6 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
jmiller	2f119fbd95	fix(security): code scanner panics at startup on RE2-incompatible regexp ... The "deserialize-yaml-py" rule in services/security/code_scanner.go used a negative lookahead `(?!\s*#)` in regexp.MustCompile. Go's regexp engine is RE2, which has no lookahead/lookbehind, so MustCompile panics during the package init() — crash-looping the entire server at startup. `go build` and `go vet` do not execute init(), and CI never boots the binary, so this shipped to main via #552 undetected; the running instances survived only because they predate that image. Replace the pattern with an RE2-safe equivalent `(?i)yaml\.load\s*\(`, which matches the rule's stated intent (flag yaml.load() without SafeLoader, CWE-502). Add a regression test that forces the package init and asserts every DefaultCodeRules pattern compiled, so a future RE2-incompatible pattern fails in CI here instead of on a live deploy. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT	2026-07-05 15:06:57 -05:00
jmiller	3aac1b456c	feat(org): org-level push policy enforced in the pre-receive hook (#727) ... Adds a single per-org push policy that cascades to every repo of the org and is enforced in the pre-receive hook: - Branch/tag name conventions (glob) — a pushed ref name must match. Fail-closed. - Mandatory secret-scanning block-on-push — org can force secret blocking that a repo cannot disable (overrides the per-repo scanner config in the orchestrator). - Max pushed-file size — rejects a tip tree containing a blob over the limit. - Blocked file-path patterns — rejects pushes changing matching paths (reuses pull_service.CheckFileProtection). The two content checks (blocked paths, max size) FAIL OPEN on any error so a policy/parsing bug can never wedge all pushes; naming is fail-closed. - models/git/org_push_policy.go: OrgPushPolicy model + CRUD + matchers + GetOrgPushPolicyForRepo. Migration 364. - API: GET/PATCH/DELETE /orgs/{org}/push_policy (routers/api/v1/org/push_policy.go, DTOs in modules/structs/org_push_policy.go, wired in api.go). - Enforcement: routers/private/hook_pre_receive.go (branch: naming + blocked paths + max size; tag: naming) and services/security/orchestrator.go (secret mandate). Deferred: a repo-facing read-only view of the org push policy (it is an org-wide config, not per-repo overlay rules; readable via the API for now). Stacked on #729/#728 for migration ordering (this = 364). Swagger annotations omitted (can't regenerate without the toolchain). Note: no Go toolchain available locally, so not compiled/gofmt'd/tested here. Hand-verified: gofmt (tabs, no blank-in-block), escape sequences in the ls-tree parser, imports used, migration contiguous (364), fail-open on content checks. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wsno14cxE49MstXFs9G5KT	2026-07-04 23:20:39 -05:00
jmiller	7c75133ef1	feat: code security scanner with OWASP pattern detection (#552) ... Implements the code analysis scanner module that detects insecure patterns across Go, PHP, Python, JavaScript, and TypeScript: - SQL injection (CWE-89): string concat in queries across 4 languages - XSS (CWE-79): innerHTML, document.write, unescaped output, dangerouslySetInnerHTML - Command injection (CWE-78): exec with variables, shell=True, os.system - Path traversal (CWE-22): unsanitized path joins, file open with user input - Insecure deserialization (CWE-502): unserialize(), yaml.load() - Hardcoded credentials (CWE-798): password assignments in source - Weak cryptography (CWE-327): MD5/SHA-1 usage 22 rules total, language-filtered by file extension. Wired into the existing scanner orchestrator via the CodeScanner config toggle. API updated to expose code_scanner in GET/PATCH security config. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd	2026-06-28 08:15:34 -05:00
jmiller	7b334f94c0	feat: security scanning API endpoints + pre-receive hook blocking (#692) ... Add REST API for security alerts (list, get, update status, trigger scan) and scanner config (get, update). Wire block_on_push into the pre-receive hook so pushes containing detected secrets are rejected with details. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011AAFzotGMf3ayvXhEmStCd	2026-06-28 02:30:04 -05:00
Jonathan Miller	18fc79fa0a	feat(security): add dependency vulnerability scanner (#551) ... Add dependency scanner module that parses manifest files (go.mod, package.json, composer.json, requirements.txt) and checks dependencies against the OSV.dev API for known CVEs. Implements the existing Scanner interface and wires into the orchestrator for push-time scanning.	2026-06-07 10:32:04 -05:00
Jonathan Miller	f7c1904625	feat(security): built-in security scanning platform (#508) ... Add a pluggable security scanning framework with secret detection as the first scanner module. Scans run on push to default branch and on-demand via the Security settings page. Includes: - Scanner interface for pluggable scanner types - Secret scanner with 15 built-in patterns (AWS, GitHub, Stripe, etc.) - SecurityAlert model with fingerprint-based dedup - SecurityScannerConfig per-repo settings - Migration v349 for security tables - Repo settings Security page with alerts table - Scan Now button for on-demand scanning - Alert resolve/dismiss actions - Push-time scanning in post-receive hook	2026-06-06 16:23:08 -05:00