
}
ctx.canWriteCode = issues_model.CanMaintainerWriteToBranch(ctx, ctx.userPerm, ctx.branchName, ctx.user) || ctx.deployKeyAccessMode >= perm_model.AccessModeWrite
ctx.checkedCanWriteCode = true
ctx.canWriteCodeUnitCached = &canWrite
}
return ctx.canWriteCode
return *ctx.canWriteCodeUnitCached
}
// AssertCanWriteCode returns true if pusher can write code
func (ctx *preReceiveContext) AssertCanWriteCode() bool {
if !ctx.CanWriteCode() {
// canWriteCodeRef returns true if pusher can write to the code ref (branch/tag/commit)
func (ctx *preReceiveContext) canWriteCodeRef(refFullName git.RefName) bool {
if ctx.canWriteCodeUnit() {
return true
}
// then check whether if the pusher is a maintainer who can write the PR author's head repo branch
if !refFullName.IsBranch() {
return false
}
return issues_model.CanMaintainerWriteToBranch(ctx, ctx.userPerm, refFullName.BranchName(), ctx.user)
}
// assertCanWriteRef returns true if pusher can write to the code ref, otherwise it responds with 403 Forbidden and returns false
func (ctx *preReceiveContext) assertCanWriteRef(refFullName git.RefName) bool {
if !ctx.canWriteCodeRef(refFullName) {
if ctx.Written() {
return false
}
@@ -130,7 +141,7 @@ func HookPreReceive(ctx *gitea_context.PrivateContext) {
case git.DefaultFeatures().SupportProcReceive && refFullName.IsFor():
preReceiveFor(ourCtx, refFullName)
default:
ourCtx.AssertCanWriteCode()
ourCtx.assertCanWriteRef(refFullName)
}
if ctx.Written() {
return
@@ -142,9 +153,8 @@ func HookPreReceive(ctx *gitea_context.PrivateContext) {
func preReceiveBranch(ctx *preReceiveContext, oldCommitID, newCommitID string, refFullName git.RefName) {
branchName := refFullName.BranchName()
ctx.branchName = branchName
if !ctx.AssertCanWriteCode() {
if !ctx.assertCanWriteRef(refFullName) {
return
}
@@ -152,9 +162,15 @@ func preReceiveBranch(ctx *preReceiveContext, oldCommitID, newCommitID string, r
gitRepo := ctx.Repo.GitRepo
objectFormat := ctx.Repo.GetObjectFormat()
if ctx.checkOrgPushPolicyBranch(oldCommitID, newCommitID, branchName) {
return
}
if newCommitID != objectFormat.EmptyObjectID().String() {
newCommit, err := gitRepo.GetCommit(newCommitID)
if err == nil {
if err != nil {
log.Error("Secret scan: failed to get commit %s in %-v: %v", newCommitID[:12], repo, err)
} else {
if findings := security_service.ScanPushForSecrets(ctx, repo.ID, newCommit); len(findings) > 0 {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Push rejected: %d secret(s) detected in commit %s", len(findings), newCommitID[:12])
for _, f := range findings {
@@ -439,12 +455,16 @@ func preReceiveBranch(ctx *preReceiveContext, oldCommitID, newCommitID string, r
}
func preReceiveTag(ctx *preReceiveContext, refFullName git.RefName) {
if !ctx.AssertCanWriteCode() {
if !ctx.assertCanWriteRef(refFullName) {
return
}
tagName := refFullName.TagName()
if ctx.checkOrgPushPolicyTag(tagName) {
return
}
if !ctx.gotProtectedTags {
var err error
ctx.protectedTags, err = git_model.GetProtectedTags(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID)
@@ -458,7 +478,7 @@ func preReceiveTag(ctx *preReceiveContext, refFullName git.RefName) {
ctx.gotProtectedTags = true
}
isAllowed, err := git_model.IsUserAllowedToControlTag(ctx, ctx.protectedTags, tagName, ctx.opts.UserID)
isAllowed, err := git_model.IsUserAllowedToControlTagInRepo(ctx, ctx.protectedTags, ctx.Repo.Repository, tagName, ctx.opts.UserID)
if err != nil {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, private.Response{
Err: err.Error(),
@@ -586,3 +606,102 @@ func (ctx *preReceiveContext) loadPusherAndPermission() bool {
ctx.loadedPusher = true
return true
}
// checkOrgPushPolicyBranch enforces the owning organization's push policy on a
// branch push. It writes a 403 response and returns true when the push is rejected.
// Content checks (blocked paths, max file size) fail open on unexpected errors so a
// policy or parsing bug can never block every push in the organization.
func (ctx *preReceiveContext) checkOrgPushPolicyBranch(oldCommitID, newCommitID, branchName string) bool {
policy, err := git_model.GetOrgPushPolicyForRepo(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository)
if err != nil {
log.Error("GetOrgPushPolicyForRepo for %-v: %v", ctx.Repo.Repository, err)
return false
}
if policy == nil {
return false
}
if !policy.BranchNameAllowed(branchName) {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, private.Response{
UserMsg: fmt.Sprintf("Branch name %q is not allowed by the organization push policy (pattern: %s)", branchName, policy.BranchNamePattern),
})
return true
}
// Deletions have no content to inspect.
if newCommitID == ctx.Repo.GetObjectFormat().EmptyObjectID().String() {
return false
}
if globs := policy.BlockedFileGlobs(); len(globs) > 0 {
if _, err := pull_service.CheckFileProtection(ctx.Repo.GitRepo, branchName, oldCommitID, newCommitID, globs, 10, ctx.env); err != nil {
if pull_service.IsErrFilePathProtected(err) {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, private.Response{
UserMsg: "Push rejected by the organization push policy: a changed file matches a blocked path pattern",
})
return true
}
log.Error("org push policy blocked-path check for %-v: %v", ctx.Repo.Repository, err) // fail open
}
}
if policy.MaxFileSize > 0 {
if path, size := ctx.largestBlobOverLimit(newCommitID, policy.MaxFileSize); path != "" {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, private.Response{
UserMsg: fmt.Sprintf("Push rejected by the organization push policy: %q is %d bytes, over the %d-byte limit", path, size, policy.MaxFileSize),
})
return true
}
}
return false
}
// checkOrgPushPolicyTag enforces the organization tag naming policy. Returns true
// (with a 403 written) when the tag name is rejected.
func (ctx *preReceiveContext) checkOrgPushPolicyTag(tagName string) bool {
policy, err := git_model.GetOrgPushPolicyForRepo(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository)
if err != nil {
log.Error("GetOrgPushPolicyForRepo for %-v: %v", ctx.Repo.Repository, err)
return false
}
if policy == nil || policy.TagNameAllowed(tagName) {
return false
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, private.Response{
UserMsg: fmt.Sprintf("Tag name %q is not allowed by the organization push policy (pattern: %s)", tagName, policy.TagNamePattern),
})
return true
}
// largestBlobOverLimit returns the first file (and its size) in the pushed tip tree
// that exceeds limit bytes, or ("", 0) if none — or on any error (fail open).
func (ctx *preReceiveContext) largestBlobOverLimit(commitID string, limit int64) (string, int64) {
output, _, err := gitrepo.RunCmdString(ctx,
ctx.Repo.Repository,
gitcmd.NewCommand("ls-tree", "-r", "--long").
AddDynamicArguments(commitID).
WithEnv(ctx.env),
)
if err != nil {
log.Error("org push policy ls-tree for %-v: %v", ctx.Repo.Repository, err)
return "", 0
}
for _, line := range strings.Split(output, "\n") {
tab := strings.IndexByte(line, '\t')
if tab < 0 {
continue
}
fields := strings.Fields(line[:tab]) // mode, type, hash, size
if len(fields) < 4 || fields[1] != "blob" {
continue
}
size, perr := strconv.ParseInt(fields[3], 10, 64)
if perr != nil {
continue
}
if size > limit {
return line[tab+1:], size
}
}
return "", 0
}
+70
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package private
import (
"testing"
issues_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/issues"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/perm/access"
repo_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/repo"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/unittest"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/git"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/contexttest"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestPreReceiveCanWriteCodePerBranch ensures the maintainer-edit write grant is evaluated against
// the exact ref being pushed on every call, derived from that ref rather than shared mutable state.
// Otherwise a per-branch grant (an open PR with "allow edits from maintainers") could be batched
// together with a protected branch or a tag to escalate into full repository write.
func TestPreReceiveCanWriteCodePerBranch(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
baseRepo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 10})
headRepo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 11})
require.NoError(t, baseRepo.LoadOwner(t.Context()))
require.NoError(t, headRepo.LoadOwner(t.Context()))
// An open PR from the head repo owner, with maintainer edits allowed: this grants the base
// repo owner write access to exactly this head branch and nothing else.
pr := &issues_model.PullRequest{
Issue: &issues_model.Issue{
RepoID: baseRepo.ID,
PosterID: headRepo.OwnerID,
},
HeadRepoID: headRepo.ID,
BaseRepoID: baseRepo.ID,
HeadBranch: "granted-branch",
BaseBranch: "master",
AllowMaintainerEdit: true,
}
require.NoError(t, issues_model.NewPullRequest(t.Context(), baseRepo, pr.Issue, nil, nil, pr))
// The pusher is the base repo owner (the maintainer) with only read access on the head repo.
maintainer := baseRepo.Owner
headPerm, err := access.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission(t.Context(), headRepo, maintainer)
require.NoError(t, err)
mockCtx, _ := contexttest.MockPrivateContext(t, "/")
ctx := &preReceiveContext{
PrivateContext: mockCtx,
loadedPusher: true,
user: maintainer,
userPerm: headPerm,
}
// The granted branch must be writable...
assert.True(t, ctx.canWriteCodeRef(git.RefNameFromBranch("granted-branch")))
// ...but another branch in the same push must NOT inherit that grant.
assert.False(t, ctx.canWriteCodeRef(git.RefNameFromBranch("master")))
// ...and a tag sharing the granted branch's name must NOT inherit it either: the grant is
// scoped to PR head branches, so a non-branch ref can never match it. (A tag ref already
// yields an empty branch name, so this guards the per-ref evaluation, not the IsBranch check.)
assert.False(t, ctx.canWriteCodeRef(git.RefNameFromTag("granted-branch")))
}
+3 -9
View File
@@ -58,14 +58,14 @@ func TwoFactorPost(ctx *context.Context) {
return
}
// Validate the passcode with the stored TOTP secret.
ok, err := twofa.ValidateTOTP(form.Passcode)
// Validate the passcode and atomically consume it to prevent reuse/replay.
ok, err := twofa.ValidateAndConsumeTOTP(ctx, form.Passcode)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn", err)
return
}
if ok && twofa.LastUsedPasscode != form.Passcode {
if ok {
remember := ctx.Session.Get("twofaRemember").(bool)
u, err := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
@@ -81,12 +81,6 @@ func TwoFactorPost(ctx *context.Context) {
}
}
twofa.LastUsedPasscode = form.Passcode
if err = auth.UpdateTwoFactor(ctx, twofa); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("UserSignIn", err)
return
}
_ = ctx.Session.Set(session.KeyUserHasTwoFactorAuth, true)
handleSignIn(ctx, u, remember)
return
+37 -9
View File
@@ -368,9 +368,21 @@ func handleOAuth2SignIn(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, u *user_m
opts := &user_service.UpdateOptions{}
// Reactivate user if they are deactivated
// HINT: OAUTH-AUTO-SYNC-USER-ACTIVATION: see services/auth/source/oauth2/source_sync.go
// Reactivate user only if they were disabled by the OAuth2 auto sync cron (invalid_grant),
// which clears AccessToken/RefreshToken/ExpiresAt on the ExternalLoginUser row
// An admin-disabled user has no such signature, so we leave IsActive alone
// and let verifyAuthWithOptions route them through the prohibit-login / activate page.
if !u.IsActive {
opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true)
extLogin, hasExt, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("GetExternalLogin", err)
return
}
isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.RefreshToken == ""
if isDisabledByAutoSync {
opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true)
}
}
// Update GroupClaims
@@ -514,17 +526,33 @@ func oAuth2UserLoginCallback(ctx *context.Context, authSource *auth.Source, requ
}
// search in external linked users
externalLoginUser := &user_model.ExternalLoginUser{
ExternalID: gothUser.UserID,
LoginSourceID: authSource.ID,
}
hasUser, err = user_model.GetExternalLogin(request.Context(), externalLoginUser)
externalLoginUser, hasUser, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID)
if err != nil {
return nil, goth.User{}, err
}
if hasUser {
user, err = user_model.GetUserByID(request.Context(), externalLoginUser.UserID)
return user, gothUser, err
user, err = user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, externalLoginUser.UserID)
if err != nil && !user_model.IsErrUserNotExist(err) {
return nil, goth.User{}, err
}
if err == nil && user.IsIndividual() {
return user, gothUser, nil
}
// The external login record is stale: the linked user no longer exists, or it exists but is
// not an individual user (only individual users can sign in, so a link pointing at an
// organization, bot or remote user can never resolve). Remove it so the next sign-in can
// relink the external account to the correct user. Nothing is lost, because the link is
// recreated automatically on the next sign-in.
reason := "linked user does not exist"
if err == nil {
reason = fmt.Sprintf("linked user type is %d", user.Type)
}
log.Warn("Ignoring stale external login link [external-id=%s login-source-id=%d user-id=%d]: %s", externalLoginUser.ExternalID, externalLoginUser.LoginSourceID, externalLoginUser.UserID, reason)
if err := user_model.RemoveExternalLoginByExternalID(ctx, externalLoginUser.LoginSourceID, externalLoginUser.ExternalID); err != nil {
return nil, goth.User{}, err
}
}
// no user found to login
+3 -9
View File
@@ -177,23 +177,17 @@ func ResetPasswdPost(ctx *context.Context) {
regenerateScratchToken = true
} else {
passcode := ctx.FormString("passcode")
ok, err := twofa.ValidateTOTP(passcode)
ok, err := twofa.ValidateAndConsumeTOTP(ctx, passcode)
if err != nil {
ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "ValidateTOTP", err.Error())
ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "ValidateAndConsumeTOTP", err.Error())
return
}
if !ok || twofa.LastUsedPasscode == passcode {
if !ok {
ctx.Data["IsResetForm"] = true
ctx.Data["Err_Passcode"] = true
ctx.RenderWithErrDeprecated(ctx.Tr("auth.twofa_passcode_incorrect"), tplResetPassword, nil)
return
}
twofa.LastUsedPasscode = passcode
if err = auth.UpdateTwoFactor(ctx, twofa); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("ResetPasswdPost: UpdateTwoFactor", err)
return
}
}
}
+3
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ import (
// ShowBranchFeed shows tags and/or releases on the repo as RSS / Atom feed
func ShowBranchFeed(ctx *context.Context, repo *repo.Repository, formatType string) {
if !checkRepoFeedTokenScope(ctx) {
return
}
var commits []*git.Commit
var err error
if ctx.Repo.Commit != nil {
+3
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ import (
// ShowFileFeed shows tags and/or releases on the repo as RSS / Atom feed
func ShowFileFeed(ctx *context.Context, repo *repo.Repository, formatType string) {
if !checkRepoFeedTokenScope(ctx) {
return
}
fileName := ctx.Repo.TreePath
if len(fileName) == 0 {
return
+3
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ import (
// shows tags and/or releases on the repo as RSS / Atom feed
func ShowReleaseFeed(ctx *context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, isReleasesOnly bool, formatType string) {
if !checkRepoFeedTokenScope(ctx) {
return
}
releases, err := db.Find[repo_model.Release](ctx, repo_model.FindReleasesOptions{
IncludeTags: !isReleasesOnly,
RepoID: ctx.Repo.Repository.ID,
+9
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,18 @@
package feed
import (
auth_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/auth"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/context"
)
// checkRepoFeedTokenScope ensures an API token has repository read scope before a
// feed serves private repository content, mirroring checkDownloadTokenScope for
// downloads. Returns false (and writes the response) when the token is denied.
func checkRepoFeedTokenScope(ctx *context.Context) bool {
context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository, auth_model.Read)
return !ctx.Written()
}
// RenderBranchFeed render format for branch or file
func RenderBranchFeed(ctx *context.Context, feedType string) {
if ctx.Repo.TreePath == "" {
+3
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ import (
// ShowRepoFeed shows user activity on the repo as RSS / Atom feed
func ShowRepoFeed(ctx *context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, formatType string) {
if !checkRepoFeedTokenScope(ctx) {
return
}
actions, _, err := feed_service.GetFeeds(ctx, activities_model.GetFeedsOptions{
RequestedRepo: repo,
Actor: ctx.Doer,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ func Teams(ctx *context.Context) {
}
}
ctx.Data["OrgListTeams"] = teams
ctx.Data["Teams"] = teams
ctx.Data["Keyword"] = keyword
pager := context.NewPagination(count, setting.UI.MembersPagingNum, page, 5)
pager.AddParamFromRequest(ctx.Req)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ func MergeUpstream(ctx *context.Context) {
branchName := ctx.FormString("branch")
_, err := repo_service.MergeUpstream(ctx, ctx.Doer, ctx.Repo.Repository, branchName, false)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) {
if errors.Is(err, util.ErrNotExist) || errors.Is(err, util.ErrPermissionDenied) {
ctx.JSONErrorNotFound()
return
} else if pull_service.IsErrMergeConflicts(err) {
+19 -28
View File
@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ func CorsHandler() func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
// httpBase does the common work for git http services,
// including early response, authentication, repository lookup and permission check.
func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler {
reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git")
if ctx.FormString("go-get") == "1" {
context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
return nil
@@ -93,11 +91,11 @@ func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler {
isWiki := false
unitType := unit.TypeCode
if strings.HasSuffix(reponame, ".wiki") {
repoName := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git")
if strings.HasSuffix(repoName, ".wiki") {
isWiki = true
unitType = unit.TypeWiki
reponame = reponame[:len(reponame)-5]
repoName = repoName[:len(repoName)-5]
}
owner := ctx.ContextUser
@@ -107,14 +105,14 @@ func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler {
}
repoExist := true
repo, err := repo_model.GetRepositoryByName(ctx, owner.ID, reponame)
repo, err := repo_model.GetRepositoryByName(ctx, owner.ID, repoName)
if err != nil {
if !repo_model.IsErrRepoNotExist(err) {
ctx.ServerError("GetRepositoryByName", err)
return nil
}
if redirectRepoID, err := repo_model.LookupRedirect(ctx, owner.ID, reponame); err == nil {
if redirectRepoID, err := repo_model.LookupRedirect(ctx, owner.ID, repoName); err == nil {
context.RedirectToRepo(ctx.Base, redirectRepoID)
return nil
}
@@ -127,31 +125,24 @@ func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler {
return nil
}
// Only public pull don't need auth.
// For private repos, also allow anonymous pull if the specific unit
// (code or wiki) has AnonymousAccessMode >= Read.
isPublicPull := repoExist && isPull && !repo.IsPrivate
if repoExist && isPull && repo.IsPrivate {
repoUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unitType)
if repoUnit.AnonymousAccessMode >= perm.AccessModeRead {
isPublicPull = true
// Only public pulls don't need auth: repo must exist, not require-sign-in
canAnonymousPull := false
if isPull && repoExist && !setting.Service.RequireSignInViewStrict {
if owner.Visibility == structs.VisibleTypePublic && !repo.IsPrivate {
canAnonymousPull = true
}
}
askAuth := !isPublicPull || setting.Service.RequireSignInViewStrict
// don't allow anonymous pulls if organization is not public
if isPublicPull {
if err := repo.LoadOwner(ctx); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("LoadOwner", err)
return nil
if !canAnonymousPull && ctx.Doer == nil {
anonPerm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repo, nil)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("GetDoerRepoPermission", err)
return nil
}
canAnonymousPull = anonPerm.CanAccess(accessMode, unitType)
}
askAuth = askAuth || (repo.Owner.Visibility != structs.VisibleTypePublic)
}
// check access
if askAuth {
// rely on the results of Contexter
if !canAnonymousPull { // not public pull, then either the pull needs auth, or the push needs "write" permission, so ask auth
if !ctx.IsSigned {
// TODO: support digit auth - which would be Authorization header with digit
if setting.OAuth2.Enabled {
@@ -237,7 +228,7 @@ func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler {
return nil
}
repo, err = repo_service.PushCreateRepo(ctx, ctx.Doer, owner, reponame)
repo, err = repo_service.PushCreateRepo(ctx, ctx.Doer, owner, repoName)
if err != nil {
log.Error("pushCreateRepo: %v", err)
ctx.Status(http.StatusNotFound)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func NewComment(ctx *context.Context) {
} // end if: handle close or reopen
// Handle custom status from the status dropdown (replaces close button for issues with org statuses).
if statusIDStr := ctx.Req.FormValue("status_id"); statusIDStr != "" && statusIDStr != "" {
if statusIDStr := ctx.Req.FormValue("status_id"); statusIDStr != "" {
if statusIDStr == "reopen" {
// Reopen via dropdown
if issue.IsClosed {
@@ -34,6 +34,64 @@ const (
tplProtectedBranch templates.TplName = "repo/settings/protected_branch"
)
// orgBranchProtectionView is a read-only presentation of an org-level branch
// protection rule for the repo settings page, with team IDs resolved to names.
type orgBranchProtectionView struct {
Rule *git_model.OrgProtectedBranch
PushTeams string
ForcePushTeams string
DeleteTeams string
MergeTeams string
ApprovalTeams string
StatusContexts string
}
// prepareOrgProtectedBranches loads the owning organization's branch protection
// rules and exposes them (with team IDs resolved to names) as read-only view models
// under the "OrgProtectedBranches" template key.
func prepareOrgProtectedBranches(ctx *context.Context) error {
orgRules, err := git_model.FindOrgProtectedBranchRules(ctx, ctx.Repo.Owner.ID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(orgRules) == 0 {
return nil
}
teams, err := organization.FindOrgTeams(ctx, ctx.Repo.Owner.ID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
teamNames := make(map[int64]string, len(teams))
for _, t := range teams {
teamNames[t.ID] = t.Name
}
join := func(ids []int64) string {
names := make([]string, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
if n, ok := teamNames[id]; ok {
names = append(names, n)
}
}
return strings.Join(names, ", ")
}
views := make([]*orgBranchProtectionView, len(orgRules))
for i, r := range orgRules {
views[i] = &orgBranchProtectionView{
Rule: r,
PushTeams: join(r.WhitelistTeamIDs),
ForcePushTeams: join(r.ForcePushAllowlistTeamIDs),
DeleteTeams: join(r.DeleteAllowlistTeamIDs),
MergeTeams: join(r.MergeWhitelistTeamIDs),
ApprovalTeams: join(r.ApprovalsWhitelistTeamIDs),
StatusContexts: strings.Join(r.StatusCheckContexts, ", "),
}
}
ctx.Data["OrgProtectedBranches"] = views
return nil
}
// ProtectedBranchRules render the page to protect the repository
func ProtectedBranchRules(ctx *context.Context) {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("repo.settings.branches")
@@ -46,6 +104,16 @@ func ProtectedBranchRules(ctx *context.Context) {
}
ctx.Data["ProtectedBranches"] = rules
// Surface the organization-level rules that also apply to this repo (read-only),
// so admins can see the org "floor" that is layered on top of the repo's own
// rules at enforcement time. See issue #727.
if ctx.Repo.Owner.IsOrganization() {
if err := prepareOrgProtectedBranches(ctx); err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("prepareOrgProtectedBranches", err)
return
}
}
repo.PrepareBranchList(ctx)
if ctx.Written() {
return
+37
View File
@@ -138,6 +138,13 @@ func DeleteProtectedTagPost(ctx *context.Context) {
ctx.Redirect(ctx.Repo.Repository.Link() + "/settings/tags")
}
// orgProtectedTagView is a read-only presentation of an org-level tag rule for the
// repo settings page, with allowlist team IDs resolved to names.
type orgProtectedTagView struct {
Rule *git_model.OrgProtectedTag
Teams string
}
func setTagsContext(ctx *context.Context) error {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("repo.settings.tags")
ctx.Data["PageIsSettingsTags"] = true
@@ -163,6 +170,36 @@ func setTagsContext(ctx *context.Context) error {
return err
}
ctx.Data["Teams"] = teams
// Surface the organization's tag protection rules read-only, so admins can see
// the org "floor" layered on top of this repo's own protected tags (#727).
orgRules, err := git_model.FindOrgProtectedTags(ctx, ctx.Repo.Owner.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("FindOrgProtectedTags", err)
return err
}
if len(orgRules) > 0 {
allTeams, err := organization.FindOrgTeams(ctx, ctx.Repo.Owner.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("FindOrgTeams", err)
return err
}
teamNames := make(map[int64]string, len(allTeams))
for _, t := range allTeams {
teamNames[t.ID] = t.Name
}
views := make([]*orgProtectedTagView, len(orgRules))
for i, r := range orgRules {
names := make([]string, 0, len(r.AllowlistTeamIDs))
for _, id := range r.AllowlistTeamIDs {
if n, ok := teamNames[id]; ok {
names = append(names, n)
}
}
views[i] = &orgProtectedTagView{Rule: r, Teams: strings.Join(names, ", ")}
}
ctx.Data["OrgProtectedTags"] = views
}
}
return nil
+27 -12
View File
@@ -448,6 +448,24 @@ func notifyPackage(ctx context.Context, sender *user_model.User, pd *packages_mo
}
func ifNeedApproval(ctx context.Context, run *actions_model.ActionRun, repo *repo_model.Repository, user *user_model.User) (bool, error) {
canWrite := func(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, user *user_model.User) (bool, error) {
perm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repo, user)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return perm.CanWrite(unit_model.TypeActions), nil
}
return ifNeedApprovalWith(ctx, run, repo, user, canWrite, issues_model.HasMergedPullRequestInRepo)
}
func ifNeedApprovalWith(
ctx context.Context,
run *actions_model.ActionRun,
repo *repo_model.Repository,
user *user_model.User,
canWriteActions func(context.Context, *repo_model.Repository, *user_model.User) (bool, error),
hasMergedPR func(context.Context, int64, int64) (bool, error),
) (bool, error) {
// 1. don't need approval if it's not a fork PR
// 2. don't need approval if the event is `pull_request_target` since the workflow will run in the context of base branch
// see https://docs.github.com/en/actions/managing-workflow-runs/approving-workflow-runs-from-public-forks#about-workflow-runs-from-public-forks
@@ -462,27 +480,24 @@ func ifNeedApproval(ctx context.Context, run *actions_model.ActionRun, repo *rep
}
// don't need approval if the user can write
if perm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repo, user); err != nil {
if ok, err := canWriteActions(ctx, repo, user); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("GetDoerRepoPermission: %w", err)
} else if perm.CanWrite(unit_model.TypeActions) {
} else if ok {
log.Trace("do not need approval because user %d can write", user.ID)
return false, nil
}
// don't need approval if the user has been approved before
if count, err := db.Count[actions_model.ActionRun](ctx, actions_model.FindRunOptions{
RepoID: repo.ID,
TriggerUserID: user.ID,
Approved: true,
}); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("CountRuns: %w", err)
} else if count > 0 {
log.Trace("do not need approval because user %d has been approved before", user.ID)
// trust the user only after a merged PR — matching GitHub Actions. Approving one
// fork PR's run must not implicitly trust later fork PRs that replace the workflow.
if merged, err := hasMergedPR(ctx, repo.ID, user.ID); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("HasMergedPullRequestInRepo: %w", err)
} else if merged {
log.Trace("do not need approval because user %d has a merged pull request in repo %d", user.ID, repo.ID)
return false, nil
}
// otherwise, need approval
log.Trace("need approval because it's the first time user %d triggered actions", user.ID)
log.Trace("need approval because user %d has no merged pull request in repo %d", user.ID, repo.ID)
return true, nil
}
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// Copyright 2026 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package actions
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
actions_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/actions"
repo_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/repo"
user_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/user"
actions_module "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/actions"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestIfNeedApproval(t *testing.T) {
alwaysWrite := func(_ context.Context, _ *repo_model.Repository, _ *user_model.User) (bool, error) {
return true, nil
}
neverWrite := func(_ context.Context, _ *repo_model.Repository, _ *user_model.User) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
hasMerged := func(_ context.Context, _, _ int64) (bool, error) { return true, nil }
noMerged := func(_ context.Context, _, _ int64) (bool, error) { return false, nil }
errPerm := errors.New("perm error")
errMerge := errors.New("merge error")
forkRun := &actions_model.ActionRun{IsForkPullRequest: true, TriggerEvent: actions_module.GithubEventPullRequest}
nonForkRun := &actions_model.ActionRun{IsForkPullRequest: false, TriggerEvent: actions_module.GithubEventPullRequest}
prTargetRun := &actions_model.ActionRun{IsForkPullRequest: true, TriggerEvent: actions_module.GithubEventPullRequestTarget}
repo := &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1}
normalUser := &user_model.User{ID: 10}
restrictedUser := &user_model.User{ID: 11, IsRestricted: true}
t.Run("not a fork PR never needs approval", func(t *testing.T) {
need, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), nonForkRun, repo, normalUser, alwaysWrite, hasMerged)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, need)
})
t.Run("pull_request_target never needs approval even when fork", func(t *testing.T) {
need, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), prTargetRun, repo, normalUser, alwaysWrite, hasMerged)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, need)
})
t.Run("restricted user always needs approval", func(t *testing.T) {
need, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), forkRun, repo, restrictedUser, alwaysWrite, hasMerged)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, need)
})
t.Run("fork PR with write permission does not need approval", func(t *testing.T) {
need, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), forkRun, repo, normalUser, alwaysWrite, noMerged)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, need)
})
t.Run("fork PR with merged PR but no write permission does not need approval", func(t *testing.T) {
need, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), forkRun, repo, normalUser, neverWrite, hasMerged)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, need)
})
t.Run("fork PR with no write and no merged PR needs approval", func(t *testing.T) {
need, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), forkRun, repo, normalUser, neverWrite, noMerged)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, need)
})
t.Run("canWriteActions error is propagated", func(t *testing.T) {
failWrite := func(_ context.Context, _ *repo_model.Repository, _ *user_model.User) (bool, error) {
return false, errPerm
}
_, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), forkRun, repo, normalUser, failWrite, noMerged)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errPerm)
})
t.Run("hasMergedPR error is propagated", func(t *testing.T) {
failMerge := func(_ context.Context, _, _ int64) (bool, error) { return false, errMerge }
_, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), forkRun, repo, normalUser, neverWrite, failMerge)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errMerge)
})
t.Run("restricted user skips permission check entirely", func(t *testing.T) {
// The perm and merge functions must not be called for a restricted user.
called := false
trackWrite := func(_ context.Context, _ *repo_model.Repository, _ *user_model.User) (bool, error) {
called = true
return true, nil
}
need, err := ifNeedApprovalWith(t.Context(), forkRun, repo, restrictedUser, trackWrite, noMerged)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, need)
assert.False(t, called, "permission check must not run for restricted user")
})
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -176,7 +176,8 @@ func validateTOTP(req *http.Request, u *user_model.User) error {
}
return err
}
if ok, err := twofa.ValidateTOTP(req.Header.Get("X-Gitea-OTP")); err != nil {
// Consume the passcode atomically so a captured OTP cannot be replayed within its validity window.
if ok, err := twofa.ValidateAndConsumeTOTP(req.Context(), req.Header.Get("X-Gitea-OTP")); err != nil {
return err
} else if !ok {
return util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("invalid provided OTP")
+2 -2
View File
@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ func (source *Source) refresh(ctx context.Context, provider goth.Provider, u *us
}
}
// Delete stored tokens, since they are invalid. This
// also provents us from checking this in subsequent runs.
// HINT: OAUTH-AUTO-SYNC-USER-ACTIVATION
// Delete stored tokens, since they are invalid. This also prevents us from checking this in subsequent runs.
u.AccessToken = ""
u.RefreshToken = ""
u.ExpiresAt = time.Time{}
@@ -57,12 +57,7 @@ func TestSource(t *testing.T) {
err := source.refresh(t.Context(), provider, e)
assert.NoError(t, err)
e := &user_model.ExternalLoginUser{
ExternalID: e.ExternalID,
LoginSourceID: e.LoginSourceID,
}
ok, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(t.Context(), e)
e, ok, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(t.Context(), e.LoginSourceID, e.ExternalID)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, "refresh", e.RefreshToken)
@@ -82,12 +77,7 @@ func TestSource(t *testing.T) {
})
assert.NoError(t, err)
e := &user_model.ExternalLoginUser{
ExternalID: e.ExternalID,
LoginSourceID: e.LoginSourceID,
}
ok, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(t.Context(), e)
e, ok, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(t.Context(), e.LoginSourceID, e.ExternalID)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Empty(t, e.RefreshToken)
+16 -13
View File
@@ -24,19 +24,22 @@ func ToNotificationThread(ctx context.Context, n *activities_model.Notification)
}
// since user only get notifications when he has access to use minimal access mode
if n.Repository != nil {
perm, err := access_model.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission(ctx, n.Repository, n.User)
if err != nil {
log.Error("GetIndividualUserRepoPermission failed: %v", err)
return result
}
if perm.HasAnyUnitAccessOrPublicAccess() { // if user has been revoked access to repo, do not show repo info
result.Repository = ToRepo(ctx, n.Repository, perm)
// This permission is not correct and we should not be reporting it
for repository := result.Repository; repository != nil; repository = repository.Parent {
repository.Permissions = nil
}
}
if n.Repository == nil {
return result
}
perm, err := access_model.GetIndividualUserRepoPermission(ctx, n.Repository, n.User)
if err != nil {
log.Error("GetIndividualUserRepoPermission failed: %v", err)
return result
}
// if the user has been revoked access to the repo, do not leak repo or subject info
if !perm.HasAnyUnitAccessOrPublicAccess() {
return result
}
result.Repository = ToRepo(ctx, n.Repository, perm)
// This permission is not correct and we should not be reporting it
for repository := result.Repository; repository != nil; repository = repository.Parent {
repository.Permissions = nil
}
// handle Subject
+30
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,36 @@ func TestToNotificationThreadOmitsRepoWhenAccessRevoked(t *testing.T) {
assert.Nil(t, thread.Repository)
}
func TestToNotificationThreadOmitsSubjectWhenAccessRevoked(t *testing.T) {
assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
ctx := t.Context()
// repo 2 is private; user 4 has no access to it
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 2})
assert.NoError(t, repo.LoadOwner(ctx))
issue := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &issues_model.Issue{ID: 4, RepoID: repo.ID})
user := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 4})
n := &activities_model.Notification{
ID: 12345,
UserID: user.ID,
RepoID: repo.ID,
Status: activities_model.NotificationStatusUnread,
Source: activities_model.NotificationSourceIssue,
IssueID: issue.ID,
UpdatedUnix: timeutil.TimeStampNow(),
Issue: issue,
Repository: repo,
User: user,
}
thread := ToNotificationThread(ctx, n)
// must not leak private issue metadata once access is revoked
assert.Nil(t, thread.Repository)
assert.Nil(t, thread.Subject)
}
func TestToNotificationThread(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
+14
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"context"
"fmt"
"slices"
"time"
issues_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/issues"
org_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/organization"
@@ -26,6 +27,10 @@ type ReviewRequestNotifier struct {
var codeOwnerFiles = []string{"CODEOWNERS", "docs/CODEOWNERS", ".gitea/CODEOWNERS"}
// codeOwnerMatchBudget caps the total wall-clock time spent evaluating all
// CODEOWNERS rules against all changed files for a single PR.
const codeOwnerMatchBudget = 2 * time.Second
func IsCodeOwnerFile(f string) bool {
return slices.Contains(codeOwnerFiles, f)
}
@@ -93,8 +98,17 @@ func PullRequestCodeOwnersReview(ctx context.Context, pr *issues_model.PullReque
uniqUsers := make(map[int64]*user_model.User)
uniqTeams := make(map[string]*org_model.Team)
// Bound the total time spent matching rules×files. The per-rule MatchTimeout
// only caps a single match; without an aggregate budget a crafted CODEOWNERS
// plus a PR touching many files could still exhaust CPU inside this loop.
matchDeadline := time.Now().Add(codeOwnerMatchBudget)
ruleLoop:
for _, rule := range rules {
for _, f := range changedFiles {
if time.Now().After(matchDeadline) {
log.Warn("CODEOWNERS matching for PR %s#%d exceeded its time budget; some rules were not evaluated", pr.BaseRepo.FullName(), pr.ID)
break ruleLoop
}
shouldMatch := !rule.Negative
matched, _ := rule.Rule.MatchString(f) // err only happens when timeouts, any error can be considered as not matched
if matched == shouldMatch {
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
// Copyright 2026 Moko Consulting <hello@mokoconsulting.tech>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
package org
import (
"context"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
repo_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/repo"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/unit"
user_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/user"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/log"
notify_service "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/notify"
repo_service "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/services/repository"
)
// Init registers the org notifier so organization repository defaults are applied to
// repositories as they are created in or transferred into the org. The notifier
// pattern avoids the services/repository -> services/org import cycle.
func Init() {
notify_service.RegisterNotifier(&repoDefaultsNotifier{})
}
type repoDefaultsNotifier struct {
notify_service.NullNotifier
}
func (n *repoDefaultsNotifier) CreateRepository(ctx context.Context, doer, u *user_model.User, repo *repo_model.Repository) {
applyOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, u, repo)
}
func (n *repoDefaultsNotifier) TransferRepository(ctx context.Context, doer *user_model.User, repo *repo_model.Repository, oldOwnerName string) {
applyOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, nil, repo)
}
// applyOrgRepoDefaults applies the owning organization's default repository settings
// to a repo that has just joined the org. Best-effort: errors are logged and never
// propagated, so a defaults bug can never break repository creation or transfer.
func applyOrgRepoDefaults(ctx context.Context, owner *user_model.User, repo *repo_model.Repository) {
if owner == nil {
if err := repo.LoadOwner(ctx); err != nil {
log.Error("org repo defaults: load owner of repo %d: %v", repo.ID, err)
return
}
owner = repo.Owner
}
if owner == nil || !owner.IsOrganization() {
return
}
defaults, err := git_model.GetOrgRepoDefaults(ctx, owner.ID)
if err != nil {
log.Error("org repo defaults: load for org %d: %v", owner.ID, err)
return
}
if defaults == nil {
return
}
if defaults.ForcePrivate && !repo.IsPrivate {
repo.IsPrivate = true
if err := repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(ctx, repo, "is_private"); err != nil {
log.Error("org repo defaults: force private on repo %d: %v", repo.ID, err)
}
}
if defaults.ApplyPRDefaults {
prUnit, err := repo.GetUnit(ctx, unit.TypePullRequests)
if err != nil {
// The repository may not have pull requests enabled; nothing to apply.
return
}
cfg := prUnit.PullRequestsConfig()
cfg.AllowMerge = defaults.AllowMerge
cfg.AllowRebase = defaults.AllowRebase
cfg.AllowRebaseMerge = defaults.AllowRebaseMerge
cfg.AllowSquash = defaults.AllowSquash
cfg.AllowFastForwardOnly = defaults.AllowFastForwardOnly
cfg.DefaultDeleteBranchAfterMerge = defaults.DeleteBranchAfterMerge
if defaults.DefaultMergeStyle != "" {
cfg.DefaultMergeStyle = repo_model.MergeStyle(defaults.DefaultMergeStyle)
}
if err := repo_service.UpdateRepositoryUnits(ctx, repo, []repo_model.RepoUnit{{
RepoID: repo.ID,
Type: unit.TypePullRequests,
Config: cfg,
}}, nil); err != nil {
log.Error("org repo defaults: update PR unit on repo %d: %v", repo.ID, err)
}
}
}
+7
View File
@@ -220,6 +220,13 @@ func AddTeamMember(ctx context.Context, team *organization.Team, user *user_mode
return err
}
// Enforce the organization email domain policy for new members.
if allowed, err := git_model.OrgEmailDomainAllowed(ctx, team.OrgID, user.Email); err != nil {
return err
} else if !allowed {
return git_model.ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed{Email: user.Email, OrgID: team.OrgID}
}
if err := organization.AddOrgUser(ctx, team.OrgID, user.ID); err != nil {
return err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ import (
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/db"
git_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/git"
updateserver_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/updateserver"
repo_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/repo"
updateserver_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/updateserver"
user_model "code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/models/user"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/container"
"code.mokoconsulting.tech/MokoConsulting/MokoGitea/modules/git"
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ func createTag(ctx context.Context, gitRepo *git.Repository, rel *repo_model.Rel
// Trim '--' prefix to prevent command line argument vulnerability.
rel.TagName = strings.TrimPrefix(rel.TagName, "--")
isAllowed, err := git_model.IsUserAllowedToControlTag(ctx, protectedTags, rel.TagName, rel.PublisherID)
isAllowed, err := git_model.IsUserAllowedToControlTagInRepo(ctx, protectedTags, rel.Repo, rel.TagName, rel.PublisherID)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ func DeleteReleaseByID(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, rel *re
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("GetProtectedTags: %w", err)
}
isAllowed, err := git_model.IsUserAllowedToControlTag(ctx, protectedTags, rel.TagName, doer.ID)
isAllowed, err := git_model.IsUserAllowedToControlTagInRepo(ctx, protectedTags, repo, rel.TagName, doer.ID)
if err != nil {
return err
}

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